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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the use of sport technology to arrive at a coherent understanding 
of the ethical issues raised by genetic modification (GM) in sport. The approach draws 
upon methods in analytical philosophy, notably in the areas of applied philosophy and 
caSUlstlc reasoning. Beginning with a conceptualisation of technology in sport, the 
thesis develops discussions about the socio,philosophical significance of sport 
technology. From here, the thesis derives a framework of technological effects, which is 
then placed into the context of three case,studies to clarify the moral content of the 
varying technological effects. From these examples, it is argued that ethical conclusions 
about technology in sport must be addressed to the particular case, rather than aspiring 
to a general theory about technology in sport. Genetic modification is argued as a 
particularly interesting case from which to understand the ethical and philosophical 
issues arising from the manner in which performance modification is evaluated in sport. 
It is argued that the use of genetics presents a significant challenge for the future of 
sports ethics and sport policy in relation to preserving sporting values, because it is 
unlike any other method of performance modification. A detailed consideration of the 
various ways in which genetics might be used in sport is then provided as a basis for 
framing the ethical discourse (encompassing genomics, somatic cell, germ,line cell, and 
pre,selection). The case,study is placed into the conceptual framework of technological 
effects, to establish how genetics give rises to ethical concerns. The analysis of genetics 
identifies the three concepts of: sport, harm and, humanness as the limiting parameters of 
the ethical discussions. From these, the concepts of personhood, autonomy, and human 
dignity serve to ground the ethical discussions in a rights,based approach to determining 
ethical conclusions about genetics in sport. It is concluded that sports ethics cannot 
remain secularised in respect of the genetics case and must be premised upon broader, 
bioethical arguments. 
Keywords: sport technology, genetic modification, bioethics, personhood, humanness, philosophy. 
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1. Research Problem 
In the past 25 years, research in philosophy has addressed the ways in which technology 
is augmenting human beings through technology, questioning whether this is for better 
or for worse. The birth of the first 'test~tube baby' in 1978 gave rise to a vast amount of 
re~theorising about medical ethics and discussion about the role of technology in 
society. 1 Concurrently, work within the Journa~ of the PhHosophy of Sport began to address 
the problem of artificial performance enhancement, most notably in 1980 with the 
publication ofW. Miller Brown's 'Ethics, Drugs, and Sport.' 
The present approach is framed by this period and is concerned with understanding the 
ethical implications of performance altering technology in sport. The aim is to derive 
what are the valuable aspects of human sporting performance that can guide the 
formulation of ethical policies about the use of such innovations. The approach is 
distinct from previous research because it suggests that the ethical evaluation of such 
performance modifiers must derive from a broad conceptualisation of technology in 
sport rather than, say, a formulation about what is fair~play in sport. Previously, such 
normative notions as fair~play have governed the approach to understanding ethics in 
sport. In respect of technology, while some links have been made with doping, ethical 
inquiries tend to have departed from considering whether the innovations challenge fair~ 
play, rather than from understanding the relationship between competitive sport and 
performance enhancement. For example, the doping issue in sports ethics has been 
addressed by an ethical investigation that departs from a weak conceptualisation of the 
nature of performance enhancement in sport. Arguably, a top~down ethical 
methodology has been overused in aspirations to arrive at a normative ethical theory of 
sport. 
Consequently, the intention here will be to provide coherent arguments that make 
explicit the philosophical assumptions underpinning legitimate performance 
modifications and to question the ethical status of such innovations. The thesis intends 
to reveal the conceptual links between different kinds of performance modification, in 
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order to clarify why specific kinds are more desirable than others are. In so doing, it will 
develop an understanding about the ethical implications of performance~based sport, 
questioning its value. From here, the thesis will give an ethical evaluation of various 
kinds of performance modifier (herein described as techno~ogy) within elite competition 
in order to conclude the parameters of legitimacy. These arguments will be made in the 
context of a specific case, genetic modification (GM), where conclusions will be made 
about the ethics of modifying an athlete's genotype as a method of performance 
alteration. This issue is isolated for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the current 
controversy surrounding the issue in the last 3 years. Steadily, the international sporting 
community has begun to recognise that genetics could provide the next form of doping 
for athletes and, notably, the World Anti~Doping Agency (WADA) has taken an 
interest. This interest has become manifest recently in the form of an international 
meeting in New York hosted by WADA, titled "Genetic Enhancement and Sporting 
Performance (for notes, see Pound, 2002; WADA, 2002). 
The problem facing anti~oping authorities is thus, how to address this technology and 
to decide its ethical status. It is argued here that, deriving the necessary ethical 
conclusions that will allow the formulation of good policy making in respect of genetic 
technologies, must depart from a conceptual framework about sport technology in 
general. Moreover, the initial approach of WADA to condemn all kinds of application 
is suggested as being unwise because it neglects the positive and valuable aspects of 
genetic research. The issue is controversial because it can be argued that there is a 
pervasive distrust of genetic technologies and an intuitive perception of such 
technologies as being comparable to drug~taking. Arguably, there is a perception that 
sport should be about the human being and not the artificiaHy enhanced human being, 
which is how the genetically modified life is perceived. However, the way in which these 
two categories are defined presents some difficult epistemological problems about sport, 
technologies, and humans, which will be fleshed out throughout the thesis. 
In order to reach a coherent and justifiable decision about the ethical status of genetic 
modification in sport, it is first necessary to understand the way in which the legitimacy 
of technology has been constructed within sport (Section O. Subsequently, it will be 
important to clarify and assert an ethical methodology that will be adopted for 
discussing genetics (Section 2). Next, it is necessary to derive a conceptual framework 
for understanding how to categorise the various methods of performance modifying 
technology in sport (Section 3). This conceptualisation will thus, provide the basis upon 
which to understand and distinguish between different kinds of performance modifier. 
Subsequently, a detailed explanation of GM and its applications to sport will be 
discussed (Section 4.1) to lead finally to an exploration of the ethical issues deriving 
from this technology (Section 4.2). The Conclusions (Section 5) aim to make sense of 
these competing implications in an endeavour to work towards a framework for the 
legitimisation or banning of the various applications of genetics in sport. 
This interest in human~altering technologies in sport departs from Hoberman's Morta[ 
Engines (1992), which has become a landmark in the socio~historical analysis of 
scientised sport. In many respects, the questions asked here derive from those that 
Hoberman sought to answer. Hoberman describes how a broad, social interest in the 
transgressing of human limits and the pathological obsession with measuring and 
quantifying human performances was immersed in an age of calibration, of which sport 
become a part. 
Hoberman's work is important to understand how questions about technology in sports 
ethics have become important. As he describes, "it is the inseparability of sportive 
training from scientific ambition of our civilisation - not the availability of drugs that 
has produced the current crisis of high performance sport" (p.19). From this, 
Hoberman acknowledges that the use of technology in sport cannot be understood 
outside from the broader projects of society. Thus, at least in the context of 
technological progress, the kinds of approach to sport technology and value in sport, 
reflect the broader values of society. The present approach aims to arrive at coherent 
ethical premises about the value of such technology in sport. For this reason, it is 
necessary to avoid de~onstructing sport, technology, and humanness from a social 
approach. Instead, it is to suggest that the crisis Hoberman mentions is a cnS1S m 
ordering sporting va[ues and it is this aspect of technology ~ understanding its value in 
sport - that underpins the present investigation. Nevertheless, sociological discussions 
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about technology in sport can be claimed as predicative of needing to address the 
evaluative questions, as Hoberman suggests. 
The scientisation of sport reveals the rational, philosophical underpinning of 
performance~based sport and it is this basis that Hoberman's work brings into question. 
These sentiments are echoed in Gibson (1993, p.2) who writes that, 
the root of the contemporary emphasis on results lies in the explosion of 
rationality and objectivity that characterises the Enlightenment. The power and 
achievement of the scientific method led to objectivity being seen as one of the 
hallmarks of truth. The criteria of reason and objectivity have been applied in a 
host of inappropriate situations and contexts ever since instrumental values 
dominated contemporary society and the value of things in themselves has become 
an outdated concept. 
The 18th Century embodied individualistic, notions of surpassmg limitations, and 
continual betterment which, as Brohm (1989, p.109) explains, are highly reflective of 
values within modern, elite sport, 
elitist sport is also deeply imbued with the idea of surpassing one's own 
limitations, which is an integral part of the positivist myth of 'progress': the myth 
of the indefinite progression of human performances, possibilities and productive 
capacity. 'Sport is a factor of advancement because its essence is a striving after 
performances and records: the will to surpass oneself, taken to the extreme 
This perspective seems increasingly accurate as sport becomes further technologised. 
Brohm (1989, p.104) identifies that '''modern sport' appeared with the advent of large~ 
scale industry during the period of the rise of English capitalism in the 18th and 19th 
centuries". It was a period in which the role of human beings in relation to labour and 
leisure was being redefined by the mechanisation of production, rendering the 
"champion a producer of performances and records" (ibid, p.105) where "his labour no 
longer belongs to him" (ibid). Moreover, one can conceive of the sportsperson as having 
become increasingly specialised, no longer having a sense of the broader praxis of sport. 
The athlete is trained very specifically for a particular kind of activity, sometimes even 
for a specific role within a specific sport. Far from being a more enriched, valued 
activity, Brohm (1989) argues that "the sportsman lives a narrow, compartmentalised 
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existence" (p.109) where "sportsmen are being turned into cybernetic robots" (bid, 
p.ll0). 
The issues raised in Morta~ Engines, beg the broader question about the ends of human 
existence and the degree to which human beings should be continually striving for 
enhancement. Hoberman presents the reader with a sense of 'sport gone v,Tong' (or, at 
least, going wrong), where the culture of doping is so rife that the role of the human 
being in sport is made nonsensicaL The human being, Hoberman's Morta[ Engine, is, as 
the metaphor and book title suggests, dehumanised, consisting solely of machinic 
qualities and capable of being engineered to provide a functional and entertaining 
performance. However, the rub is that Hoberman's metaphor provides only a partial 
account of this sporting paradox. While it is accepted that sport without humans is not 
particularly interesting, the desire to witness an extraordinary performance is also 
acknowledged - there is an aspiration for athletes to be superhuman. It is this tension 
between humanness and seeking to be super,human that presents the conflict in values 
about sport and, it is suggested, that presents the challenge to negotiate sporting values. 
Consequently, the central problem of this issue is establishing what are the aspects of 
sport that give it value and how technology corresponds to, or conflicts with these ideas. 
It is intended that the conclusions will provide some basis for formulating a more 
rigorous and coherent policy about the ethical suitability of performance modifications 
in sport, by isolating central and important values. 
As Hoberman (1992) explains, the guidelines within sport that distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate methods of performance enhancement are insufficient. 
Hoberman makes this argument with reference to a comparison between hormonal 
substances and fibre,glass poles used by pole,vaulters, asking about their conceptual 
differences that make one acceptable and the other morally repugnant. This example 
captures the primary task of the thesis, which will be to clarify the differences between 
various kinds of performance enhancing technology in a way that goes beyond the 
simple drug,taking and doping categorisation. Perhaps a more recent example that 
Sl'tYCS to reveal the inadequacy of this categorisation is the 'altitude tent.' Such 
technology creates an artificial climate, which allows an athlete to acclimatise to a higher 
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altitude and enhance their performance, while remaining in a low altitude location. 
Understanding how this example of technology in sport fits within the general discourse 
of what is acceptable or not, is the basis for arguing why ethical conclusions about 
performance modifiers in sport must derive from a coherent conceptualisation of 
technology in sport. 
In the philosophy of sport, this subject has been problematised in relationship to 
performance enhancements mostly in the context of drug use. Yet, questions 
surrounding what constitutes legitimate performance extend beyond performance 
enhancement. During the 1980s, drug;use in sport received a great deal of publicity and 
criticism, notably in the case of Ben Johnson at the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. 
Subsequent to winning the 100m Gold medal in an extraordinary performance, 
Johnson's achievement would, overnight, be tarnished by the announcement of a 
positive test result for the anabolic steroid, stanozolo1.2 Yet, before the Johnson 
scandals, the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, Houlihan (1999) explains, revealed that 
international sport was saturated in a culture of drug use (bid). By the time Ben 
Johnson won the 100m sprint in 1988, the use of anabolic steroids was, indeed, clearly 
prevalent. However, athletes were becoming increasingly sophisticated in their use of 
drugs, experimenting with human growth hormone (hGH) and recombinant 
erythropoietin (rEPO), which were (and for the latter, still are) impossible to detect. 
In the context of these varied substances, the philosophy of sport literature has 
continually problemsatised the ethical status of doping and drug taking, by contrasting 
them with an alleged ethical character of sport. Typically, there seems to be the intuitive 
assumption that drug;taking and doping are wrong and that it is cheating in sport to use 
such methods of performance enhancement. From this initial claim, sport philosophy 
has constructed elaborate arguments about what constitutes cheating, relating ideas to 
broader philosophical debates about meaning and value for human beings. Indeed, it is 
important to recognise that the drugs issue remains controversial and a high priority for 
international sport. Most recently, International Olympic Committee (IOC) President, 
Jacques Rogge, has identified doping as the priority for international sport (International 
Herald Tribune, 2001). 
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As well, there continues to be a strong contingent of anti..doping supporters, who 
consider that drug use and other methods of doping are morally questionable and ought 
not be an accepted part of sport. Importantly, such campaigns are integral to the 
interests of many important organisations, such as the European Union, the Council of 
Europe, and the United Nations, whose work in relation to social improvement 
explicitly overlaps with issues about drugs in sport (Houlihan, 1999). Yet, some ethicists 
are not convinced that the arguments against drug use in sport justify the infringement 
of individual liberties imposed by anti~doping rules. Rather, a fundamental 
inconsistency in the logic of sport rests with the position that advocates the total 
removal of drugs and other ergogenic aids from competition, while accepting other 
kinds of performance enhancement, such as new tennis racquets. 
Beyond these ideas about the use of substances and doping methods in sport, there have 
been limited writings about other kinds of performance enhancement. Sporadically, 
articles have included examples of other kinds of performance enhancement as a means 
to identifying that there are inconsistencies in the acceptance of conceptually similar 
ergogenic aids. For example, Gardner (1989) considers the broader concept of 
performance enhancement, utilising examples such as the U~groove golf clubs that were 
designed to increase the spin rate of the golf ball and thus, to allow greater controL 
Similarly, Parry (1987) introduces the examples of how fibre~glass poles in pole vaulting 
and hi~tech bicycles are ethically acceptable technologies in sport, though they are 
conceptually similar to drug use, which is considered unacceptable. Parry also uses such 
examples to conclude that sport is interested in performance enhancement. Thus, to 
ban drugs on the basis of them enhancing performance would seem to be contradictory. 
However, neither of these examples, nor others from Bjerklie (1993), Gelberg (1998), 
Carr (1995), Haper (1985), Hummel and Foster (1986), and Rintala (1995), provide a 
comprehen::;ive conceptualisation of these kinds of performance enhancement and their 
legitimacy. This is surprising given the proliferation of performance enhancing 
technologies that exist in sports. Today, sport i::; undoubtedly a technological endeayour 
- if, indeed, it cycr ha::; not been. The number of example::; of technological innoyation 
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that have made international news, because of the controversy they have raised, is 
extensive. Most recently, the list includes the use of bigger tennis balls within 
professional men's tennis (Miah, 2000c), Speedo's Fast,skin full,body swimming costume 
(Magdalinski, 2000), and the use of genetic technologies to reduce injury time or 
increase endurance capabilities (Miah, 2000b; Miah, 2001a, Munthe, 2000). From these 
few examples, it can be seen how sports embody an ambiguity about how they use 
technology and how they embrace new performance enhancement in some respects, but 
not others. It is not clear whether technology is making for a more exciting valuable 
practice or whether it is removing or lessening aspects of sport that are integral to its 
value and it is precisely this ambiguity that gives rise to the ethical uncertainty. 
At the end of Mortal Engines, Hoberman describes the possibility of genetically 
engineering athletes or breeding them as one might breed racehorses. This, Hoberman 
suggests, would be entirely congruent with the logic of elite sport and would seem to be 
the most efficient means of achieving the super,athletes that elite sports seem to 
demand. This is not the first time such prophecies of super,athletes have arisen within 
academic literature. Perhaps one of the first identifications of modern sports as tending 
towards the technologically absurd is from Johnson (1976), who suggests that technology 
will become increasingly dominant in sports at the expense of the human being. 
Johnson explains a number of fantastical ideas about the future of sport that are 
increasingly conceivable as greater sophistication in the technology available for sports is 
achieved. Johnson (ibid, p.226) describes how, 
drugs will be sold openly at sporting~vent concessions ... hot dog of tomorrow will 
pack the same kick as the marijuana brownie of today ... there will be only one 
discussion in boxing, the heavyweight, all others having vanished because of 
boredom or bankruptcy ... ski boots will have sensors that release the binding if the 
stress on a leg bone approaches the breaking point ... non~ontact sports will be 
played in the nude ... a round of golf will be played on one spot, by means of a 
computer and TV screen; and that ice hockey will be played on T etlon 
Admittedly, it is easy to be critical of any speculations and one ought not attribute any 
academic rigour to such claims. Howeyer, it is extraordinary to recognise that thc::;c 
prophecies were made 25 years ago and are somewhat reflective of present~ay sport. 
Johnson (ibid, pp.227,228) describes how, 
sport will continue to reflect the society in which it occurs .... hockey and football 
will be more violent in the year 2000 because we may be such a sedentary society 
that we need some release for our emotions 
Interestingly, within Johnson's argument he suggests that technological "developments 
are likely to get piled upon one another, which will decrease the role of the human 
being" (p.230). Moreover, it is suggested that "ridiculously super,fit athletes will occur as 
a result of random mating in an increasing population to bring together diversified 
genes, plus better nutrition and the absence of childhood diseases" (p.231). Again, it is 
reasonable to accept that Johnson had some foresight about the tendencies of elite sport. 
Yet, the tension is still present in that these versions of sport are only partially desirable. 
Indeed, these specific depictions do not seem desirable at all, yet they certainly do 
respond to the performance,based model of sport. 
Within the context of this theoretical background, it will be shown how ethical 
arguments about performance modification are underpinned by a rationalisation about 
technology that pervades elite sport. This will be achieved by drawing upon perspectives 
in the philosophy of technology, which respond to the lack of clarity about technology 
in the sport philosophy literature. Subsequently, the ethical analysis will engage with 
ethics in sport and in medicine (biomedical ethics) arguing that neither one of these 
perspectives alone is sufficient to make any useful conclusions about the ethical status of 
genetic modification in sport. 
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2. Theoretical and Methodological Premises 
The methodological approach derives from applied philosophy, which is grounded in 
issues of urgent and practical importance. Thus, it is argued that in the world of sport, 
the ethical concern about performance alteration is one such example of an urgent 
philosophical issue that requires attention in order to inform governmental decisions 
and the judicial system. As well, applied philosophical issues are characterised by the 
need for there to be some difficult decision to be made. Thus, in the context of the 
present inquiry, it is recognised that governing bodies of sport must respond to the 
realities of new technological enhancements that might be used in sport. A policy must 
be produced that asserts some moral conclusion about whether the innovation is 
acceptable or not. 
Applied ethics, which will form the basis of the main discussion and conclusions of this 
thesis, has emerged out of a trend to prioritise specific kinds of ethical issues as having 
substantial social significance. The perspective of applied philosophy adopted here is 
not, however, to be seen as separate from applied ethics. Rather, it is simply that, for 
applied philosophy, the concern is wider than the ethical issues. Because the present 
approach seeks to understand epistemological issues in sport that relate to the main 
ethical inquiry, applied philosophy is a more accurate reflection of the approach. 
To answer questions about the ethical status of technology in sport and the way in 
which governing bodies can derive ethically informed policy about genetics, an 
investigation is required into what constitutes performance enhancement. It is necessary 
to begin with a philosophical inquiry into the meanings and forms of performance 
cnhancement or, more succinctly, to understand what they are. Such an approach fits 
with Kretchmar's (1998, p.20) re~statement of the need for metaphysical inquiry to 
underpin ethical deliberations. As he claims, 
To separate 'is' conditions (e.g. what sport is) from 'ought' recommendations (e.g. 
how athletes ought to act in sport) is to sc\'er ties with important sources of 
10 
information. It is to try to behave ethically in vacuo and thereby to court moral 
confusion. 
Kretchmar's perspective draws upon traditions in analytical philosophy, which, Williams 
(1985) argues, "involves argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to 
achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech" (p.vi). This clarification of concepts 
and the relentless 'peeling back' of meanings and terms is something attributed more to 
essentialist approaches of understanding philosophy. Moreover, such approaches are 
critiqued for not being useful to make clear demarcations between the analysis of 
concepts and the ethical evaluation of them within specific contexts. As such, this 
metaphysical inquiry is sometimes not seen as an important aspect of ethical inquiry. 
Nevertheless, the literature in relation to performance modification in sport would seem 
to lack such clarity of terms. There has been no thorough conceptualisation of the 
various technologies in sport as there was, say, in relation to distinguishing sport from 
other forms of activity, such as play and games. The early work in sport philosophy by 
Suits (1973) and McBride (1979), recently resurrected by Schneider (2001), which 
tackled such issues, has become seminal in the discipline, serving to inform many papers 
about ethics in sport. Such utility, seems to provide some justification for the value of 
metaphysical inquiry into defining performance modification. Consequently, the 
argument will proceed to do so, indicating where it becomes problematic and where it 
could be useful to consider a specific ethical analysis. 
Importantly, the perspective of analytic philosophy does not dismiss oriental or 
continental philosophical approaches to philosophical inquiry. Rather, championing 
the sanctity of reason and rationality, it asks for a justification of their approach, which, 
from their perspectives, is its flaw. The critique of this might require some discussion 
about the place of rationality and reason within philosophy and, indeed, the need for 
justification. It might require, so to speak, justifying why justification is necessary, as has 
been done by philosophers such as Mackie (1977), or to question the sanctity of reason 
in philosophical (and particularly moral) debates. Any such clarification will not be 
attempted here since to doing so would distract far from the interest of this thesis. 
Ne"ertheless, these are important meta~philosophical issues that must be addressed. 
1 1 
This initial philosophical inquiry into technology and sport (Section 3) will serve as a 
basis for the ethical analysis for which it is, again, necessary to rationalise the chosen 
ethical methodology. Thus, to arrive at a useful ethical perspective to this thesis, it is 
necessary to give a brief overview of the ways in which it is possible to approach ethical 
questions. It might not be necessary to provide justifications for the methodology in the 
context of other approaches to ethics. For example, despite their vast differences, it is 
not considered necessary to justify the adoption of a consequentialist ethical approach in 
favour of a de ontological methodology? 
However, in order for the methodology to be defensible and understood, it seems useful 
to make the distinctions and decisions clear. An explanation and rationalisation of the 
ethical approach is also necessary as there are a number of ways in which one can 'do' 
ethics. Thus, some attention must be given to provide a critical approach to ethics and 
give an overview explaining different approaches. Subsequently, the methodology will 
conclude with a rationale for adopting the chosen ethical framework for the thesis. 
It is important to note how this approach differs from, say, a sociological, or an 
historical analysis of the genetics issue in sport. Indeed, it could be worthwhile to track 
the historical antecedents that might provide a better awareness for understanding why 
genetics is such an important issue and why it is seen as largely dystopic in the media. 
However, the present approach is guided by critiquing questions of value and asking for 
their justification. Abstracting from the social or historical context, the questions posed 
are about whether genetic modification has value in sport, when considered alongside 
ideas about what gives sport value.4 
A common criticism of the value of ethical research derives from a perspective of social 
or natural sciences, which might argue that ethical choices are socially constructed. 
Such arguments attack the value of seeking objective ethical choices and thus, see any 
inquiry into establishing right and \\Tong as a fruitless pursuit. From this approach, the 
only truths that can be sought are non-generalisable local truths that are reflective of 
what is right for a gin'l1 culture (Simon, 1991). Such a conclusion is premised upon 
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recognising that there are no absolute philosophical truths, or moral ones and would 
appear to reject the need for philosophical inquiry. As a response, this very statement 
makes an assumption that is itself philosophical, which would seem paradoxical. It does 
not seem possible to refute the value of philosophy with an argument that is, itself, 
philosophical. For an ethical discourse, a similar argument can be made. It is 
acceptable to adopt a relativistic position about the nature of ethical decisions. 
Accepting its truth, however, is to reject only one aspect of ethics - that it is possible to 
derive universal truths about right and wrong. 
Beyond this, the ethicist can inquire into the construction of relativistic morality. 
Again, the ethical relativist or anti~theorist Oamieson, 1993) might argue that notions of 
right and wrong derive from tradition, habit, inherited, and socially evolved norms. In 
so doing, the aim of the ethical relativist is to reject the value of ethical inquiry. This 
response entails the assertion that, if discerning right from wrong is the aspiration, then 
it is necessary to examine the values within a community and observe how they evolve, 
rather than to subject them to some ethical analysis to establish whether they are true. 
The ethical relativist would argue that such empirical findings are the only source of 
conclusion and that no more can be said about morality than that which is discovered 
within the culture. 
Yet, ethical inquiry can ask a further question about first princip~es (defining what is 
'good' or 'right') and to inquire about the possibilities of communities to evolve, morally 
speaking. Accepting that various communities derive their values from inherited 
notions of right and wrong does not preclude these notions from evolving or being 
challenged. As such, it is the manner in which this takes place that directs the ethical 
inquiry. Thus, the evolution of morality must take place in some context, which, from 
the ethicist's perspective, must entail an ethical discourse of some kind. For example, 
the existence of an ideal legal system, derives from a highly complex system of 
establishing what is right, wrong, just and unjust. So, the moral norm of it being 
unacceptable to violate individual human rights departs from a philosophical premise 
ahout the value of rights and human life. This premise is one that finds its roots within 
philosophy and ethics and its evolution depends upon philosophical and ethical 
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discourses that seek to refine ideas about the right and the good, through problematising 
their application within society. 
This suggests that there is, indeed, a case for conducting ethical inquiry, even if one 
rejects the value of meta~ethical inquiry. A further point to make in response to the 
ethical relativist is to stress that the discussion is misconceived if it is presumed that 
these are oppositional epistemological assumptions. However, for the ethical relativist, 
it is important to recognise that ethical discourse has value precisely because it is 
possible to reflect upon values and to seek their justification within a given philosophical 
framework. People do not accept any version of right and wrong and better and worse 
arguments can be provided for adopting a particular kind of practice within social 
practices. 
The final point to contest, and which might appear the last resort of the ethical 
relativist, relates to the relevance of specific kinds of ethical inquiry. One approach 
given by the ethical relativist (although this is not exclusive to them) is to argue that, 
while there might be some grounds for accepting the above arguments, research is at a 
point where ethical inquiry is no longer necessary. Along these lines, the argument is 
made that the values deemed to be of importance have already been derived. As such, 
there is no need for ethical inquiry anymore. For example, scientific research 1S 
premised upon the established principles of medical ethics and that is all that 1S 
necessary for now. Thus, all research governing human subjects is guided by concise and 
unchanging ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, non~maleficience, and justice 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 1994). It would seem that science is relatively content with 
these guiding principles and they inform many ethical codes of conduct in research. 
Yet, such principles are not beyond scrutiny and are, in fact, often found to be 
insufficient to serve as a guide for good practice in medical research. Thus, it is the 
questioning of such principles that is taken for granted by much scientific inquiry that 
reflects the value of ethical analysis in the present study.s 
From these conclusions, a further distinction must be made betv.een the meta~thical 
and normative ethical methods of inquiry. The former (neta~thi(s) asks questions 
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about the nature and methodology of making moral judgements. It studies the meaning 
of such terms as 'good' or 'right', questioning the degree to which it is possible to arrive 
at moral truths through ethical investigation. From such methods, one might begin by 
questioning what constitutes the content of ethical questions and ask upon what basis 
one can suppose that ethical questions are unique or anything more than subjective 
expressions of preferences or intuitive approval. Alternatively, normative ethics is 
traditionally phrased as being an inquiry into deriving principles that delimit 'how one 
ought to live'. 
However, normative ethics can also be separated into two further sections: normative 
theory and applied ethics. The former seeks to derive general moral principles, whereas 
the latter studies moral questions about specific areas and places moral principles into 
an applied context. In contrast to applied ethics, practical ethics places more emphasis 
upon the context, adopting a bottom~up approach where moral principles - if any are 
possible - are derived from the particular case examples. Thus, it does not neglect the 
practical implications of ethical decisions and endeavours to base pragmatic decisions 
within an ethically informed framework. Nevertheless, the imperative is upon utility for 
the particular and special contexts within which the decisions must be made and to 
arrive at workable conclusions that can be implemented. It is, perhaps, accurate to say 
that practical ethics, on this view at least, is concerned more with what works rather 
than what should be the case. However, its tacit rejection of moral principles does not 
prevent practical ethics from utilising such principles to guide and develop ethical 
conclusions. Consequently, it can be a useful tool with which to address specific ethical 
dilemmas. 
Through the specific use of casuistry, an applied ethical approach will be utilised in the 
current thesis. The use of casuistry - quite literally the study of cases - departs from the 
claim that moral conclusions must derive from individual cases. For example, til 
relation to the principles guiding medical ethics, casuistry would find weakness til 
deriving such moral rules from some abstract moral standpoint. Rather, ca~ui~try 
examines the specific context of medical practices where ethical conflict~ arise, to derin> 
tentative guidelines from such contexts. 
1') 
One criticism of casuistry is that the approach departs from mid~level principles. Thus, 
it argues that, if X is valued, then Y ought to be valued (Rachels, 1998). However, it 
does not interrogate whether X should be valued in the first place. Indeed, such a view 
suggests that the inquiry departs from a basis that leads simply to 'question begging', as 
to what kinds of values should be held at all. Yet, pursuing first principles would 
abstract considerably from the context under discussion here. Therefore, a balance is 
sought between deriving ethical norms from the applied context, and placing these 
against currently held values so as to bring into question such guiding norms. By 
engaging with relevant normative principles, it is intended that the basis for such 
criticism will be weakened. 
Importantly, with casuistry, there 1S no expectation that the conclusions can be 
generalised. Rather, their specific conclusions provide a more coherent basis from 
which further inquiry can take place. Yet, there is no assumption that this must lead to 
a workable set of principles that can be utilised in all situations. Consequently, the 
approach is one that recognises ethical inquiry to be an ongoing process and certainly 
not something that can precede action with a view to deriving rules that make 
redundant the need for further ethical inquiry. 
The appropriateness of casuistry for the present ethical inquiry is reflected in the 
disciplines that inform the discussion, namely: philosophy of sport, philosophy of 
technology, and the philosophy of medicine (also termed as bioethics). These areas of 
philosophy have their roots in modern trends and are relatively new fields of study -
though, not surprisingly, the issues they consider are imbued with philosophical ideas of 
some centuries. Moreover, it can be argued that each of them has an interest primarily 
in doing applied or practical ethics. For each of the disciplines, their academic study has 
evolved out of practices where ethical issues have arisen and raised the need for 
deliberation. As well, each has gone through a similar process of epistemological 
definition. 
16 
One of the main ethical considerations within sport has been to seek answers about 
what kinds of performance enhancement are ethically justifiable and what constitutes 
good sporting practice. Such questions have been placed into specific applied contexts 
rather than limited to abstract conceptual investigations. Thus, ethical inquiries have 
been recognised by sport philosophers as best understood when placed into concrete 
examples, such as the moral status of animals by considering hunting (Wade, 1990; 
1996), or the morality of harm and individual liberty by considering the status 0 f boxing 
(Davis, 1993/4). Such discussions have revealed that a theoretical approach to 
understanding ethics is not sufficient to provide ethical conclusions, so they must be 
used to accompany more applied debates. 
In this capacity, sports ethics is not dissimilar from bioethical inquiries, which also 
adopt an applied approach to doing ethics - particularly within the last decade. Indeed, 
Rachels (1998) provides some recognition about the approach, strengths, and 
weaknesses of bioethics, which can be conceived as being comparable to sports ethics. 
Through an inquiry into the place of ethical theory within bioethics, Rachels argues that 
the straightforward appUcation modd, whereby one applies ethical theory to the context, is 
rejected within bioethics. Thus, applying the theory of utilitarianism to a moral 
situation in bioethics (and, by suggestion here, sport) is not sufficient to provide answers 
about what moral conclusion must be reached. For example, one significant issue in 
bioethics most recently has been the cloning of human stell-cells - the cells that provide 
the building blocks for life. From a utilitarian perspective, one might simply endeavour 
to evaluate the harms and the benefits to derive a moral conclusion. From one 
perspective, such techniques could (and it is important to recognise the probability of 
success in making the evaluation) allow infertile couples to conceive a child, which 
would seem desirable. However, it might also be argued that the process of natural 
selection dictates that some members of a species must be unable to procreate to ensure 
the survivability of the species, which could be a negative consequence of cloning. 
l J tilitarianism would have to find someway of ascribing a quantitative value to these 
differing effects, with a view to concluding which is preferable (that which maximises the 
greatest good). However, Rachels \vould argue that the situations, about which the 
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ethical conclusion should be applied, are far too complex for such a straightforward 
utilitarian approach. The degree of detail and complexity of the case of stem--cell cloning 
cannot possibly be reduced to a quantitative analysis of harms and benefits to allow 
concluding what is the right decision regarding its legality. The theoretical premises 
underlying this thesis, in respect of technology, adopt a similar perspective. It is 
necessary for the normative rules to emerge from the detailed consideration of cases in 
sport, which reveal the ethical conflicts and varying values.6 
A case study approach to ethics provides a method by which ethicists can begin with 
mid~level principles to determine ethical conclusions. Again, this is recognised as 
problematic since, to reinforce the foundationalist argument, one can reasonably expect 
these mid~level principles to have derived from some higher level principle. Thus, 
Rachels considers that "the mid~level principles alone cannot provide definitive answers 
to the question of what we should do" (p.18). Instead, such an approach reveals what 
one should do if one values X or Y. Nevertheless, casuistry, Rachels suggests, can help to 
identify intuitive principles that influence moral evaluations. Still, however, there is 
doubt about the value of ethical theory, as it does not provide a basis for choosing 
between competing theories. 
Again, the approach taken here reflects Rachels' thesis, which is to recogn1se that 
beginning with mid~level principles does not prevent one from approaching a more 
accurate reflection of values. It is not necessary that one approaches understanding right 
and wrong from mid~level principles alone, but instead subject these principles to critical 
reflection in an endeavour to approach a more representative theory. Thus, Rachels 
concludes that there are grounds for dialogue between vastly different cultures that can 
enable the recognition of shared values. The example used by Rachels is slavery, where 
he poses the question of whether there is any argument against slavery that must be 
acknowledged by every reasonable person, regardless of tradition. Rachels' aim here 1S 
to demonstrate that, even if a community considers that a specific value 1S 
understandable (and acceptable) only within its culture, that it is possible that this value 
can be subjected to questioning that can reveal its unacceptability as a moral criterion. 
From this C'xample, Rachels (ibid, p.2l) writes, 
l~ 
all forms of slavery involve treating some people differently from rest, depri\'ing 
them of liberty and subjecting them to a host of evils. But is it unjust to set some 
people apart for different treatment unless there is something about them that 
justifies setting them apart ~ unless, that is, there is a rdevant difference between 
them and others. But there are no such differences between humans that could 
justify setting some of them apart as slaves; therefore slavery is unjust. 
Thus, Rachels considers it possible to identify the assumptions within philosophical and 
ethical positions and deliberate their acceptability. In this, Rachels identifies that 
Aristotle considered slavery defensible since he considered that slaves possess an inferior 
degree of rationality. However, Rachels notes, such an assumption is demonstrably 
false. 
The study of bioethical issues demonstrates similar methodological assumptions, most 
evident in the applied ethical discussions of such issues as, for example, euthanasia, 
abortion, or cloning. The way in which these issues are now approached demands more 
detail about the contexts under discussion. They do not rely on the clarification of 
abstract principles to make conclusions. Instead, they seek to derive normative 
guidelines based upon currently held values. As such, bioethics has encountered a 
significant change from the earlier works that have investigated the abstract 
philosophical questions of, for example, the moral status of human embryos (Warnock, 
1987), or the ethical concerns about making an individual's genetic heritage public 
knowledge (Knoppers, 1999). 
This has led to bioethicists being concerned, increasingly, with contextual issues that are 
highly specific and which do not seek generalisation. While its roots are within 
principle~based ethical approaches that guide medical practices (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 1994), this has evolved into a more casuistic methodology. This is not to say 
that bioethics does not 'hang together' as an ethical discourse, as is often the criticism of 
casuistry. Rather, these applied ethical debates inform the abstract ideas as well. 
Additionally, the abstractions are grounded in the use of examples and do not pretend 
that it is pm,sible to separate the concepts from the contexts. 
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The ethical approaches taken in sports ethics and bioethics are useful companions in 
this regard as sports ethics has also proceeded through a process of theoretical definition 
in its ethical approach. Sports ethics literature recognises the value of an applied 
normative ethical approach, beginning with such notions as 'fair play' and proceeding to 
give their abstract conception some content and practical value. As well, the range of 
cases in sport - even within the doping issue alone - have given rise to ethical arguments 
being directed to specific substances (for example, Verokken, 2001). 
Finally, it is distinct about applied ethics that there is an interest in arnvmg at 
conclusions that can inform the formulation of policy in the given area. Indeed, applied 
ethics is considered by some as inextricable from professional ethics and the forming of 
codes of conduct. Similarly, the present investigation will endeavour to provide an 
ethical foundation for the development of policy about genetic technologies in sport 
that has immediate utility for international sporting authorities. 
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3. Conceptualising Methods of Performance 
Modification 
With the methodological approach in mind, it must now be questioned how it is 
possible to make sense of new innovations in sport. How does one begin even to 
conceptualise and make categorisations of different innovation? One might be tempted 
to adopt an essentialist approach, whereby one could employ something like 
Wittgenstein's (1953) family resemblance theory or even Suits (1973) and McBride's 
(1973) approach to clarifying the nature of sport and games. Indeed, Steenbergen and 
Tamboer (1998) deem such an approach as essential to allow for good ethical 
investigations. However, the present interest is less to define sports than to understand 
how performance modification is used within them. Thus, any such conceptualisation, 
at least initially, is best utilised to understand the relationship of sport and technology 
rather than of sport in isolation. As well, a solely definitional approach does not allow 
an understanding of the intended meanings of a technology within specific contexts. Such 
an approach appeals to absolutism and the possibility of objective truths in the 
explanation of meanings, which in this context, is not considered to be of value or a 
fruitful investigation. 
It is surprising that a conceptualisation of technology in sport has not really taken place 
within the sport philosophy literature or, indeed, anywhere, since technological change 
has been present within sport in various forms since its very inception. Its presence has 
been brought into very discrete and controversial topics, such as the use of new fibre~ 
glass poles or new golf clubs. However, the theoretical analysis of these examples has 
not sought to understand how technology functions within sports and what ethical 
problems it might raise. As such, the sport philosophy literature can be of limited use 
here. The considerations of technology in sport, as will be detailed further below, tend 
more to be in understanding technology as a discrete entity than as part of an enduring 
characteristic with special attributes. 
21 
Nevertheless, where authors have recognised the ethical content of technology in sport, 
the conclusions and conceptualisations have been useful and provide a point of 
departure. Thus, for example, Simon (1991) describes technology as something that can 
change the nature of an activity and its intended test, or how it can remove a defect that 
is evident in previous designs of equipment. As well, it is acknowledged how technology 
can make a sport easier for the participant as is the case for lighter tennis rackets, 
kneepads in volleyball, or toe--caps on bicycle pedals. 
Other examples of a similar nature abound within the philosophy of sport literature, 
where technology is understood and used as an example to reveal inconsistencies in 
seemingly more pressing issues, such as doping. Thus, in questioning the legitimacy of 
doping, authors have used the acceptance of new technological equipment as a basis for 
arguing that ethical rejection of doping is inconsistent and hypocritical, if it intends to 
reflect a cogent sports ethical standpoint. From such a perspective, it is argued as 
insufficient that drugs should be banned for sporting reasons, since if they were, then 
these other technologies would also be unacceptable. 
Despite these reasons to support the utility of sport philosophy to inform the discussion 
about technology in general, a broader consideration of technology is required to 
conceptualise sport technology. Two central and initial questions arise within a 
philosophical inquiry about technology. Initially, it must be questioned exactly how one 
goes about understanding technology. Second, it is necessary to provide some limitation 
about what counts as an example of technology. Together, these investigations can give 
substance to the rather abstract question 'what is technology?' Moreover, they provide a 
richer understanding of the kinds of question that will be asked about sport when 
inquiring into the ethical status of technology. This analysis will help to clarify what it is 
about sports that are of value by informing the discussion with clearer ideas about how 
technology can challenge the ethical character of sport. By understanding more about 
what is technology and its boundaries of application, it will be clearer what kinds of 
examples of sport technology are of concern. 
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fu such, the following section will provide an articulation of how technology can be 
understood and will make sense of classifications in sport. It will argue that technology 
must be understood in terms of its actual effects within practice. Moreover, it will be 
suggested, along with Tiles and Oberdiek (1995), that its moral content is found in its 
application, which is necessarily its context of understanding. Thus, it is argued that 
technology is not morally neutral and it is unavoidably applied in a socially biased 
context. 
3.1 The Importance of Efficiency 
Two main strands of understanding technology can be identified within philosophy 
broadly and, more specifically, in the philosophy of technology literature. The first view 
can be considered the traditional view of technology, which departs from the work of 
Aristotle, who argues the need to ask four questions about technology: what is it? What 
is it made for? Who/what made it? What is its purpose? These four causes; formal, 
material, efficient, and final, are considered as a framework for understanding the 
implications of technology (Cardwell, 1994). In recent times, Heidegger (1977) and 
social theorist, Jacques Ellul (1964, 1983), take up ideas about technology. However, 
such approaches depart from Aristotelian ideas and can be argued as opposing 
Aristotle's initial formulations in one important respect: Aristotle argues technology as 
purposive, goal,directed and morally neutral; the latter theorists do not. Aristotle's 
approach removes technology from its context. In contrast, Heidegger and Ellul 
consider that Aristotle's approach to analysing technology outside of its applied context 
is logically incoherent - the technology and its context cannot and should not be 
considered separately. 
The ideas of Aristotle are reflected within the philosophy of technology literature by 
Hood (1983), who argues that "technology is a human arrangement of technics - tools, 
machines, instruments, materials, sciences, and personnel - to make possible and serve 
the attainment of human ends" (p.347). Thus, Hood views technology as a means~nd 
activity; technology is not an end in itself, but a means to the realisation of some other, 
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valued end. In this capacity, technology is understood as lacking m moral content, 
which suggests that it does not raise moral issues. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that technologies do gain moral content in their 
application. The point might seem trivial since the immediate response might be that 
technology necessarily has an applied context and that, therefore, the Aristotelian 
approach is clearly bunk. Indeed, it is not sensible to talk of the television or the 
automobile outside of the social context within which they are applied. Thus, one 
initial response to this articulation (and an indication of later critiques) is the argument 
that technologies are necessarily located and to discuss their moral neutrality is but a 
trivial point. Indeed, the thesis continues by asserting that, 
use is not an end in itself, its final purpose is the same as that of all human action 
- namely the maintenance of human life and its perfection in which man attains 
eudaemonia, his supreme happiness .... To achieve human perfection man needs to 
cultivate not just technology, that habits and know~how which make up productive 
cognition, but a life that transcends mere making (Hood, 1983, p.35 1). 
Thus, the Aristotelian ideas describe technology as morally neutral, but recognise 
technology as being integral to human aspirations, which give it moral content and an 
ideological underpinning. However, this very point leads toward the Heideggerian 
articulation of technology as fundamentally value laden. On this view, "it no longer 
makes sense to maintain that technology is a neutral instrument which, for better or for 
worse, serves man" (Hood, 1983, p.352) since it cannot be separated from its 
application. Heidegger's view proceeds from recognising technology as being grounded 
in human 'being' or Dasein, which refers to the basic connection between human 
existence and Being to indicate that a human's very own existence is what is proper to 
him/her, and what distinguishes it from all other entities. Thus, Heidegger (1977, 
p.352) writes, "what is basic to man [sic] is the fact that he is always in a world." Indeed, 
the stronger claim is made by Hood (ibid, p.354) that the, 
meaning of technology is not that it makes possible the execution and ~atisfaction 
of human needs, or that it is instrumental (both of which are true), but that it 
rct1ccts the concern man has for the Being of entities. Thus technology i~ 
ontologically possible because his concern grounds it. 
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These arguments conclude persuasively that technology is best understood as being value 
laden, because it is necessarily applied within a human context. Whilst its abstract 
conceptualisation might be value neutral, it is not sensible or useful to think of 
technology in this way. Moreover, the notion of technology being comprehensible as a 
means--end entity, about which it is necessary to understand only its purpose, is 
misleading. Indeed, the role of efficiency here is ambiguous, though needs highlighting 
for its implicit and explicit implications for understanding both technology and sport 
literature. 
In relation to sport, it could be argued that elite athletes seek an efficient and 
technological performance in an Aristotelian sense - the technology is designed as a 
means towards a given end (to enhance performance). However, it must be questioned 
whether this view is accurate and whether it implies the rejection of Heidegger's and 
Ellul's ideas. It is not sufficient to understand technology as a means~end oriented 
enterprise (efficiency driven), while at the same time argue that it is important to 
examine the effects of technology (understanding technology as ends-based). 
To help reconcile this tension, classical techno~theorist Langdon Winner (1986) argues 
that it is difficult to neglect the role of efficiency in the design of technology. It is less 
relevant whether the technology is effective in its design and thus, whether it makes the 
activity more efficient, than it is that technologies are designed with an intention to 
improve efficiency. As well, Winner stresses the political content of technology 
challenging the efficiency~based approach to understanding technology as reductionism. 
However, it is not clear how this helps in the question of technology in sport. It still 
remains unclear what is the subject of discussion when considering sport technology. 
Aristotle suggests examining the purpose of the technology - what does it intend to do? 
Alternatively, Heidegger suggests that it is necessary to examine its implications to 
challenge or redefine concepts of what it means to be human. 
Neither of these views seems helpful at this stage. Not only are they contradictory, but 
they also both seem intuitin?ly plausible. It can be recognised that technologies are 
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purposive, but also that such purpose is located in human intentions. As well, it is not 
clear how Aristotle or Heidegger can help the discussion in a sporting context. Aristotle 
would argue that it is necessary to examine the purpose of the technology. Heidegger 
would argue that the conceptualisation must begin from the point of understanding 
how the technologies alter the meaning of humanness. 
Perhaps, then, the two perspectives are not so oppositional. There seem very clear 
differences in understanding technology as being value laden or not. Though, as 
suggested earlier, this might be a relatively trivial difference. In the sense of 
understanding technology, it does not seem that accepting one view necessitates the 
rejection of the other. Tiles and Oberdiek (1995) argue a similar perspective, though an 
added dimension of contro~ is propounded in their thesis. Drawing upon biological 
systems as examples, they argue that, comparable to evolution, technology has a habit of 
assuming its own identity. Thus, rather than conceptualise technology as being 
grounded in human intentions, its real nature is uncertain and often unpredictable. 
There are, as Tenner (1996) argues, "unintended consequences" of technological 
application, which serve to illustrate the inadequacy of considering technologies by their 
intentions. 
One example of unintended consequences in sport is found in Gelberg's (1995) 
overview of the plastic helmet in American Football. The innovation was designed to 
reduce the significant risk of head injury that existed in American Football. By virtue of 
being more robust than previous leather shells, the plastic helmet was set to promote a 
new standard of safety within American Football, despite some initial teething problems 
in design. As Gelberg describes, by the late 1950s leather helmets were no longer used 
by Football players and plastic helmets became dominant. However, Gelberg explains, 
the result was not simply a less dangerous sport; instead, the game became even "more 
brutal" (p.302). While head injuries decreased, a significant increase occurred in the 
amount of other injuries that were sustained by Football players. This anomaly is also 
attributable to the helmet since, as Gelberg explains, players would tackle harder, 
resulting in more injuries to other parts of the body. Players \\'ould eyen learn to use the 
helmet as a weapon against opponents, as its robust structure allowed a significant 
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impact upon another person's body. As Gelberg states, "If the helmet hit the player, 
often the force was devastating enough to cause the player to release the balL" (p.306) A 
similar example can be found in the development of boxing gloves that were intended to 
protect the hand, but that resulted in a multiplication of other kinds of injury. As 
Tenner (1996, p.215) explains, 
Gloved play and the managed interest in the knockout blow encouraged boxers to 
land one hit after another on the side of the opponent's face. Bouts were 
sometimes as brutally bloody as the old bare,knuckle fights, but more often the 
greatest damage was not apparent. 
One other central kind of unintended effect includes the consequence of further 
competitive injustices. An indication of this is the manner in which the new style 
javelins of the mid,1980s provoked a shift in terms of who were the most competent 
throwers (further detail of this case is given later). Many more examples can be provided 
and to take them into account requires drawing upon the broad social context 
underpinning the implementation of any new technology in sport. The condition lends 
support to the claim that sports are not external to some social context. While some 
kinds of logic within sport might be closed, the implementation of technology produces 
changes in the way a sport is played, and thus, the wayan athlete trains, or how a 
spectator views the sport. 
This factor is sufficient for Tiles and Oberdiek (1995) to conclude that technology must 
be understood necessarily within a human, applied context, where it is value laden. On 
their view, this is not to say that technology is out of control, as is the argument made by 
Kelly (1994). Rather, it is to recognise that the results of their application, for example, 
the automobile, cannot entirely be anticipated until it is implemented. This causes a 
significant problem for making ethical judgements in the context of any technology, 
since its benefits and harms will not be known, seemingly, until it is too late. Thus, the 
only possible basis for making such judgements is upon the intended effects of the 
technology and, assuming that such decisions are deemed ethically sound, to then 
implement the technology and address its unintended consequences subsequently. As 
sllch, the categorisation suggested here deals with the intended effects of technologies. 
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3.2 Categories of Effect 
From the efficiency metaphor, one could be led to conclude that technology in sport is 
driven solely by a performance principle - to make the athlete increasingly efficient. 
This claim seems reasonable, particularly in the context of elite sport where achievement 
overrides other criteria of play such as recreation, pleasure, or even exercises. However, 
even elite sport exhibits different kinds of technological effect. It is possible to cite a 
broad range of examples as an initial basis for deriving some conceptual framework. 
This will be done for the additional reason of demonstrating previous literature and the 
extent of its consideration of technology in sport. For the present purposes, this 
overview of examples can be relatively descriptive. The categories are arranged and titled 
by the intention behind the technology rather than its resultant effect. The categorisation 
strives to provide a tacit and not exclusive conceptualisation of how technology - and in 
some cases, the same example of technology - can have very different effects, some of 
which are ethically pertinent. 
Importantly, the categories derive from the existing literature that has discussed 
technology in sport. As was noted earlier, little attempt has been made to conceptualise 
various kinds of technology in sport. Consequently, the basis upon which to attempt 
such a categorisation is solely upon the sporadic examples listed and these initial 
clarifications from the philosophy of technology literature. 
The list makes reference to literature on two levels. Where an author has problematised 
the technology to such an extent that he or she has derived a category of effect, then the 
author is referenced within the general category title. However, where the author has 
limited their consideration to a primarily descriptive analysis of the technological 
without any real engagement with the philosophical or ethical issues, then the reference 
is made specific to the example and it has been a judgement to categorise the technology 
as stich. For example, Gelberg (1995) is referenced both within the general heading - as 
an author that has engaged with the philosophical effects of technology - and within the 
specific example of the plastic American Football helmet, which occurs within the same 
category, Safety and Harm. 
Subsequent to this overview, a clearer point of departure might be possible to discern 
what is meant by 'technology'. It is not possible here to give an overview of each 
technology. Thus, each section will give a brief outline of the effect being described with 
a sufficient number of accompanying examples. Finally, a selection of key case studies is 
used to introduce the ethical implications of technologies. It is important to note that 
these categories ought not be considered oppositional. Any single technology will 
respond to one or more of these varying categories. As well, it ought not be construed 
that one of the terms within a section is morally preferable to another. Thus, for 
example, in the category of De~skilling and Re~skilling, no statement is being made about 
the efficacy of these two possible effects in comparison to one another. It is not 
necessarily preferable that a sport is re~skilled or de~skilled. 
Making sport possible 
An initial category of effect for technology would seem sensible to reflect the inherent 
role that technology plays in making some sports possible. The category raises the 
broader question about what counts as an example of technology since it returns the 
discussion to the very early examples of sport, the technology for which was 
manufactured from natural products, such as pig's bladders for soccer balls. More 
abstractly, technology (primitive or sophisticated) is unequivocally a necessary 
characteristic of many sports, without which, sport would not be possible. It is thus, no 
surprise to notice that, as the technology evolves, so too does the sport. In Formula One 
motor~racing, it is possible to see this most strongly since advances in motor engineering 
vastly effect the outcome and demands upon a driver and race team. In such a 
performance~driven sport, the technology has often been argued as being the 
determining factor of success, where the driver plays merely a secondary role ~veni, 
1996). One important conclusion that must be drawn from this is to realise that 
technologies are not antithetical to sports and that it can only be the v .. ay in which they 
develop - rather than their very existence in sport - that raises ethical problems. 
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Safety and Harm (Gelberg, 1995). 
One of the central aims of technological change in sport has been to improve safety and 
reduce the risk of harm. The examples include the bizarre needs within javelin throwing 
in the 1980s, when athletes were throwing dangerously close to the spectators. The only 
reasonable solution was to change the specifications of the javelin so that the athletes 
could not throw it as far. This resulted in a change in the kinds of athlete that were 
successful as javelin throwers, from the strongest to the technically proficient. Other 
examples include, 
• Improved floor surfaces within sports halls to reduce shock to athletes when landing 
or bounding (Bjerklie, 1993). 
• Introduction of plastic helmets in American Football to reduce head injury (Gelberg, 
1995). 
• More sophisticated shoe design for more support to foot during athletic events. 
• Increased wicking qualities in clothing to protect climber or mountaineer from the 
cold and rain (Rickaby, 1999). 
• Spring board surface in diving to prevent slip and increase resiliency of board tips to 
reduce injury (Bjerklie, 1993). 
• Sturdier epee and foil in fencing, as well, Kevlar jackets for more protection but with 
no loss to movement (Tenner, 1996). 
• Navigational equipment in sailing «nizan, 1994; Tenner, 1996; Root, Domonkos, 
Granek, and Hustler, no date). 
• Carbon composite Poles in Pole Vaulting and enhanced safety pits, allowed more 
daring contest and higher vaults (Bjerklie, 1993). 
These examples identify the role of sports federations or governing bodies of sport to 
strive for their practices to be less dangerous for the competitors by introducing new 
technological measures. Their ethical justification derives from an interest in athlete 
safety and, generally, allowing the athlete to perform at an optimal level without placing 
undue stress on the body. However, these examples are controversial since their 
implementation can change the kind of test that is constituted by the competition. 
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De~ski1ling and Re~skilling (Gardner, 1989; Hummel and Foster, 1986; McIntosh, 
1963; Simon, 1991) 
Technological innovation can alter the way in which a sport is played. It can change the 
conditions of training that are required to be successful at a particular skill, and can 
even make it easier to perform the required skills. Examples of such technologies 
include, 
• U~groove golf clubs that allowed greater accuracy on stroke (Gardner, 1989). 
• Depth finders in fishing to make it easier to locate large schools of fish to enhance 
prospects of catching (Hummel and Foster, 1986). 
• Superman cycling position that allowed more streamlined position for greater speed 
(Fotheringham, 1996). 
• Breathable clothing material used to regulate body temperature in extreme climates 
(Miah, 2000a). 
The Professional Golfers' Association's (PGA) reasons for disallowing the 'square' or 'U~ 
grooved' irons from golf in 1990 reflect how technology can alter the kinds of skill 
required of an athlete (Gardner, 1989). Gardner describes how tour players considered 
that the clubs gave the golfer an advantage by creating a higher spin rate, which 
translated into better ball control. Some tour professionals had been opposed to their 
use because of a concern that they "devalue true golf skill and consolidate their talent" 
(p.69). Similarly, Hummel and Foster (1986) recognised that the 'spinning reel' in 
fishing "virtually eliminated backlash in casting and thus the necessity of an 'educated 
thumb' to act as a drag on line being cast" (p.46). Thus, the innovation was considered 
to have democratised the skills of the sport and had devalued or de-skilled the activity. 
While these devices would seem quite useful for a novice who may require assistance to 
engage in the activity in a meaningful way, their application to competitive sports IS 
implied - yet, it is unclear that such things are beneficial within elite competition. 
Additionally, it is not representative to argue that these technologies necessarily de~skill a 
sport. It may also be argued that technological changes in sports Ire-skin' an activity. In 
explanation of 're~skilling' one may consider the controversial 'superman' cycling 
position introduced by Graeme Obree in 1995. The position entailed the arms of the 
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cyclist being placed in front of the face and the seating post being unusually high, thus 
making the position more aerodynamic. Thus, whilst the skill had not been made any 
easier, it had altered the bicycle such that it did not resemble conventional cycling 
positions (it had been re,skilled and it made it possible to achieve more without any 
greater physical capability). Interestingly, the International Cycling Union (ICU), made 
this very argument when legislating against the use of the position. In concluding their 
stance on the 'superman' position, the ICU argued that the technical developments had 
"obscured the physical demands made by cycling, and had made it harder for the man 
on the street to identify with elite cyclists" (Verbruggen cited in Fotheringham, 1996, 
p.23). Despite such claims, it might be wondered how the lCU justify the acceptance of 
methods of design and construction of bicycles that are more comparable to the design 
of an aircraft than an 'everyday' bicycle. It would seem possible to argue that, on similar 
grounds, the use of such materials also makes the bicycle unacceptably different from a 
preconceived notion of what is a bicycle. 
Dehumanising and Superhumanising (Hoberman, 1992) 
The example of cycling raises a more complicated notion about what can be said about 
whether an athlete can claim responsibility for any performance achievement and puts 
into question whether the human athlete or the technology has achieved the 
performance. However, to answer such a question requires being able to make clear 
distinctions between each. Indeed, this category presumes that something clear can be 
said about humanness that is lessened or removed by the use of some technology. This 
categorisation might be criticised for bringing together two quite different claims about a 
technology that are not at all oppositionaL Indeed, the elite athlete might both be 
dehumanised and superhumanised by a technology. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of this categorisation is to demonstrate ideas about the moral 
implications of technology so as to identify the kinds of argument that are being made 
about the effects of technology. In this sense, dehumanisation is justified in as much as 
r('~('archers of technology have made such claims. Some examples that have been (and 
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might be) seen as reflective of dehumanising/ superhumanising technologies are as 
follows. 
• Doping and Drug~taking (Hoberman, 1992j Fraleigh, 1984a). 
• Genetic Enhancement (Miah, 2000b, 2001aj Munthe, 2000). 
• Springboard in diving allowed divers to gain more height on dive (Bjerklie, 1993). 
• Fibreglass archery bows, more resilience and more consistency (Bjerklie, 1993). 
• Plastic/metal composite discus allows longer throw 
• Barbells are now stronger with some flexibility to allow the lifter to use more 
technique when lifting and drop bar at end of lift to save strength (Bjerklie, 1993). 
• Kevlar and carbon~fibre kayaks are lighter, more sturdy and easier to manoeuvre. 
Whilst various authors have talked around the subject of how these technologies alter 
what it means to be a human being, adding content to such claims is more problematic 
as identifying the salient characteristics of humanness that are removed or lessened by 
such technology is not easy. Nevertheless, if one is to place any credit at all in these, at 
least, intuitions about technology, then it is worth considering the possibility that they 
are not becoming of humanness. If one is not convinced that these technologies do, in 
fact, lessen the value of humanness, then it can be useful to discuss whether any kind of 
technology could be a threat to humanness. Would, for example, a human that is 
largely a mechanoid be a challenge to humanness? If not, then is a robotic human, one 
whose mental capacities are formed by some artificially intelligent computer, a threat to 
humanity? If such beings can be seen as a challenge to humanness, then there might be 
some grounds for concern. Where this line is drawn is less important than the 
possibility that it could be crossed. The relevance of this possibility to ethics will be 
identified later. For now, it is sufficient to recognise the possibility of technologies that 
dehumanise or superhumanise the human performer. 
Increase participation and/or spectatorship (Miah, 2000c). 
One of the major interests of a sport governing body is to maximise the breadth of 
inclusion within the given sport. This ambition often translates into the development of 
technology that can allow a sport to become more accessible to prospective participants. 
The example is slightly different from developing technologies to make the sport easier, 
as the main aim here is the maintenance of standards, with the broadening of 
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participation. Alternatively, equipment is often developed that can even exclude 
particular kinds of individual from participation. For example, the sophistication of 
technology demands a level of finance that is beyond many individuals. Examples of 
such technology include the following, 
• Artificial turf for field sports (Tenner, 1996). 
• U,Grooved Golf Clubs (Gardner, 1989). 
• Carbon composite tennis racquets and mass production of other kinds of 
equipment (Brody, 2000). 
• The Carving ski (alpine) that makes it easier to learn skiing. 
• Different sized tennis balls (Miah, 2000c). 
• Varying speeds of squash ball for different levels of competence. 
The benefits of such technology are not complex. The ability to reach a wider audience 
can seem a worthwhile ambition. However, the ends of such ambitions can be 
problematic for the sport. For example, in sports such as climbing or skiing, there exist 
limited natural resources, the overuse of which could seriously damage the environment 
and lessen the aesthetic experience of the performance. If mountains were overrun with 
climbers and skiers, they could lose their tranquil characteristics, which would seem to 
entirely contradict what is valuable about these activities. Along these lines, it is not at 
all clear how big would be big enough for sports. While the ambition for widening 
participation is admirable, its justification tends to be founded more upon a financial 
basis rather than a moral one. Yet, the exploitation of a sport simply to widen 
participation and generate more financial resources seems ambiguously beneficial. 
These varied examples provide some basis for understanding the complexity and effect 
of technologies in sport. As was indicated earlier, there are further concerns about the 
unknown consequences of new technologies. This perspective is also considered 
accurate within the broader social,technological context. For instance, it could not have 
been possible to truly understand how the combustion engine would affect society or 
how aeronautic engineering could provoke the realisation of a global society. Equally, 
within sport it has not been clear how the changes in design would alter the future 
cour~c of sports and change them as practices. 
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One limitation of this conceptualisation is the degree of overlap that can be argued for 
different technological innovation. For example, the improvement of floor surfaces 
within sports halls that can significantly reduce injury and which would thus, fit within 
the safety category, also re~skills the activities. As such, it could be argued that the 
categorisation vastly simplifies any single example of technology within sport and, 
therefore, does not suitably characterise it. 
Consequently, it is tempting to draw some further categorisation about them in an 
effort to find some conceptual framework that demarcates technologies from non~ 
technologies. Thus, one might separate them into such categories as body, external, 
internal, environment, or something similar. One might use an example of technology 
such as genetics as a body augmenting technology or a tennis racket as an external 
technology. However, this categorisation would not yield any further critical edge to the 
main question. It is not reasonable to expect that categorising technologies will yield an 
answer to which ones are acceptable or not. 
To demonstrate why this is so, a simplified example will suffice. Suppose that there are 
two sub~ategories within the category of 'dehumanising vs. superhumanising' and that 
these were 'internal' and 'external' technologies. Thus, one might imagine that 
examples of internal superhumanising technologies are drug, or the process of altering 
an athlete's genetic constitution. Alternatively, external technologies that also 
superhumanise the athlete might be, for example the recently promoted Fast~Skin 
swimming costume that is designed from special materials that reduce drag in the water. 
If one is to ascribe any importance to such distinctive characteristic, then, presumably, 
the intention is to identify whether they are ethically sound. Thus, one might conclude 
that drug use - being internal to the body - is unacceptable. However, because the 
swimming costume is added onto the athlete's body and does not involve any physical 
alteration or harm effects (it is external), that it is acceptable. 
As an intuitive method of determining acceptability the categorisation is appealing as it 
has very clear demarcations. Indeed, this is the level at which many technical 
commissions of sports governing bodies operate and one might extend such an analysis 
by contextualising the distinctions that are given. In the example suggested above, one 
might inform its distinctions and the conclusions that follow it, by justifying it in 
theoretically informed terminology. For example, Blake (1996, p.151) identifies the 
problem with technology that alters the body is that, 
the human body, a collection of bones and orifices and connecting tissues, has 
somehow disappeared into that dangerous territory 'common sense'. It has been 
naturalised, taken for granted, as an authentic, and to many people sacred, entity 
whose composition is fixed and cannot, or rather, should not, be altered. The 
body has arguably become the last site of humanism. 
Thus, one can problematise technology through notions of embodiment. However, this 
construction of the natural,body is contingent and does not speak to the philosophical 
implications of sport technologies. It might explain why some kinds of technology are 
considered to be unacceptable (such as drug use or genetic alteration), but it would not 
explain which kinds shou[d be unacceptable. Thus, it is the very basis for concluding why 
internal technology is unacceptable and external is acceptable that must first be 
questioned in order to reach any conclusion. If one's intention is for a categorisation to 
inform ethical decision making in sport, then one must first have an idea about what 
makes, in this example, internal alterations unacceptable and external ones acceptable. 
The function of having some basic demarcations between different kinds of 
technological effect, however, does allow the discussion to focus upon the relevant 
ethical content of technologies. For example, one might inquire into the ethical 
implications of enhancing safety, re,skilling a sport, or increasing participation. As has 
been established, the critical question of the thesis is to determine what should be the 
ethical limits of sport technologies and this might be in the context of technologies 
designed to affect any of these categories. However, what remains to be clarified is how 
it can be known that these different effects give rise to ethical concerns. Indeed, the 
moral content of these technologies must be placed into context. Demonstrating the 
inadequacy of a broad approach to this problem, the following sections will examine 
some key cases of technologies that raise ethical concerns for sport and identify the basis 
of the moral concerns. They will encompass the following: 
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• 
• 
• 
Mountain Climbing 
Tennis 
Cycling 
The examples chosen are neither exhaustive nor encompassing of the many that could 
be analysed. However, collectively, they raise issues relevant to the questions of this 
thesis and thus, will suffice to demonstrate the ethical content of sport technology. 
3.3 Case Studies 
Mountain Climbing 
Recent times have provoked an unprecedented greater plurality in the design and 
manufacture of technology for mountaineering, encompassing crampons, ice~axes, 
weatherproof clothing, and bolting technology. Of course, it would be misleading to 
argue that climbing and mountaineering have ever been without the latest technology. 
Clearly, mountain experiences are constituted partly by having the necessary equipment 
that can make the experience possible by allowing it to be minimally safe. However, the 
degree to which mountaineering is now immersed in technology has brought about a 
recognisable change in the pursuit that has raised significant ethical issues, notable by 
the reactions and conflict within the climbing community. Two distinct perspectives 
describe one of the more significant problems within climbing; the separation of 'sport' 
climbing from 'traditional' climbing. The former argue that technology can enhance 
climbing experiences, through it making particular manoeuvres safer, or allowing the 
completion of, otherwise, inaccessible routes. In contrast, more traditional 
mountaineers argue that the same technology makes otherwise challenging, routes easier 
and unacceptably de~skills the activity. 
One of the specific technologies that is in dispute is retro~bolting that allows a climber to 
fix an anchor point in a rock~face, where there is no location to place a jamming device. 
When climbing, it is useful to have such places to reduce the danger if a fall should take 
place. Thus, when ascending a route, the climber will place anchor points at regular and 
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convenient intervals. Traditionally, this has been done with a mechanical jamming 
device called a 'friend', which is placed into a crack and which expands to stay locked 
into place without damaging the rock. The use of bolting techniques have emerged for 
particularly difficult climbs where there have not been places to locate a jamming device 
and so it has made some climbs possible that previously were not. However, in so doing 
there has also been a defacement of such rocks due to the invasive technology of bolting 
that actually involves inserting a thick bolt into the rock using a power tool, comparable 
to a drilL In addition to this defacement, an overuse of the technology has emerged. 
Climbers have become reliant upon the technology and, in some cases, considered its 
use justifiable to enable a different kind of climbing experience that allows the climber 
to focus on the physical challenge rather than the risk involved in climbing. From the 
traditionalist perspective, this is negative for the mountain environment as it encourages 
its defacement and, on one view, reduces it to the level of mere physical competition. 
Additionally, in many cases bolts are not removed from the rock~face, which further 
frustrates the traditional climber because of the destruction of climbing's aesthetic 
content. 
This dispute entails a disagreement about what kind of activity climbing is and, 
moreover, what it should be. From each of the perspectives, the community is 
interested in asserting its own way of climbing as the way in which it should take place 
to the point of claiming that the other community is not climbing at alL Nevertheless, it 
can still be argued that there are some other kinds of activity that have no place in 
mountainous countryside. 
As has been suggested earlier, this idealist approach can become problematic due to 
being highly contested. However, while devising absolute characteristics that can define 
climbing or mountaineering might appear problematic, there are various activities that 
would not count as climbing. For example, it would not be accurate to say that one has 
climbed a mountain if one was carried, or if one were dropped on the summit by a 
helicopter. Similarly, neither does it seem accurate to say that one has scaled a face if 
one has done so on an artificial wall, even if that wall entirely replicated the difficulty of 
the real rock face.7 Though such examples are simple, it becomes problematic when one 
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posits the circumstances that reflect current practice. For example, these discussions 
bring into question whether one can claim to have completed a climb if one has used 
oxygen at some stage of the ascent. Similarly, it might be argued that, through using 
drugs to suppress sickness or fatigue, it must also be questioned to what extent the 
climber or the drugs have been responsible for ascending the route. Indeed, one might 
even argue that the wearing of highly protective clothing has the effect of making the 
climb unacceptably easy, through its insulating of one's body from the environment. 
Clearly, the distinction between what does or does not count as climbing is difficult to 
discern; though understanding whether the technology is appropriate or not seems to 
hinge on this very matter (Miah, 2000a). 
Because it is contested, it would seem that some ideological concept of climbing and 
mountaineering is not sufficient to conclude the acceptability of new technology. 
However, it is important not to completely dismiss the value of deriving characteristics 
that can be said to give value to a practice. It is also argued that the kinds of technology 
that appear inappropriate for climbers to use are those that tend to change climbing into 
the kind of activity that was previously identified as definitely not being climbing. For 
example, one cannot have climbed a route if one has been carried to the summit for the 
simple reason that one would not have had to physically and mentally negotiate the 
climb and haul oneself to the summit. Similarly, it is inappropriate to use technology 
that lessens the degree to which one must exert oneself, physically and mentally. Thus, 
the use of oxygen or increasingly light and protective clothing are, conceptuaUy, not 
appropriate in climbing, since they are technologies which are underpinned by the 
desire to make the climb less demanding through providing a greater degree of comfort or 
ease in the climb. 
This is not to suggest that climbers should not use such technology (which is the more 
difficult claim to support), or even that their using them will prevent them from 
claiming, legitimately, that they have succeeded in their climb. Rather, it is to recognise 
what one cannot claim to have achieved if using technology that tends a climber towards 
the de~skilledness. It is this kind of concept that raises an awareness of the potential for 
ethical questioning in the context of new technology.8 
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If one takes as a case example the development of weatherproof clothing, it can be 
identified that such innovations have the effect of making the climber more comfortable 
in the mountains and thus, can be said to have made the challenge easier to accomplish. 
Such examples as increasingly weatherproof jackets, bags, tents, gloves, and socks, made 
from the latest Coolmax fabric or Gore,Tex shell are designed for the sole purpose of 
ensuring a greater degree of insulation of the climber from the elements. Indeed, this is 
evident from the ways in which manufacturers market their products, advertising how 
the newest rucksack weighs less than one kilogram me , or how the new tubular rope' 
break offers "greater security for the climber with reduced energy expenditure" (Rickaby, 
1999, p.65). 
From such examples, there appears to be some tacit admission that, when climbing, 
climbers seek their insulation or protection from the elements to some degree. Indeed, 
the argument can be extended to encompass much more than clothing. If one takes as 
the salient characteristic of such technological innovations, that they make the activity 
'easier', then it can be applied to any new design which seeks more efficiency and 
effectiveness. Thus, new designs in ice,axe technology, which might seek to enable 
greater forces being exerted upon the ice though with less disruption and vibration to its 
surface, actually ensure more control over an environment that, in some sense, might be 
partly defined and valuable because of its unpredictability. 
A case might even be made for something as seemingly inconsequential as batteries. 
The development of more durable batteries could be argued as having some altering 
effect on climbing performance through it, perhaps, not requiring the athlete to carry 
supplementary equipment.9 Such an effect, would translate into lightening the load a 
climber must carry, and thus, making the climber more efficient and the climb more 
manageable. Indeed, it is such minor innovations that are significant in transforming 
the climbing experience, which ought not be omitted from the ethical analysis. 
This is not to say that the technology necessarily makes a climb easy. The use of current 
examples of technology still require the climber to use their body and mind to a great 
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technical degree to ensure safety and success. However, it matters less that a route 
remains challenging and technically demanding as a result of technology, than it does 
that the technology has been used to make the climb easier. The problem is more with 
the rationalisation underpinning the development and implementation of climbing 
technology, than with the resulting effect upon the performance. The reason for this is 
that, if one expands such rationalisation further into the future, one might realistically 
foresee climbing as becoming significantly automated, which can be argued as 
impoverishing the value of the activity. Whilst current technology is limited to merely 
providing oxygen or suppressing sickness (supposedly to enable one to function 
normally), one must recognise that underpinning such technology is a tendency to 
automate climbing and mountaineering - to experiences that become increasingly easy 
because of the available technology. 
This uninspiring description of climbing as tending towards greater comfort might seem 
to be unfair. Clearly, there are quite reasonable arguments to be made for striving 
towards greater comfort and safety in climbing, particularly when 'more comfortable' 
means not losing one's life. However, it is this acceptance that requires drawing 
attention to since, whilst one rationality would conclude the acceptance of ever-
increasing safety in climbing, another perspective could be that there is a point at which 
the enhancement of safety is no longer compatible with climbing experiences. On this 
view, climbing is partly defined by the taking of risk and to dilute such risk infinitely 
would be to transform climbing into something that is quite different. To use an 
extreme example: if one embarked upon a climb with absolute certainty of not coming 
to harm, then it might be questioned whether this would constitute 'legitimate' 
climbing. The term 'legitimate' is used quite tentatively here, though deliberately to 
make explicit the concern that an argument might be made for concluding some forms 
of technological enhancement in climbing negate the activity as being necessarily (and 
importantly) risk-full. Thus, it might be argued that climbing is an endeavour that 
requires accepting the potential for danger or risk, and where one's achievements are 
attained when in conditions of high unpredictability and danger. 10 
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Such claims have been made in the context of the Global Positioning System (G.P.S.) 
devices, which are intended assist navigation in extreme circumstances (where 
traditional compass~bearings cannot suffice - as might be the case in a 'white-out' where 
all around is invisible due to snow conditions). Thus, the G.P.S. provides a greater 
perception of safety for the climber, which they would otherwise not have were it not for 
the technology. The G.P.S. functions via a satellite that allows the mountaineer to 
determine their location, much in the same way as a compass. It is argued that such 
technology is unacceptable because it does not rely on experience and skilled 
mountaineering abilities. So, the use of G.P.S. or a cellular phone as a means to getting 
oneself out of circumstances that would otherwise be reliant upon one's knowledge, 
experience, skill, and dexterity in the mountains, is quite inappropriate. However, this 
conclusion holds if, and only if, one is seeking the kind of experience that can be 
described as entirely independent, autonomous, and in complete isolation with the 
mountain. 
This does not imply that the use of a G.P.S. is absolutely inappropriate in the mountains 
or even to argue that climbers should not take one into the mountains 'just in case'. 
The position is well made by the British Mountaineering Council (B.M.C.), in their web~ 
based training document, where it is argued that the use of such equipment "is not a 
substitute for skill and knowledge in the fundamentals of mountaineering" (BMC, 1999, 
html). The B.M.C. identifies the logic and reality of the mountain experience as one of 
grave danger, one that ought not result in death, the risk of which climbers should be 
proactive to ensure is prevented. 
There are few distinctions between climbers that are more obvious than those that 
distinguish between the traditional and the sport climber. The former v,'ith their pitons, 
axes and task~centred perspective on climbing, and the latter with their retro~bolting and 
performance~oriented perspective. Each defines their climbing in quite different ways, 
though each endeavours to engage with a mountaineering experience. Admittedly, it 
can be argued that climbing has always encompassed a multitude of styles, as is e\'ident 
from the game playing analysis of climbing by T ejada~Flores (1978). Though the focus 
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here is upon the changes in climbing brought about by technology, which elicit forms of 
climbing that might be said to alter or even remove the climber from the performance. 
The various technologies in mountaineering provoke a wide range of effects that each 
respond to the categories in different ways. Many examples, such as clothing or GPS, 
have a clear benefit of enhancing the safety of mountaineering and would thus, seem to 
be a positive aspect of the technology. However, such a conclusion depends upon 
whether one places any negative concerns in the de-skiWng or de-hurnanising effects that 
the same technology can have. Sport climbers might claim that bolting technology re-
skHs climbing, allowing a wide range of new kinds of experience within climbing. 
However, it might also be said that the technology is harmfu~ to the environment and has 
reduced the challenge of climbing to a skill,based activity rather than one that involves 
risk. It might also be considered super-hurnanising insofar as it allows the climber to 
complete routes that were previously not possible. A further claim is that it increases 
participation, because climbing technology makes it easier to become minimally 
competent. However, this too might be seen as negative if the mountains become over 
saturated with people. Finally, it could also be said that there are alarming unintended 
consequences such as the over use and dependency upon technology, where traditional, 
well,nurtured skills might have sufficed. 
Tennis Technology 
In contrast to mountaineering, the highly professional, organised, and competitive world 
of elite tennis raises different kinds of ethical issue in regard to technology. Over the 
last 30 years, tennis has become increasingly technological; a plethora of changes in 
racquet technology and increased investment into athlete training and support has 
yielded players that can be argued as having outgrown the structure of the game. 
Arguments suggesting that men's tennis has become dominated by the power serve, have 
promoted the ITF's reaction to consider strategies of resolving the problem. 
The last 30 years have also been innovative for tennis in a much broader sense since it 
was only in 1978 that specifications were made in respect of the tennis racket. For the 
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centuries of tennis before then, players could use any implement they wished to play 
tennis; the rules did not prevent the use of anything. This significant change came 
about after an innovative engineer designed what became known as the spaghetti-strung 
tennis racket. As Gelberg (cited in Radio National Transcripts, 1999) describes it, "the 
racket consisted of three planes of non~intersecting strings, with a plastic coating on the 
outside of the strings" (p.77). Using the proposed formulation, the effect of this racket 
could be said as super~humanising the player, though there were also other effects. The 
design was particularly interesting for novice players, which was from where the 
technology emerged. The effect of the spaghetti~strung system was to hold "the ball on 
the strings longer, allowing athletes to impart greater topspin on the ball than they 
would with a normal topspin stroke." (Gelberg, cited in Radio National Transcripts, 
1999). Thus, it could also be said that the racket served to increase participation in the 
sport. 
However, the racket also created upset on the professional tennis circuit. Players 
ranking 200th were beating 4th seeded players and so seemed, unequivocally, to entirely 
change the kind of skills required to play tennis. As such, the International Tennis 
Federation (ITF) decided to ban the innovation arguing that the spaghetti strings proved 
to compromise athletic challenge too drastically. 
Nevertheless, at the same time the development of composite rackets was also taking 
place, though the reaction by the ITF was quite different. At the First International 
Congress on Tennis Science and Technology in 2000, Dr. Howard Brody, outlined that 
the tennis racket is now "lighter, stiffer, more forgiving, more stable, more durable, and 
capable of imparting higher speeds to the ball with less effort by the player" Q3rody, 
2000, pA 7). The effect was comparable to the spaghetti~strung racket in one sense - it 
allowed players to perform more efficiently. However, it was not regarded by the ITF to 
challenge the integrity of tennis so much that it would need banning. Indeed, Brody 
notes that it "has also resulted in rackets that makes it easier for a beginner to learn the 
aame of tennis and for the recreational player to enjoy the game more" (ibid, pA 7). The 
b 
significance of the two different positions can be said to have greatly affected how tennis 
has evolved in the last 20 years. Indeed, Gelberg (1986, p.78) argues that, "in making 
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these two different conclusions it shaped the nature of the sport, the type of athlete who 
was successful, the type of injuries that plague that game, and the cost of the sport". 
Currently, the rTF has a similar predicament which, arguably, has come about partially 
due to racket technology: the pace of the game. Critics of tennis have been claiming for 
some years that the elite game is becoming reduced to a serving game. The increased 
pace of first serves is such that it has become increasingly difficult for a player to return 
the ball. Consequently, the players with the fastest serve win games and tournaments. 
If this is the case (and it is, by no means, a perspective shared by all), the criticism is that 
tennis is a game comprising of many more skills than simply the serve and for so much 
to rely upon the serve is to reduce the value of other skills. 
Presently, men's service speeds are reaching in excess of 140 mph, which is argued by 
Brody (2000) as approaching the limit of human reaction time for the receiving player. 
Thus, if serves start to tend beyond this limit, then the elite men's game will become 
merely a serving competition since no player will be able to return a ball from a serve. 
As such, it is argued by the rTF that something must be changed within tennis to try to 
reduce the dominance of the serve and prevent a future for tennis that could comprise 
of only serving. There are, however, a number of competing views about how this 
particular problem should be addressed. For example, Gray (1999) outlines various 
proposals that have been presented to the rTF in the past decade, though have not been 
deemed acceptable for the following reasons, 
Take 10% of Using a slower, flatter ball This would actually increase the 
the air out of would result in fewer aces. number of service aces as a flatter ball 
the ball. would have so little bounce, it would 
be almost impossible for the receiver to 
return . 
Go back to 
wooden 
racquets. 
Make the 
server stand 
three feet 
behind the 
baseline. 
Today's high-tech, high-
powered frames are causing a 
proliferation of aces and 
short, boring points. 
The greater distance would 
slow down the ball and give 
the receiver a much better 
look at it. 
This would only muffle serve speed by 
4%. The biggest decrease in velocity 
would be on the return, thus adding to 
the receiver's woes and the server's 
advantage. 
This would destroy the serve-and-volley 
game by forcing the server to cover 
more ground in getting to the net. 
Make the It would reduce the number Every tennis court in the world would 
servlce box of out-wide aces. have to be relined. 
narrower. 
Allow only To keep servers from This would also create 30% more 
one serve per gunning the first one, smce double faults, which are even duller to 
point. there would be no second watch than aces. 
ball to fall back on. 
(Gray, 1999) 
In response to these proposals , the decision to experiment by altering the size of the 
tennis ball has been chosen to curtail the serve. Nevertheless, Brody (2000) recognises 
that this is no t the only poss ible solution and that it is worth experimenting with other 
suggest io ns, such as changing the service court size or raising the net. 
In July 1999, the ITF announced its approva l of experimenting with different ball type ' 
in the profess io nal circuit with an intention to try and address the 'pace' problem. Head 
of the ITF Technica l Co mmiss io n , Andrew Coe (2000, p.3), recognises that the dclBtc 
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centres upon mediating a tension between "technology and tradition" and that it is 
necessary to strike a balance, given that tennis is always evolving. As is outlined in the 
ITF announcement in This Week (1999, July 12), 
1. New Ball Type 1 is a faster ball for use on slow surfaces such as clay. These balls will 
be harder and lower bouncing than standard tennis balls. 
2. Ball Type 2 will be used on medium paced surfaces such as hard courts and will be 
made to existing specifications. 
3. New Ball Type 3 is a slow pace ball for use on fast surfaces such as grass and some 
indoor carpets. Type 3 Balls will be about 8% larger in diameter than standard 
balls. 
(ITF, 1999) 
From the introduction of new ball Type 3, it is intended that there will be a slight, 
though significant, reduction in the speed of a serve, thus allowing the receiving player 
more time to react to the service. From this example, it is important to realise that, from 
the perspective of a governing body like the ITF, there are a number of competing 
interests and thus, values. It would seem that one of the major concerns about the pace 
of the game stems from the interest it can hold for spectators. It has been claimed that 
if the game becomes a serve~dominated sport, then the number of spectators (and by 
implication, the recreational player and the participation base of the sport) will begin to 
dwindle. A comparison may be drawn here with table~tennis, which has faced the 
problem of how to make the sport watchable, since the pace at which the ball moves has 
made it impossible for a viewer to observe. As well, the example is interesting because 
not long after the ITF announced its decision to use new balls, the International Table 
Tennis Federation (ITTF) also announced 'new balls' to slow down their game 
(International Table Tennis Federation, 1999). 
Returning to tennis, by stating its decision to introduce different kinds of tennis ball to 
the game, the ITF claims to be acting so as to "preserve the nature of the game" (Coe, 
cited in Cislunar Aerospace, 1999, html). However, the question is left begging as to 
what nature and whose game is being asserted, when it is concluded that something is 
awry. 
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From the ITF's claims, a number of different reactions seem evident in response to how 
performance,modifying technology is understood. In the context of the spaghetti,strung 
racket, the technology seemed to unacceptably re-skin the activity, making it something 
that was no longer recognisable as tennis. On this matter, however, it might also be 
claimed to have de-skiHed the activity, since it also made it easier to become competent in 
the game. Yet, this might also be seen as a benefit for it increasing participation in the 
sport. Other racket designs had the benefit of reducing the severity of injuries sustained 
by players and thus, can be said to have enhanced the safety of tennis. However, this 
benefit has also allowed players to demonstrate super-human capabilities, particularly in 
serving, which has resulted in the game, for some, lacking creativity and chance. Such 
an approach to justifying technologies is comparable to the claims about 
mountaineering technology, where a conceptualisation of the sport is asserted by the 
practice community to conclude acceptability. A similar perspective is also visible in 
cycling. 
Cycling 
In 1995, world~lass cyclist Grame Obree got a new bicycle, which would later become 
popularly known as the 'superman' bicycle, named thus for the position the cyclist 
adopted whilst on the bike. This entailed the arms being placed stretched out in front 
of the head, in a similar way to how the fictitious comic,book character Superman would 
fly. As well, the seating post was unusually high, thus making the position more 
aerodynamic. Indeed, the rationale behind the technology (the 'intended effect') was to 
make the rider more aerodynamic, thus reducing the air resistance, which would 
translate into a faster speed being achieved by the cyclist. 
The bike caused a great deal of controversy because it appeared particularly innovative 
and not all cyclists had the advantage that was conferred by the riding position. Indeed, 
the International Cycling Union (lCU), made this very argument when legislating 
against the use of the position. In concluding their stance on the 'superman' bicycle, the 
leU argued that the technical developments had "obscured the physical demands made 
by cycling, and had made it harder for the man ~ic) on the street to identify with elite 
cyclists" (Verbruggen cited in Fotheringham, 1996: 23). However, such reasoning 
creates problematic boundaries of distinction by claiming only certain changes within a 
sport alter the 'form' of that sport. From such a position, one would find it necessary to 
consider at what point an alteration to 'form' becomes unacceptably distinct from the 
original design. 
One may argue that changes In the construction materials of a bicycle (lighter and 
stronger) affect the physical demands of the sport in a similar way. However, 
innovations of this kind have been accepted within competition. By claiming that the 
'superman' position no longer resembled a 'bicycle,' the leu suggests a quite precise 
prescription of the bicycle. However, drawing upon Wittgenstein's (1953) ideas about 
'family resemblance', it may be argued that the limitations of this prescription are within 
some form of acceptable 'resemblance' whereby one recognises a number of 
characteristics that can identify a term. Thus, altering a number of the characteristics, 
such as the construction materials of the bicycle, may still enable the identification of 
the bicycle. However, as the Obree example may illustrate, there are degrees to which 
resemblance can be maintained, and the 'superman' position, the leu argues, went 
beyond this acceptable resemblance. 
The example might seem a little surprising since the technology used to design world~ 
class bicycles utilises space~age material and engineering techniques that are deemed 
legitimate. Moreover, the superman innovation was less about technological 
advancement than it was about a change in design, which might equally have taken place 
decades before. Indeed, the example raises a further question about the limits of 
questioning performance modification. It is not necessarily artefacts that are being 
discussed, but that scientific processes and design are also of interest. 
This is not the first example of high~technology in cycling. Indeed, cycling is an 
interesting sport to consider for it having been fundamentally constituted by technology 
and for it utilising technology to make the sport more dynamic. fu Tenner (1996, 
pp.234~5) describes, 
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In the 1960s and 1970s, narrow~tyred derailleur~quipped bicycles, though more 
difficult to maintain and use than the three~speed variety, helped promote a 
bicycle boom in the United States .... the purpose of the derailleur was to achieve 
the greatest possible variation in mechanical advantage according to terrain, 
along with the lowest possible weight. 
More recently, the development of the 'tear~drop' helmet would also create a great deal 
of controversy, it too transforming the cyclist into a being more alien than human in 
form. Again, the intended purpose behind this innovation is performance 
enhancement, through the reduction of wind resistance. 
In the context of these cycling technologies, a number of claims can be made about their 
intended effects. More often than not, cycling technology has had the explicit aim of 
making the cyclist go faster. Whilst this is not done by altering the athlete, it is achieved 
my manipulating the form of a cyclist to reduce what might be termed as performance 
inhibitors (Perry, 1988). Arguably, this is simply a disguise for making the athlete 
superhuman though the example is complicated as there can be no real sense of what a 
cyclist is, to know whether reducing wind resistance gives a truer reflection of that 
cyclist's abilities, or whether it de-skills the activity. 
3.4 Preliminary Conclusions on a Conceptual Framework for Understanding 
Technology in Sport 
A number of preliminary conclusions can be made on the basis of this case~by~ase 
overview of specific innovations. 
Technology is too Broad a Concept (Top~Down does not work) 
Initially, it can be claimed that the generic concepts of technology, performance 
enhancement, safety, and so on, cannot be used to derive general principles that can 
lead to an ethical theory about sport technology. It is not possible to make general 
conclusions about the efficacy of, for example, enhancing safety in a sport, or re-skiWng an 
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activity. The ethical status of these intended effects can be understood only in the 
context of the specific case (the applied context). This is not to say that conclusions 
made about anyone technology cannot inform other ethical inquiries about similar 
technologies. However, it is not sufficient to abstract the intended effects from their 
context. 
Technology has varying degrees of moral content in sport 
Second, it can be argued that new technologies are not always accepted and fans, 
athletes, spectators, and governing bodies are not prepared simply to accept that any 
technology is acceptable. As such, because technologies matter in sport, they raise the 
need to assert some ethical framework for understanding them. Thus far, it has been 
shown that there are various responses that are given to new technologies, which reflect 
a particular way of asserting an ethical perspective. Thus, what might be termed the 
governing body perspective is evident from the case,studies where some appeal to the 
integrity or essential natures about the sport is asserted. In other cases, technologies are 
seen as unacceptable because they introduce an inequality that is considered unfair, such 
as the fibreglass pole for pole,vaulting or the Fast,Skin swimming suit. As such, an 
initial basis for concluding what is right or wrong with any innovation in sport, must 
entail an articulation of sporting values. It requires asking the basic ethical question 
'what is wrong with this technology?' Furthermore, some discussion must be made 
about the varying perspectives, which can be conflictive. For example, the interests of 
the sport, the spectators, or the athletes can lead to the assertion of different moral 
standards that requires substantial navigation. 
In response to these conclusions, it is incumbent to specify what will be the focus of the 
remaining part of this thesis and how these initial conclusions can inform a more in' 
depth discussion about the ethical implications of sport technology. It has been 
concluded that any ethical analysis must be directed at a specific case of technology 
rather than technology in general. These conclusions, thus, serve as a guide for a more 
detailed analysis of a given technology. As was indicated at the outset of this the:-;is, the 
inten:':-;t here is to understand the ethical implications of genetic modification (GM) in 
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sport. The reasons for selecting GM as the central example of ethics in sport technology 
require clarification. Indeed, the investigation could proceed in a number of directions 
from here, particularly since previous literature examining sport and any kind of 
technology (except for doping) is relatively non--existent. However, GM is a particularly 
interesting case to understand in sport and, unlike other technologies, can speak to a 
great breadth of issues about legitimate performance modifiers in sport. Arguably, GM 
is likely to challenge the acceptability of performance enhancement most persuasively in 
the next decade. As well, it is an innovation quite distinct from other methods of 
doping and drug use and which, thus, raises new challenges to applying arguments about 
the legitimacy of performance enhancement and sporting values. 
Applying information and knowledge about genetics to the practice of sport is not 
something particularly new. Indeed, the practice reflects an evolution of techniques 
used by physiologists and other scientists to better understand how the body works and 
how to render it more capable of performance. Nevertheless, altering the genetic 
composition of athletes 1S an emerging science and something that has attracted 
substantial criticism already. 
The relationship between elite sport and genetic engineering has become increasingly 
apparent, particularly since such organisations as the World Anti,Doping Agency 
(WADA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have begun to take the issue 
seriously. In June 2001, the IOC convened a working,group to examine how best to 
address the prospect of genetic modifications in sport. Already, key figures in the 
sporting world have begun to condemn the application of genetics to sports, though the 
necessary ethical inquiry to ascertain its ethical status has not yet taken place. One 
alarming concern is that the direction of a policy about GM in sport already seems to 
treat it as another method of doping. This approach completely misrepresents this new 
technology and that substantial ethical inquiry must ensue to arrive at a coherent policy 
in sport. As such, an important rationale for studying the ethical discourse about 
genetics in sport is its immediate importance. It can be argued that the present time is a 
critical period in the formulation of arguments about genetics and that such discussion 
can detcrmine the manner in which genetics is handled by sports. Thus. the present 
interest is to try and inform this discussion and provoke a way of theorising value in 
sport that is more coherent than the straightforward policy of strict liabilityll that governs 
anti-doping codes. 
The conceptual framework derived from the examples considered thus far, provides a 
manner in which this ethical analysis must take place. The aspiration to derive over, 
riding principles that can inform a broad debate about technology in sport is considered 
insufficient, which challenges the manner in which sports governing bodies often 
theorise the notion of performance enhancement. The examples reveal the imperative 
to break-down technology into individual cases and then, perhaps, even further so to 
allow for quite specific conclusions to be made about each kind of innovation. Without 
such conclusions, it could be tempting to try and assert some guiding moral principle to 
determine whether genetics (or other technologies) are 'good' or 'bad' for sport. 
However, such an approach vastly oversimplifies the complex relationship between sport 
and technology. 
4. Ethical Implications of Genetic Modification (GM) in 
Sport 
4.1 Outline of Case 
Already, genetic engineering has been used for experimental purposes in developing 
research to treat disease through alteration in non~germ line human cells (somatic); 
those cells that are not hereditary (Gardner, 1995). The effectiveness of this research is 
still unclear, though it is not difficult to imagine that, if successful, then it could 
generate interest in the benefits of germ line (hereditary) therapy and enhancement. 
While engagmg in philosophical discussions about GM might once have been mere 
futurological discourse, the last decade - if not more - has shown that societies are not 
always prepared for new technologies as they become utilised. The moratorium set by 
former U.S. President Clinton in 1997 on the cloning of human beings seems indicative 
of this, particularly, in the case of genetic technologies. Some four years later, in the 
summer of 2001, an Italian scientist announced that there will be the birth of the first 
cloned human baby in 2002. Only months after this, the same scientist announced that 
a woman was 8 weeks pregnant with the first cloned human baby. 
Nevertheless, the science of gene therapy is in relatively early stages of development and 
much is unknown about complex gene disorders and our ability to do anything to 
manipulate genes with any degree of safety. However, a great deal of literature has 
emerged from biomedical ethics bioethics) to address this new technology and its 
imminent reality is being taken seriously on a global scale. Within this literature it is 
possible to identify phases that reveal how the ethical discussions surrounding genetics 
have moved from principle~based approaches, to arguments that recognises bioethics as 
being a discipline requiring a more casuistic approach to ethics. 
Neither of these ways of doing ethics has been without criticism, though the comments 
arc more generic to the theoretical approach than unique to the applied cases for which 
it is used. Thus, principalism - the process of applying moral principles to derive ethical 
conduct in specific contexts - is criticised for being too absolute and vague, departing 
from contested ideals without any real connection with specific cases. Conversely, 
casuistry - literally the study of cases to arrive at ethical conclusions - is critiqued for 
departing from a view from nowhere and is seen as superficial and somewhat arbitrary 
therefore, as was recognised in the methodology. Nevertheless, in the case of bioethics, 
it is reasonable to argue that the specificity of the issues under discussion demands a 
more casuistic approach to ethics, and this is also reflective of current trends in 
bioethics. As Carter (1998, html) explains, 
In place of moral theory and the application of universal principles of moral 
action or agency, methods of bioethical inquiry from these perspectives include 
narrative and interpretation, case study and casuistry, and procedural decision~ 
making by consensus, as occurs in many bioethics committees and commissions. 
As well, bioethics has now a noticeable presence within philosophical literature, which is 
addressing the many implications of gene technology. Within the last ten years, the rise 
of bioethics has been noticeable through the emergence of national bioethical 
committees, such as the UK Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the US National Bioethics 
Advisory Committee, and UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee. Indeed, it is 
relevant to be aware of these debates for the current thesis as the ethical discussions can 
provide useful parallels in the subsequent conclusions. 
During this time, bioethical research has considered such broad issues as the patenting 
of human DNA and problems with ownership of life (Miah, 2002). Most recently, this 
has been highlighted by the publication of the Human Genome Project, the biggest 
scientific collaboration in the history of medicine. This project has completed the 
mapping of the entire human genome and, thus, provides a vast source of information 
about the nature of human genes (Harris, 1998; Reiss and Straughan, 1996; Wilmut, 
1999). From this research, concerns have arisen about the power of genetic knowledge 
to instil the essentialist fallacy that genes alone can determine a person's health (Elliott, 
1999; Keyley, 1996; Macer, 1990; Nagl, 1998). Indeed, similar arguments could be 
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made in respect of sport, when arguing the limits to genetic influence upon 
performance. 
When applied to the sporting context, there is, however, more of a need to understand 
how GM might be relevant. While it will be shown that research is developing to apply 
knowledge about genetics to sport, it is not clear whether these applications will be 
realised. Presently, many of those that would lead to enhanced athletes are 
experimental, though other kinds of application might be equally alarming. 
Nevertheless, because the technology is still somewhat hypothetical, it is necessary to 
make some tentative assumptions that will underpin the ethical discourse. 
Assumptions about the genetically modified athlete 
It is possible to genetically engineer a human to be better at sport 
Perhaps the most immediate question that must be argued about genetics is whether it is 
actually possible to engineer a person with a particular modification in mind - in this 
case, a predisposition for athletic excellence. Is it possible to engineer a great 
mathematician, artist, athlete, or philosopher? Whereas the bioethical dilemmas 
challenge the acceptability of gene enhancement (getting from therapy to enhancement), 
this particular assumption is about the possibiUties of the technology. Without the 
possibility, the issue becomes more speculative philosophical theorising than applied 
ethical research that is grounded in substantive social problems. 
While there has been no engineering of specific genes in order to enhance a person's 
physical capability beyond what is humanly possible, some research has suggested that 
specific genes are responsible for specific kinds of predisposition such as criminality or 
alcoholism (Philpott, 1995). Such claims are of interest more to the tabloid press than 
the serious scientific community, where associations between social behaviour and 
genetics are tenuous at best, though, more often, entirely rejected (Ho, 1998). 
Nevertheless, within a sporting context, a substantial amount of research has begun to 
take place to explore these links. 
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The application of genetic knowledge to sports tends to have been limited to elite 
performers, where the benefits of performance knowledge are clearest. Hoberman 
(1992) makes reference to this imminent technology by identifying its logical 
inevitability in performance,based sport. Some years later, studies are beginning to 
explore the ways in which genetic information could be used to augment the human 
athlete. Of particular mention is the use of gene therapy in sports medicine, specifically 
to reduce the time spent injured by genetically repairing the injured athlete (Lams am , 
Fu, Robbins, and Evans, 1997). Dr. H. Lee Sweeney has conducted comparable 
research at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Sweeney has researched the possibilities 
for using the protein called insulin,like growth factor,1 (IGF 1) to repair muscle tissue. 
Dr. Geoffrey Goldspink at the Royal Free and University College Medical School in 
London makes similar findings. Using a form of IGF,1 called mechano growth factor 
(MGF) with mice, which is used to treat muscle,wasting diseases such as muscular 
dystrophy, Goldspink's team were able to isolate muscle tissue and insert the MGF gene. 
The results showed an increase in muscle mass by approximately 20 percent after two 
weeks. 
At Harvard University, Dr. Nadia Rosenthal used IGF,1 in gene therapy in mice to halt 
depletion of muscle strength that comes with old age. As Rosenthal notes, "Older mice 
increased their muscle strength by as much as 27 percent in the experiment, which 
suggested possibilities for athletes as well as for preserving muscle strength in elderly 
people and increasing muscle power in those who suffer from muscular dystrophy" 
(cited in Longman, 2001, html). 
As well, genetic science has endeavoured to target specific genes that can be identified as 
determining biological characteristics, such as the capability for endurance (Cogan, 
1998). Recently, research has taken place to identify the effects of inserting genes into a 
virus to produce a specific bodily effect. Such research has taken place at a number of 
instiUItions, particularly using erythropoietin (EPO) to increase endurance. For 
example, at the University of Chicago, Jeffrey Leiden used an adenovirus to deliver epo 
to mice and monkeys, to observe whether it would render a difference in biological 
capabilities. By inserting the gene into a virus strand, it was subsequently transported 
throughout the body and did, indeed, have the effect of increasing the level of red blood 
cells that were being pumped around the body. In performance, this produces a similar 
effect to that of blood~doping, which operates on a similar principle by re~introducing 
blood into the body to boost the amount of oxygen being transported around the body, 
to off set fatigue. Thus, genetically inserting epo into an athlete could increase the 
capabilities for endurance when active, which would be useful for any long distance 
event. 
While no such research has been applied to humans, the possibilities for improving 
endurance capabilities for the purpose of competing are clear. Indeed, similar work has 
been conducted by Dr. Steven Rudich, of University of Michigan, where inserting epo 
into the leg muscles of monkeys produced a significantly elevated red blood cell level for 
20 to 30 weeks (Longman, 2001). A slightly different kind of gene therapy has been 
directed towards increasing muscle mass. Again, this has taken place at a number of 
institutions and involves the protein IGF~ 1. 
In spite of this research, simply because specific genes might influence specific 
capabilities does not make it possible to engineer athletic capability with any degree of 
certainty or safety. By altering one gene, one might actually influence the function of 
other genes to the detriment of the individual's health (Harris, 1998). Certainly within 
the immediate future, there seems little reason to suppose one might engineer a specific 
gene without any imbalance occurring between other genes - a phenomenon known as 
p~eiotropy. As such, it might be deemed too risky to do any kind of engineering for any 
kind of gene. Beyond engineering the 4,000 genes involved in single~gene disorders 
such as Huntington's disease or muscular dystrophy, the possibilities of medical genetics 
are in question (Appleyard, 1999). 
Although one can argue that the evidence is inconclusive in showing whether genetic 
manipulation could safely engineer genes with a view to a specific kind of enhancement, 
there is growing evidence to suggest that this might be possible. Furthermore, when one 
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recognises the infancy of genetic research and what has already been achieved in this 
relatively short amount of time, it would seem naive to ignore such possibilities. 
There would be an interest to genetically modify humans for sport 
The second assumption that is made within this analysis is that people would actually 
want to use genetic engineering to make their children more capable for sport (or for 
any activity). In this assumption, there appear to be two issues that must be considered. 
First of all, it must be argued whether persons would seek to engineer their children at 
all. Second, it must be considered why, out of all the possible kinds of alterations that 
might be available, one would choose to engineer an embryo to become a super~athlete. 
After all, it is likely that enhanced capability for sport would be but one of a 
supermarket of genetic possibilities that could be chosen. Thus, it might be possible to 
engineer an embryo to be better predisposed to become a great doctor, carer, musician, 
or scientist. 
To deal with the former difficulty initially, it could be argued that there is something 
unnecessary about enhancing the genetic composition of a human embryo. As any 
loving parent could testify, life is so very precious that if one's child was born free from 
any causes of pain or discomfort, then to seek improvement upon this would seem 
ungrateful to such good fortune. Indeed, it might be considered immoral to genetically 
engineer such a child if there were a potential for jeopardising the baby's future health 
that might ensue by doing so. However, again it is possible to consider the hypothetical 
prospect that the health risks would not be of significant concern. Moreover, if 
necessary, it could be argued that the health risks are non~existent and that engineering 
one's child would definitely be without any cause of harm to the child. It is conceivable 
that, still, a parent would not wish to effect such fundamental changes to the body of 
their child and so, the engineering would still not be particularly valuable. In some 
cases, it can be supposed that a parent would not wish for their child to go through any 
kind of surgical operation so early in life. 
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However, a further complication might be added if two possible scenarios are imagined. 
First, the circumstances could be such that the genetic alteration would not be at all 
invasive. Thus, it might simply be a case of the child taking a spoon full of medicine. 
This minimisation of the technology's invasiveness removes the possible claims that 
invasive medical technologies are morally problematic. Alternatively, it is possible to 
imagine that the baby (or even the foetus) has a known genetic malfunction of some 
kind that can be corrected by GM. As well, the further condition can be added that the 
parents - in seeking for their child to be healthy - might also make their child better 
than well. The child must go through some invasive surgery, though to make the child 
well or better than well would pose no difference in risk. Thus, the parents are faced 
with the choice of making their child much more capable without it posing any greater 
risk to the child's health. There would seem no immediate reasons for why the parents 
would not wish to modify their child for the better (presuming that the child's health is 
the only concern). 
As for whether people would choose to enhance the athletic capability of their child 
over other characteristics, athletic capability has in its favour that such engineering could 
be described so as to yield direct health benefits, whereas to enhance the brain 
functioning of an individual might not. Of course, one might respond to this by 
arguing that genetic engineering to create an elite athlete would actually be to create an 
unhealthy body, since an elite athlete's body is abnormally fit and not healthy from a 
long,term perspective. However, this objection need not be relevant since the 
circumstances need not assert such specific enhancements as specialised training would 
bring. Rather, these discussions are concerned with engineering general health 
properties that would provide subtle, though significant, changes to athletic capability. 
This is an important point as some ethical discussions about genetics have been 
criticised for being completely far,fetched to the point of not being genuine applied 
ethical issues. As renowned bioethicist Peter Singer argues, the claims to cloning elite 
athletes and other great historical figures are completely ridiculous as it completely 
misunderstands what are the implications of the technology (Singer, 1999). In contrast, 
the kinds of GM that are of concern here are those that could enhance human 
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capacities for athletic capability. For example, it is not being claimed that it is possible 
to engineer an elite swimmer or football player. Rather (and at most), it is argued that 
GM could provide some basis for making humans more predisposed to having the 
potential for being an exceptional athlete by providing the genetic basis for elite 
performances in a broad sense. 
It seems reasonable to assume that such opportunities would be of interest to some 
parties even if such motives were morally questionable. When faced with the choice of 
whether or not to try and ensure a healthier future for one's child (providing the risk is 
negligible), the logical, individualistic, choice would surely be to do so. There would 
seem something quite logical about trying to ensure a more fruitful future for one's child 
by safe genetic engineering. Indeed, conferring genetic enhancement might simply be 
construed as being akin to "giving one's child a good education" (Ayabe and Tan, 1995, 
p.463). 
OM would render an ledge' in competition 
There would seem to be no other reason to genetically enhance one's child (and 
subsequently to consider the ethical implications of doing so), than for the very 
knowledge that the risk of engineering a life that could be 'normal' would be far less 
than the potential benefits. Unless there can be some degree of certainty that the 
engineering will have the effect of placing one's child at an advantage, then there seems 
little reason to pursue it. 12 As such, there is a need to address whether genetic heritage 
actually makes a difference to the success of an athlete or the health of an individual. Is 
it really possible to argue the significance of this one characteristic, when so many other 
factors influence an athlete's performance? Arguably, the many years of training, dietary 
specialisation, failure and striving to better oneself that an athlete must endure, cannot 
be undermined by simply genetically enhancing oneself, as appears from placing 
importance in the ethical consideration of this technology. Yet, accepting that genetil' 
heritage does play some part in determining success does not commit one to 'generic 
essentialism' - the view that all that consists of being human is an individual's gene til' 
predisposition. The evidence that genetics does make a significll1t differencl' [d 
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performance in sport is limited Cogan, 1998). However, given that the difference 
between elite competitors is now so marginal (Kearney, 1996), the ability to enhance 
even a small component that affects performance is an advantage that is likely to be 
exploited (even if human life is not). As such, it is an important ethical consideration 
because of the danger of placing so much emphasis upon it in determining which 
athletes will be successful. 
Genetically modified athletes will not be the only kind of athletes 
The final assumption made by this analysis concerns the way in which engineered 
humans would emerge within society. Recognising that societies will not, suddenly, find 
that persons who are not genetically engineered no longer exist, the fairly unproblematic 
assumption is made that there will be circumstances whereby the genetically engineered 
will live alongside the non~ngineered. This likelihood raises questions about equity, 
ontological issues of normalcy, and the potential for prejudice between persons of 
different genetic capabilities that are quite extraordinary. One might wish to draw 
parallels with the kinds of differences between people of different cultural origins and 
argue that the engineered class would be of a similar difference. However, unlike the 
distinguishing characteristics of any race or culture, the defining boundaries will be, 
overtly, biological - which seems to challenge a great deal of work to combat racial 
boundaries deriving from alleged biological difference (Appleyard, 1999). 
The practical ethical implications of this might be to argue that such technologies are 
unacceptable, since they would serve to promote segregation and boundaries between 
people, the removal of which has been the ambition of much social work, education, 
and integration. This is not to suggest that the engineered class will be any better than 
the non,engineered. However, it would most certainly be the case that a non,engineered 
class would be noticeably disadvantaged, when compared with people whom are 
. 11 . d 13 gcnetlca y engmeere . For sport, this matter has practical implications precisely 
because sport aspires to such ideals as fair play and equal competition. The degree to 
which sport really does embody these values would thus be tested by the existence of 
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genetically engineered athletes (and the way In which ethics 1S theorised by sports 
authorities in respect of the technology). 
Together, these assumptions provide some basis for considering that the implications of 
GM for sport are significant and that they raise an array of ethical dilemmas for the 
organisation of sport. As well, these assumptions provide an underpinning rationale for 
the ethical analysis of genetics in sport, which is critical to the methodological approach 
to ethics in this study (Ozawa, 1996). 
Applications of Genetic Research to Sport 
The current, scientific research interested in utilising genetics in sport is not exhaustive 
of the possible applications of GM to sport. As has been claimed in the earlier 
categorisation of technologies, any ethical analysis must be directed towards specific 
cases, each of which have varying ethical implications. Perhaps the most succinct and 
comprehensive articulation of the varied kinds of application of genetic knowledge is 
from Munthe (2000). In Munthe's analysis of the various forms of gene technology that 
might be used to engineer sports champions, he considers four main categories. 
First, Munthe discusses the possibility of how information about genetic predispositions 
and their influence on the body might be used to fine~tune already established methods 
of training by manufacturing more effective drugs genomics). Such information is 
comparable to how other scientific discoveries within sports medicine have yielded 
greater ways of making training more efficient. The relevance of findings from the 
Human Genome Project would be of particular relevance here, though it is important to 
recognise that this application does not entail any GM of the athlete at alL Rather, it is 
simply a process of utilising knowledge about genetics to create more effective ways of 
enhancing performance using drugs or by optimising training methods. 
Second, Munthe outlines the possibility of engineering the somatic cells of the body -
the non~hereditary cells. The non~hereditary cells of the body are those that constitute 
the clements of the individual that are not passed down to the next generation. Quite 
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rightly, Munthe identifies such techniques as being most comparable to the ways in 
which athletes currently use other methods of doping. The procedure is performed 
upon already fully developed human beings. A useful example of this is the possibility 
that somatic cell engineering could be used to develop genetically modified red blood 
cells to enhance endurance in a way that is comparable to the effects of erythropoietin 
(EPO) and blood doping. 
One stage further from this possibility is the engineering of germ~line cells, Munthe's 
third category. Such engineering would most likely take place very early in life (within 
some days of conception), due to the complexity of engineering such genes. As such, the 
effects are hereditary and have the added ethical implication of affecting subsequent 
generations. 
Munthe's final category of genetic technology is its use for the pre~selection of athletes. 
This seemingly eugenic possibility, where prospective athletes could be chosen on the 
basis of their genetic predisposition for athletic capabilities is, Munthe suggests, not very 
different from coaches going to watch young athletes and selecting which are most 
deserving of investment. 
A similar categorisation is given by Tamburrini (2002), though it is also made explicit 
that the pre~selection of athletes could be made at the embryonic stages of human 
development and not only by testing infants and young children. As Tamburrini (2002, 
p.254) argues, this would ensure that "resources can be concentrated on those 'good 
prognoses' who are in possession of the right physiological conditions to become top 
athletes". The use of genetic pre~selection, derives from the medical utility of screening 
for genetic dysfunction. The basic principle is to introduce a probe into the DNA 
molecule of the subject. This probe attaches itself to the subject's DNA with a view to 
revealing disorders in the genetic make~up (Macer, 1990). 
As well, Tamburrini (2002, p.255) offers some further detail on the process of germ~line 
CM, that recognises there are two methods of conducting such engineering. The fir:st 
entails a similar process to engineering somatic cells, though the cells are then 
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"introduced into a blastocyst, thereby changing the germ,line of the future individual." 
Alternatively, Tamburrini describes, "the other procedure involves cloning. An adult 
somatic cell is genetically modified and, then, the DNA of this cell is introduced into an 
embryo by way of cloning, from which the new individual originates." 
Consequently, the possible applications of genetic science to sport maybe summarised 
thus: 
1. Genomics (using genetic information to improve methods of performance 
enhancement by creating more effective drugs and training techniques). 
2. Somatic,cell modification (altering the non,hereditary cells of the body, such as those 
specific to muscle tissue). 
3. Germ,line modification (altering the hereditary cells of the body very early on in 
life). 
4. Genetic Pre,selection (using information of a person's genotype to conclude 
suitability for sport either at embryonic stage or infantile stage). 
Thus, the applications of genetic techniques are various, as are the ethical issues raised 
by each. As has been identified already, the kinds of genetic modification that would be 
applicable to sport would be therapeutic or enhancing and the legitimacy of the 
technique would seem to hinge upon this distinction. The example of pre,selection does 
not really correspond to this notion, though the rationale behind deriving such 
knowledge for sport would, similarly, be for ensuring the most capable genotype for a 
given activity. Consequently, the ethical analysis of genetic technologies in sport must 
deal with the various cases separately. 
Nevertheless, some genenc claims can be made that underpin each of the vanous 
applications described above, which can provide a useful starting point for 
understanding their efficacy. These claims can be placed into the conceptual 
framework provided in section 3.1 to understand what specific kinds of effect are 
implied by GM. 
4.2 The Ethical Issues 
Making sense of these various applications and their ethical implications in the context 
of GM is now possible using the conceptual framework provided earlier in the thesis. 
To reiterate, the earlier conclusions argued that the moral content of these applications 
must be understood in terms of their intended effects. Consequently, it is necessary to 
understand how the effects in the framework are affected as a result of genetic 
technologies. 
MAKING SPORT POSSIBLE: How does GM make sport possible? 
In reference to 'making sport possible', two perspectives can be asserted that describe the 
ethical limitations upon using technology based upon the conceptual framework. The 
first can be called the radica~ view and stipulates that, 
Techno~ogy ought not to be emp~oyed where it is not necessary; where necessary means 
that, without the techno~ogy, the sport cou~d not be p~yed. 
This perspective recognises that technology is often a necessary and constitutive aspect of 
any sport, though, importantly, does not endorse the continual development of 
innovations. For example, this view would accept that technology is necessary for the 
sport of tennis to be played. Without a tennis racket, tennis ball, or net, there would be 
no game. However, this view does not consider it necessary (and thus, ethical) to 
continually re,design such equipment. Although it might seem that the principle is 
essentialist in character, it does not base ethical decisions about technology in the 
context of some ideal form. Rather, it simply asserts that, for example, tennis played 
with hi,tech rackets is a different kind of game, than tennis with wooden rackets. In this 
sense, parallels can be seen with this and the earlier discussion about traditional 
climbing and sport climbing. It is not that the view need claim one ideal of the sport as 
being superior to another, but that they are two different kinds of activity and, if our 
interest is the former version of the sport, then the technology ought not be employed. 
On this view then, it also takes a position on the ethical acceptability of re,skilling a 
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sport using technology. However, since GM does not have any consequences on re, 
skilling, it is not necessary to delve any further into this matter. 
A more moderate view, which is perhaps more representative of how governing bodies 
address change in sport argues that 
Techno[ogica[ devdopment is acceptab[e where it is required to anow the continued 
enjoyment of the kinds of performance to which it aspires. 
This view is comparable to assertions about using technology to preserve an alleged 
'integrity' of the game (Gelberg, 1996; Houlihan, 1999; Simon, 1991). Again, this can 
be seen clearly in the tennis example given earlier, where it is claimed by the ITF that the 
need to alter the tennis balls was premised upon wanting the game to continue being of 
a prescribed character. In this case, the criticism was that the dominance of the serve in 
men's tennis (which might be seen as a revenge effect of other technological 
developments) had rendered an imbalance in the game's playability.14 Thus, the 
technological change in the ball type (at least experimentally) had been justified on the 
basis of wishing to maintain the p[ayabiUty of the game. 
In this case, it seems evident that an ideal version of the sport is being asserted. The 
credibility of this kind of argument need not be addressed immediately, since - as has 
been noted - the focus here is to understand how GM fits within this view. Although 
one might critique such an essentialist approach, it may prove to have little relevance for 
the present case if the claim is not warranted. Consequently, the radical view would 
conclude that GM is not at all ethically sustainable. As well, from the moderate 
perspective, GM is unethical unless its use contributes to gaining a nearer 
approximation of the ideal sport. Thus, in order to legitimate any kind of GM on this 
view requires demonstrating that its use promotes relevant values in sport. 
Intuitively, it would seem that GM does not make sport possible. Sports have not 
needed athletes to be genetically modified to be playable. Indeed, all that gives sport 
value currently has been due without any credit to GM. Thus, GM is not like an item of 
sports equipment, without which it, would not be possible to play the sport. As such, it 
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would not seem relevant to consider GM as a technology that has the effect of making 
sport possible and, as such, it is tempting to dismiss it as unethicaL However, a more 
considered inquiry into this question reveals that it is a matter that is premised upon a 
theory of sport - what it really means to be playing sport. To reduce sport simply to 
teams or individuals competing with the necessary equipment in the relevant court and 
according to some rules, is not necessarily sufficient to conclude that sport is taking 
place (Feezell, 1988). Rather, answering the question demands a greater explanation 
about what it means to be playing sport. 
From this perspective, then, GM might actually make sport possible if one accepts that a 
basic value of sport is that it is interested in the surpassing of known limits or, more 
generally, the fascination with producing extraordinary performances. Thus, one basis 
for concluding that GM is ethically justified is that it is a necessary technology in order 
for sports to continue breaking human limits. The unstated assumption is that sporting 
value derives from the breaking of human limits and it is here where the argument must 
be made more substantiaL However, there is a significant empirical element to the 
claim that also requires clarification: Are sport performances reaching the limits of 
unmodified human capability? As well, affirming the answer to whether GM makes 
sports possible requires analysing whether, accepting that there are human limits, GM 
would be the preferred method by which further enhancement should take placee. 
The Empirical Claim 
Research lacks a consensus about whether human beings are approaching or, indeed, 
have already attained natural limits in elite sport. As Loland (1998a, html) argues, 
As biological beings, our capacities for improving speed, explosivity and strength 
are limited. It is, for example, inconceivable to think of a hundred~meter sprint in, 
say, 5.00 seconds. Our phylogenetic potential does not change over night, and a 
hundred~meter sprint is still one hundred meters long. 
In contrast, Kirsch (1986, p.18) argues that the following factors can provide much more 
scope for enhancing athletic performance: 
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1. Constant increase of the medium height 
2. Increase in the number of people who practice sport and increase of the children of 
great athletes who show excellent disposition to sports 
3. Selection based on talent 
4. Methodical encouragement of the more talented athletes 
5. Improvement of training methods and, consequently, better schooling of the 
coaches 
6. Improvement of sports techniques, mainly as a result of biomechanical research 
7. Technological development (improvement of the materials and revision of the rules) 
8. Protection and assistance of the athletes from the community as a whole 
9. The public opinion's growing interest that encourages competitive sports, especially 
, 
women s sports 
10. The effective policies of the Federations. 
However, answering this empirical question is not really the interest of this thesis. 
Rather, the consequences of either conclusion are important to consider. If, indeed, 
humans are not approaching their performance limits, then there is no basis for arguing 
that OM is ethically justified on account of it making sport possible or, at least, that 
other means might be more desirable to employ before using OM. However, given the 
ambiguity in research about this matter, it is worthwhile considering that it might be the 
case that human limits are approaching and so, to respond to the ethical discussion 
surrounding this possibility. 
The Evaluative Claim or, The Value of Limit Breaking in Sport: Does it necessitate 
the use of OM? 
The evaluative claim in relation to human limits is not at all contingent upon empirical 
research. It speaks to the associated values of sport and is evaluative because it asks a 
question about what kinds of values ought to be associated with sport. The perspective 
concedes an affirmative response to the initial question that humans are, indeed, 
approaching their natural limits and subsequently, inquires into the value of sport that 
is driven by an interest in sustaining performance enhancement. Thus, the argument 
preceding this inquiry into the value of limit breaking is as follows: 
PI: Maintaining sporting value is necessarily tied to limit breaking 
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P2: Non,natural performance modifications are necessary to break limits 
C: Sporting value requires non,natural performance modifications. 
Despite the unfortunate (and contested) use of the term 'natural,' which will be 
problematised later, the following argument begins with accepting premise 2. It is now 
required to argue whether Premise 1 is persuasive. As will be clear from the conclusion, 
accepting both premises does not necessarily have anything to do with GM. However, 
in this case, the interest is solely with genetic technologies that do actually enhance the 
human being. Consequently, it is not all kinds of GM that are of interest here. 
Genetic pre,selection is of little interest to this debate, as it does not alter the human 
being in anyway. At most, it could be used as way of refining the pool of elite athletes to 
ensure that those competing are the very best possible (biologically). As well, the 
interest is not in GM that can render therapeutic effects on the athlete. As such, the 
debate is guided towards technologies that are not taken seriously in the scientific 
literature (Le. genetic enhancement). The possibility of actually enhancing a human 
being's capacity for sport performance is rejected by the medical community, as 
inherently unethical and scientifically dubious. For reasons identified earlier in relation 
to the effect of pleiotropy, the possibility of being able to genetically engineer specific 
performance characteristics is uncertain and important to consider for this reason. 
Furthermore, a limiting condition should be placed on this ethical argument so that the 
weight of conclusions from these two questions is put into context. The reliance upon 
human limits and the importance of world records as a basis for legitim ising 
performance enhancing technologies, is most relevant only to some sports. In athletic 
events such as sprinting, jumping, and throwing, the world record is clearly discernible 
and is given value. However, in sports such as football or hockey, it is less clear that 
human limits are important. Thus, this would seem to lessen the strength of any 
possible conclusion in regard to 'making sport possible'. As Loland (2000, p.44) states, 
many ball games are 
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built on a different logic. Performances are not quantifiable in exact physical, 
mathematical entities, and there is little or no talk of records here. Performances 
are relative and depend upon interplay between competitors. Every game is 
different and cannot easily be compared in quantitative terms. 
However, in contrast to Loland, it can be argued that all sports are governed by human 
capabilities, no matter how complex the game. As such, accepting that these capabilities 
are fixed, then the implications of human limits does have importance even for, say, 
football. Every kind of game can be broken down into skills, of which the significance 
of human limits plays a role. The most complex ball games are premised upon a 
relatively fixed idea of the human body. For example, the height of a basketball net is 
relative to the height of a basketball player. The size of a soccer or hockey goal is relative 
to the size and reactive possibilities of the goal,keeper in conjunction with the ability of a 
striker to be sufficiently accurate enough to make the challenge of goal,keeping difficult, 
but not impossible. In tennis, the limits of human reaction time are suggesting very 
serious consequences for the game as the speed of the serve continues to improve. 
Thus, the relevance of human limits does impact upon game playing sports as well as 
individual performance sports, though in different ways and perhaps to greater and 
lesser extents. While it might be the case that the attainment of human limits would 
not prevent the playing of these games or imply that they will not be interesting 
interactions to watch, it does suggest the possible disappearance of extraordinary 
performances. 
On this view, it is claimed that significant value is placed in games where innovative and 
extraordinary performances are exhibited and that the possibility of witnessing such 
events is part of the appeal of game sports. The interest to see new tricks and techniques 
using a ball are limited by the physical limitations of the body. If it is not possible to see 
new kinds of creative game,play, then one is left somewhat disappointed with the 
repetitive game event. However, the degree to which this is of value and the extent to 
which it will take priority over other aspects of sport is in need of questioning. 
The importance of record breaking and, more generally, of providing more spectacular 
human performances is reflective of various perspectives about what value in sport has 
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become in the latter part of the 20th century. It is not unreasonable to claim that elite 
sport is exciting and valued in some way because it is reflective of the pinnacle of human 
performance (Tamburrini, 1998). As Loland (1998a, html) recognises, 
The fascination for records is a key element in our fascination for sports. Records are 
the stuff of which legends and myths are made. Johnny Weissmuller's 1924 one 
hundred meter freestyle swim under the minute, Wilma Rudolph's fabulous sprint 
records from the early 1960s, and Michael Johnson's explosive two hundred meter 
record run at the 1996 Atlanta Games, are all paradigmatic examples of Coubertin's 
ideals. The record stands as a symbolic message of human greatness and infinite 
possibility. 
By extension, Tannsjo (1998) refers to our fascination for excellence as an admiration 
for strength rather than weakness - the winner is admired. Indeed, T amburrini makes 
explicit this claim, arguing that "in general terms, the results achieved by an athlete are a 
central element in the attribution of excellence" (pA2). Also in favour of associating 
performance attainments with excellence in sport, Hoberman (1992) argues that the 
pursuit of modern sport is necessarily about experimenting with human limits. This 
value derived from deep~seated ideas about what constitutes human identity and 
possibilities, and is caught up in the Enlightenment project of progress. For this reason, 
what makes physical achievements important to sport must be questioned. As Loland 
(2000, pA2) notes, "The logic of quantifiable progress has in a common~sense manner 
become a normative ideal in sports." 
However, it is the content of excellence that is of importance here. Tamburrini (1998, 
pA4) critiques Tannsjo on account of his narrow definition of excellence as strength and, 
in response, argues that 'provided we adopt a plural notion of excellence, I see no 
inconsistency in admiring the most excellent athletes without feeling contempt for the 
less skilled" . Yet, T amburrini' s thesis is equally premised upon excellence as 
performance and such prejudice is revealed when he claims that "Handicapped athletes, 
for instance, only achieve relative top performances" (pAS). Aside from critiquing the 
comparison of disabled sport with able~bodied sport, it can be argued that this 
performative basis for deriving a theory about sporting excellence is relatively shallow. 
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Indeed, it can be argued that the value of breaking human limits does not override other 
values and thus, necessitate the employment of performance enhancing technologies. 
Even if some value in sport is attributed to the importance of results, it is not necessarily 
the case that results are, or should be, a primary value. Indeed, the importance of results 
in sport has not always been so clear. Even within some non,western sports, where the 
importance of winning is significant, the emphasis on it is secondary to the ritual and 
spectacle of the event. Indeed, Allen Guttmann writes in his 1978 text From Ritual to 
Record about the peculiarity of modern, Western sport to place so much importance in 
recording sporting achievements. Guttmann is puzzled by the modern obsession with 
results and measurement, which, he argues, is born out of the 1 tl century scientific 
revolution. Thus, an initial retort to excellence as performance is to recognise that there 
are other ways of valuing sport. 
This peculiarity raises the question about to how valuable performance enhancement is 
assessed within sport (elite or otherwise). Despite the conventional connotation of 
performance enhancement as being about making an athlete perform better in a 
quantifiable, measured sense, it need not be the case. Performance enhancement might 
also refer to performing better in a sense of, for example, an athlete's character. Instead 
of rewarding the winning team and placing them as being the most admirable team, it 
could also be possible to reward the team that has played most fairly, as is done in many 
contests. Indeed, the latter would seem to respond much more to an ethical inquiry 
into sport as it speaks more to moral actions than does simply winning a contest. Thus, 
basing value in sport primarily upon performance enhancement is not a tenable idea, if 
one hopes to derive an ethical theory of sport. 
In support of this idea, a number of arguments have arisen in the philosophy of sport 
asserting a Maclntyrean approach to deriving sporting values. Alisdair Maclntyre's 
(1985) distinction between the internal and external goods of sports provides a basis for 
a more substantial theory about what things give sport value. 1s The former, internal 
goods, relate to those aspects of performance that can be achieved only by participating 
in that activity, whilst the latter are more generic. For example, an internal good of 
tennis, might be the feeling of hitting a backhand topspin that travels along the court in 
a perfect line away from the opponent. In contrast, an external good might include the 
financial reward that the same backhand topspin might provide by winning a 
competition. In this case, financial reward is not something that is unique to the 
practice of tennis, and thus, is to be construed as an external good. 
A comparable argument can be made in the context of record,breaking, which can be 
seen as an external good because it is not something that is achievable only within the 
specific activity. As Schneider and Butcher (1994, p.65) argue, "victory, while valuable 
on a variety of counts is only of sporting value if achieved as a result of more skilful play 
in a fair competition." Reid (1998, html) adds that, 'we view winning as much more 
than scoring the most points or crossing the line first. We view winning as the 
manifestation of certain virtues inherent in the athlete in a given performance." 
Similarly, and contrary to the notion of sporting excellence as performance attainments, 
Gibson (1993, pA8) claims that "Excellence applies to any quality or feature in which 
the person or thing excels or surpasses all others." Thus, record breaking and 
straightforward physical accomplishments are seen here as being far too narrow to 
sufficiently represent excellence in sport. Indeed, Gibson argues that, "If athletics is 
nothing but a fight for a prize, then it is a spectacle and de,humanizing. As such, 
athletics would not be an arena in which excellence would have any meaning" ~bid, 
p.59). This recognition of the inadequacy of results and performance standards in 
sports as quantifiable results, leads necessarily to the rejection of the value of breaking 
human limits as a justification for legitimating performance enhancements. 
This problematising of sporting or athletic excellence is also developed extensively by 
Kretchmar (1992), where he argues that excellence must be described in relation to 
internal goods rather than external ones. The former are those which allow the practice 
to flourish and which are attainable only by practising the activity to which they are 
attached. Moreover, focusing upon the attainment of external goods is to the detriment 
of internal goods. Consequently, the basis for ethical decisions in regard to sport 
technology should be premised upon whether they contribute to the attainment of 
internal goods or not. The underlying premise is that the standard of excellence is tied 
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to the means of attainment more than in performance accomplishment. The yiew is 
affirmed by Schneider and Butcher (1994), who consider that, if a person performs an 
action solely for the sake of the extrinsic rewards, then there is no good reason to 
perform the act properly, or well, or even not to cheat. Importantly, this recognises that 
an ethical theory about sporting excellence necessarily consists in a dialogue about 
virtues and the attainment of internal goods rather than external goods. By contrast, 
external goods, do not allow for an ethical discourse because they are necessarily self-
centred, selfish, and individualistic ends. 
In sum, it is not convincing that the 'human limits in sport' argument warrants the 
acceptance of performance enhancing technologies, such as GM. Recalling again the 
argument structure detailing whether non~natural methods of performance modification 
are necessary in sport, Premise 2 of the argument is rejected. 
P 1: Maintaining sporting value is necessarily tied to limit breaking 
P2: Non-natura~ performance modifications are necessary to break Umits 
C: Maintaining sporting value requires non~natural performance modification. 
Basing an ethical theory of sport upon performance standards is not simply bad ethics, 
but no ethics at all. Rather, the value of performance enhancement is, here, considered 
insufficient to base any ethical perspective about sport. Yet, if this argument is 
sufficient to concede that the value of breaking human limits does make performance 
enhancement acceptable, then the subsequent question will still be relevant to answer. 
However, if one accepts that sporting values have little to do with breaking human 
limits, then there would be no need to posit the subsequent question and GM will not 
be justifiable on account of it making sport possible. 
Nevertheless, the arguments support the idea that performance enhancement, if not the 
only thing, is an important factor in modern sporting values. As such, it is important to 
consider the alternative conclusion that champions performance modification. The 
value given to breaking human limits that is identified by such authors as Hoberman 
(1992) and Gibson (1993) gives sufficient social significance to the possibility that such 
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factors might have importance for sport, despite their seemingly immoral character. 
However, affirming this initial question does not necessitate the use of GM as a means 
to enhance performance. At most, it is a case for re--evaluating what constitutes a 
legitimate method of performance enhancement and inquiring into which kinds of 
intervention should be used. 
Therefore, to conclude that GM makes sport possible is also to assert that the ethical 
implications of GM are preferable to other means that might also be used to make sport 
possible, where human limits prevent the enjoyment of sport. This, however, has not 
yet been clarified. Moreover, to make any such conclusion requires further elaboration 
on the ethical implications of GM in regard to its other effects and how it compares 
with other methods of doping that might also be used to break human limits. Such a 
comparative analysis must be extensive and is not the focus of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
subsequent categories will speak to the issue, by challenging the concept of performance 
enhancement. 
SAFETY AND HARM: How does GM affect harm and safety in sport? 
Potentially, any of the four applications of genetic information would promote safety 
and reduce harm in sport. The use of genomics can allow the provision of greater, more 
effective medical treatments for athletes when injured and even provide a greater 
recovery after injury by improving currently used drugs. Alternatively, the engineering 
of somatic or germ cells could be with an interest to make the person more resilient to 
disease or injury. Engineering 'resistance' genes could make the athlete more healthy 
and subsequently more capable of performing and training well for sport. fu well, if 
genetic information could reveal that a child might have a predisposition to a specific 
kind of medical condition or injury, then it could be used to deter that child from 
competing in a given sport and thus prevent the injury from happening.16 
With somatic and germ,line cell engineering, the potential for reducing harm is equally 
probable, though also more speculative. If one could imagine a situation where an 
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athlete seeks to engineer their somatic cells to enhance their performance, then they 
might use unsafe techniques to achieve this. If this occurred, then this would be a basis 
for rejecting such technology from ethically acceptable methods of performance 
enhancement. However, if the methods are shown not to cause any harm to the health 
of the athlete, then the basis of health harms alone does not warrant their rejection. 
Yet, this is not an argument that is unique to GM and can be made against any other 
kind of performance modifier, including drugs. 
Regardless of these effects, the analysis does not deal sufficiently with the ethical issues 
arising from safety and harm. While it seems that there is a basis for arguing that GM 
can be conducive to health, the issue of harm has a further complication. Whereas 
increasing safety seems to speak specifically about the safety of an individual or 
individuals (in terms of people), the concept of harm can be seen more broadly. As 
such, it is necessary to understand what is meant by harm and which kinds of harm arise 
as a consequence of legalising (and banning) GM in sport. It is understandable that the 
two elements of this effect appear similar, since to increase safety would also seem the 
same as reducing harm. However, the concept of harm need not be directed to physical 
harm (what might be termed as risk of harm); whereas safety would seem more of this 
type. Thus, the concept of harm might be broader than simply harm to an individuaL 
This idea is summarised by Schneider and Butcher (2000) when discussing respect for 
sport. In general, it requires asking whether the given sport technology incurs any kinds 
of harm that has moral implications. Such harm mayor may not be directed to an 
individuaL Consequently, two levels of inquiry must take place to understand whether a 
given technology is affecting the level of harm in a sport in an acceptable way. Initially, 
it must be questioned whether the technology increases or decreases the safety or reduces 
the risk of physical harm. Second, it must be asked what other kinds of harms derive from 
the employment of GM in sport. 
The former question, however, demands an empirical answer that currently cannot be 
given. In terms of genomics, it can be argued that knowledge about genetil~ could 
provide a more effect in' and healthier \\'<1Y of altering the athlete or providing more 
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effective medication. Equally, the experimental nature of such technology in the near 
future could render it difficult to have a comprehensive awareness of the long-term 
harms deriving from such drugs. Alternatively, genomics might simply allow further 
ways for the drug-using athlete to avoid detection at anti-doping tests or for the creation 
of new enhancers that have even greater health risks. Nevertheless, if one accepts the 
basic premise behind genomics that its purpose is to provide a better understanding of 
biology, then it would seem to promote better kinds of medication, even if they are 
made illegal in sport. For this reason alone, it would be necessary to revisit the 
legitimacy of drugs, which do not have any detrimental physical effects for the athlete in 
the long or short term. 
Structuring the vanous perspectives about other kinds of harm is a rather more 
complicated task. Various appeals to the significance of harms, the integrity of sport, 
normative values such as fair play, and the obligatory imperative of agreements or 
contracts in sport competition are examples of harms created by using methods of 
doping. Moreover, various authors integrate or separate these categories depending 
upon their focus. Schneider and Butcher (2000) is particularly useful here, as it 
approaches the issue of doping in a rather different manner to the present ethical 
inquiry, though also gives a comprehensive overview of the harms resulting from doping. 
Thus, their overview can be seen as bringing together a number of the perspectives that 
have been asserted throughout the last 20 years in the philosophy of sport literature and 
is thus, endeavouring a similar task to the current one. However, their approach 1S 
markedly different from the present aims and worthy of comparison therefore.
l
? 
Schneider and Butcher's categorisation of 'reasons for why doping should be banned' 
comprise: cheating and unfairness, harms (including harm to athletes who dope [users]; 
harm to other [clean] athletes; harm to society; harm to the sports community; harm 
caused by bans), perversion of sport's nature, and the unnaturalness of dehumanisation. 
In contrast, the present approach includes a number of their other categories within the 
framework of 'harms'. Thus, the effects of doping creating unfairness or being a pe'T\'ersion 
of a sport's nature are each considered here to be harms (as opposed to different kinds of 
effect). The definition of the problem might seem a relatively trivial point, thOlIgh it is 
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significant because it derives from a conceptualisation of technologies in sport within 
which forms of doping are included among other kinds of technologies such as sports 
equipment. It might be contested that non,health harms warrant a separate category of 
effect completely, though this is less relevant at this stage and requires further attention 
and argument about the conceptual framework for understanding sport technologies 
than is possible here. It would also mistakenly conflate the differences between 
categories of effect and the moral issues deriving from sport technologies. 
The present categorisation will encompass those that are made in Schneider and 
Butcher's overview, though includes a number of their other reasons for banning doping 
within the general category of harms. The differences between the two approaches can 
be seen by the following table: 
Schneider and Butcher's (2000) Present categorisation of harms 
categorisation of harms (in bold) 
Cheating and unfairness 
Harm 
- harms to athletes (users) 
- harms to (clean) athletes 
- harms to society 
- harms to the sporting community 
- harms caused by bans 
Perversion of sport's nature 
Unnaturalness and dehumanisation 
Harms to others 
- athletes (users) 
- unfair advantage, safety 
- athletes (non~user): 
- unfair advantage, contract 
violation, coercion 
- members of the sporting 
community 
- expectation disappointment; 
role models 
Harms to Society 
- aversion harms 
- technological momentum 
Harms to Sport 
- unfair advantage 
- rule breaking 
- compromise of internal goods 
- unnaturalness 
- not an earned advantage 
The exception 1S their category of 'unnaturalness and dehumanisation', which is 
considered here as being a different kind of effect of GM altogether. The basis for this 
discussion will be provided in depth in the subsequent section, though can be explained 
by recognising that an argument in respect of GM based upon naturalness and 
dehumanisation requires a very different set of reasons to demonstrate than do other 
kinds of harms. To argue about naturalness and dehumanisation (and subsequently 
superhumanisation), requires a basis of arguing what constitutes the human being. In 
contrast, the harms that are included here rely upon an assertion about what is sport or 
the salient aspects of an athletic performance. 
Thus, the category of harms here includes harms to others, society, and sport:-;, within 
which Schneider and Butcher's other categories of 'arguments again:-;t doping' are 
L'ncompassed. For example, Schneider and Butcher's 'cheating and unfairnes:-;' (;\tL'~ory 
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appears in the form of a number of different kind of harms in various sections of the 
present structure. One criticism of this approach might be that it is not sensible to 
argue that non~living entities can be harmed. Thus, the categories of 'harms to sports' is 
not meaningfuL On such a view, because harm is something that must be felt, such 
entities cannot be harmed because they are incapable of perceiving such harm. At most, 
the harm that is done to non~living or abstract entities is felt indirectly by persons who 
perceive that there has been harm committed. Consequently, it might be accepted that 
the harm is indirect but, nevertheless, has consequences for human beings. For this 
reason, harms to non~living entities are separated from specific others. IS 
It can be useful to remember that this interest to clarify harms derives from 
understanding the ethical implications of technologies that affect the level of harm in 
sport. It was concluded earlier that health harms (or health risks) are of limited 
relevance to the discussion about GM as they are largely speculative and empirically 
contingent (although the hypothetical cases should be addressed). However, it was 
identified that there are other kinds of harm that are morally relevant in the discussion 
about the ethical status of GM in sport. Generically, these can be called 'other harms' 
and comprise harms to other persons, society, and to sport, which are of a moral, rather 
than a bodily injurious nature. 
A further consideration must recognise that there exists no thorough categorisation of 
potential harms resulting from GM in sport. As such, to respond to the kinds of harms 
that might ensue from GM is somewhat of an experimental and tentative task. 
However, there is some basis for a comprehensive structure that can be used, which 
builds upon the categorising of non~injurious harms that derive from other kinds of 
performance modifications in sport. Mainly, this speaks specifically to methods of 
doping, in particular, the use of drugs. It is surprising that, still, there has been only a 
limited amount of attention directed towards other kinds of doping methods and their 
legitimacy, such as the use of altitude chambers or tents to improve endurance capacity 
(Clarey, 2001b). This generalistic approach to understanding the ethical issues of 
doping is insufficient since, even if some claims can be made about doping in general, it 
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does not assist with the consideration of the specific cases and their particular ethical 
status. 
The system of categorising non~health harms in sport deriving from GM is premised 
upon two distinctions: old and new harms. The former will speak to those harms -
relevant to GM - that are identified in conjunction with previous literature that 
addresses the harms deriving from doping (substances and methods) in general. 
Alternatively, 'new harms' will reveal further harms that can be the effect of employing 
GM in sport, which will draw upon general, relevant harms about the use of GM. 
While there is some degree of overlap, the distinction is useful to provide the additional 
insight into how GM compares with other kinds of performance enhancement in sport. 
It is important to recognise that the initial approach will be to consider the harms of 
legaUsing GM, rather than the harms associated with banning it, the latter of which is 
addressed by Schneider and Butcher (2000). These banning harms will be addressed in 
conjunction with the response to legalising harms and will take place in the conclusions. 
The old harms of legalising OM 
In the philosophy of sport literature, a variety of harms can be identified in relation to 
doping, that might be summarised thus, 19 
1. Coercive ([amburrini, 2000; Gardner, 1989; Lavin, 1987; Parry, 1987; Simon, 
1991; Tamburrini, 2000). 
2. Unfair (Schneider and Butcher, 2000; Gardner, 1989; Lavin, 1987; Parry, 1987; 
Simon, 1991; Tamburrini, 2000, 2000). 
3. Health Risks (Schneider and Butcher, 2000; Holowchak, 2000; Brown, 1995; Lavin, 
1987; Parry, 1987; Simon, 1991; Tamburrini, 2000, 2000). 
4. Unnatural (Hoberman, 1992; Houlihan, 1999; Lavin, 1987; ; Perry, 1988; Schneider 
and Butcher, 2000; (Tamburrini, 2000). 
5. Rule Breaking / Cheating / Respect (Arnold, 1997; Houlihan, 1999; Simon, 1985, 
1991). 
6. Unearned advantage (Carr, 1999). 
7. Contrary to / Does not promote the internal goods of sport (Schneider and Butcher, 
1994). 
8. Contrary to the nature of sport (Tamburrini, 2000, 2000; Simon, 1991). 
~! \-
While these are often cited as reasons for justifying the banning of various forms of 
doping, there is no consensus that one or some of them is sufficient to warrant the 
complete rejection of all forms of doping from sport. In relation to these discussions, 
there has been an emphasis upon analysing drugs as the primary method of doping in 
sport. This is not surprising since drugs have been particularly alarming in their likely 
promotion of physical and mental harm for the athlete. However, such an emphasis 
upon drugs in the sport philosophy literature has given rise to a distorted perspectiYe 
about what kinds of harms might exist in relationship to performance enhancement, 
generally. As well, it has prevented a more holistic approach to understanding the way 
in which performance modification is valued in sport. Nevertheless, drug use provides a 
starting point to discuss what are the other kinds of harms (besides physical ones) 
associated with doping methods in sport. 
HARMS TO OTHERS 
A number of harms to others involved with the competitive sport experience have been 
addressed previously. These consist of the harm that can arise by breaking a tacitly 
agreed contract and thus breaking with the ethos of sport. As well, some athletes will be 
harmed by the result of OM producing further unfair advantage for the modified 
athlete. Finally, harm can also arise from athletes being coerced into using OM to 
remain competitive. In addition, it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of 
athletes in the context of these harms. A similar approach is taken by Schneider and 
Butcher (2000) in relation to drug use, where they distinguish the different harms 
brought upon athletes that are also using drugs and those who are not. In this category, 
it is possible to distinguish between athletes who are using the performance 
enhancement (users) and those who are not (non,users). 
Other: athletes 
Users 
Unfair advantage: For the user, contrary to what might be assumed, there is still an 
equality differential wrought by the enhancement. Thus, even though the athlete using 
OM might be seeking to gain an adyantage over others, they might actually be placed in 
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a worse position by so doing or by embracing such technology as an accepted method of 
performance modification. This is evident from the use of drugs, sports equipment, or 
even nutritional supplements and recognises that the same method of performance 
enhancement does not necessarily guarantee the same level of enhancement for all its 
users. It is not the case that all athletes using EPO will incur similar benefits to their 
performance. The harm then, derives from an expectation that using the enhancer will 
necessarily place one at an advantage over others, which it might not. This harm 1S 
somewhat contingent upon the potential dangers of using the enhancement, but 1S 
premised simply upon the use of such performance modifiers as being self.·defeating, if 
the athlete hopes to gain a competitive advantage. In response, this harm might simply 
be avoided by removing the expectation that the technology will have beneficial 
consequences. Indeed, if an athlete is minimally aware of how drugs function, then this 
expectation might not be so prevalent. 
In the case of GM, the argument is similar, though the investment from the athlete 
might be considerably less. If genomic drugs are more effective, then there is even more 
of a basis for expecting a significant change in performance, though if their benefit 
remains unclear, then this harm might still be avoided by education about the likely 
success of genomic enhanced drugs. Through germ-line cell engineering, this concern is 
not relevant since the modified embryo will know nothing of the alteration to have any 
expectation about its effect. Potentially, there might be a disappointing expectation if 
the growing child expects to be a successful athlete due to their genetic predisposition. 
However, this can be lessened by information outlining that genetics alone is not a 
guarantee of any exceptional athletic capabilities. For genetically pre-selected athletes, 
there is no guarantee that all those who have an exceptional genotype will be selected by 
gene-scouts and so disappointment might also ensue to, for example, parents who might 
have expected their enhanced child to be chosen. However, disappointment in life is 
not sufficiently persuasive to warrant the removal of the causes of disappointments. As 
such, this does not seem a particularly significant harm to use as a basis for rejecting 
GM. 
Safety: Conflicting perspectives can be asserted on the basis of safety and harm and their 
relationship to technology in sport. As the earlier example of climbing clarifies, for 
some sports it can be claimed that there exists a degree of risk that, if lessened, would 
lead to the de,valuing of the performance. Thus, to remove the risk of harm from 
climbing or any extreme sport, could be argued as unethical on the grounds that it is 
contrary to the characteristics of the sports that give it value. An alternative view states, 
to the contrary, that technology is morally justified on account of it making a sport safer, 
where a greater degree of safety is considered valuable. Examples of such application 
might be found in the case of the American football helmet or helmets used in boxing, 
which were intended to increase the safety of the athletes. 
In summarising the position, it seems that a technology is justifiable if it contributes to 
the level of safety in the sport, where such safety is sought and where such safety is not 
contrary to the purpose of the sport that makes the practice unique. Thus, it would 
make little sense to introduce a system in climbing whereby it could be possible to 
retreat from the rock face, without fear of falling, regardless of how far one has 
ascended. Such an activity would be more characteristic of traversing a rock face 
(bouldering), which is used more as a basis for training and is not considered to be the 
same as ascending a rock face. Equally, it would make sense to provide accompanying 
support to an expedition team, as might be said is achieved by the Global Positioning 
System device. 
In the case of GM, the argument from harm must ask whether GM is more or less 
harmful than other kinds of performance enhancement and whether the harm that is 
created by the technology is an integral or acceptable part of the sport. From one 
perspective, it can be argued that the risk to health taken by athletes is no greater than 
the risks taken by virtue of participating in some sports at all. For example, boxing and 
equestrian events are among the most dangerous activities that are used as past time~ 
and competitive events - regardless of whether the athletes take drugs. The potential for 
severe injuries is remarkably high and the harms from using drugs to run fast might be 
~een as relatively negligible by comparison. Equally, the risks from GM might be 
suh~tantially less than thc~e other forms of performance enhancement. 
There is, however, some basis for arguing that it is of little consequence to compare the 
harms between different sports. One criterion to employ might be to argue that it is 
foolhardy to tolerate or encourage the use of technologies that increase the harm within a 
sport, beyond that which must be accepted for one to be able to participate. Thus, one 
might accept the harms of boxing, but not tolerate increases to harms in boxing 
resulting from using drugs as welL This might seem a rather selfserving criterion upon 
which to judge the harms of sport in general, though it departs from a perspective that 
accepts that sports are worthy of participation despite their inherent harms. The 
perspective does, however, beg for a justification about the ethical importance of 
tolerating high risks of injury. However, this is a question of evaluating the acceptability 
of sports, from a social perspective, which is of little interest here. Instead, it is assumed 
that, despite their danger, some sports are valuable because of their risk for injury. 
However, the gratuitous increasing of this risk is not necessarily acceptable, unless it can 
be argued as enhancing the value of playing the sport. 
For GM, it seems a particularly difficult case. As has been suggested earlier, the use of 
genomics is likely to provoke a safer use of drugs. Scientists can have more certainty 
about the effects of drugs on the human body and so drugs derived from genomics 
would be more desirable than non,genomic drugs. In the cases of somatic and germ,line 
manipulation, the degree of safety would also be greater than drug use, precisely because 
this technology would not be used until such a point that it is safe to use within 
medicine. Once such a standard is set, it would be hard for sports governing bodies to 
then ban the technologies on the basis of safety. The use of somatic cell engineering 
raises concerns about the abuse of technology, which can have as many possible harms 
as the abuse of drugs. However, unlike drug use, the legitimate use of GM would most 
likely have health benefits and so would be desirable alterations. In respect of genetic 
pre,selection, this bears no direct relation to the discussion, though it can be argued as 
having a number of positive consequences for an athlete's health regarding the selection 
of suitable genotypes for suitable sports that can, for example, prevent injury. As such, 
the harm of health risk seems less concerning in the case of GM than it might for other 
kinds of performance enhancers. Moreover, these harms ought not to be seen as 
significant enough to warrant the rejection of GM. 
Non-user 
Unfair advantage: For the non-user, the harms are rather more transparent. Initially, 
there is the obvious harm of being disadvantaged in competition as a consequence of the 
opponent using a performance enhancer that is not available to others. The salience of 
this from an ethical perspective has been made clear in numerous cases in sport where 
an innovation has been banned on account of it being inaccessible to a significant 
proportion of the athletic community. For example, the development of the fibre-glass 
pole in polevaulting (Houlihan, 1999) or the superman cycling position (Fotheringham, 
1996) or the FastSkin swimming suits Magdalinski, 2000), are all cases where the 
technology was seen as ethically problematic by governing bodies because it was not 
available to all participants. 
Underlying this judgement is the premise that the contest shouLd involve athletes of 
equal standing - no athlete should have access to means that others do not. 
Importantly, this is not to say that all athletes should use the same equipment (which is 
the case in some sports). Rather, it is to recognise that all athletes should have the 
opportunity to maximise their performance capabilities by having access to all known 
methods of performance maximisation. In many cases, it might be that the same piece 
of equipment does render an advantage for all athletes (such as using flippers in 
swimming). However, in sports such as skiing or even the case of the FastSkin suit, it is 
not necessarily beneficial for all athletes to have the same equipment. 
Presuming that the technology is effective, there would seem to be an advantage that is 
gained by using GM. As well, it is likely that such technology would not be available to 
all competitors in some cases. For example, germ-line engineering -necessarily taking 
place early in life - would not be an option for athletes later who found themselves 
competing against germ-line engineered athletes. For this reason, there seems strength 
in concluding that it is unacceptable to place the two kinds of athlete against each other 
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on the basis of equal access to enhancements. For the case of somatic-cell or genomic 
engineering, there does seem less of a reason for concluding that the technology could 
not be available to all athletes. Save for arguing that the modifications would not be 
financially viable for some athletes, there is no reason for why athletes of any description 
might use the technology. Yet, it is not clear that the affordability of the technology is 
even a sound basis for concluding that it is unfair, since a variety of training techniques 
and facilities are available only to the wealthy countries, and this is tolerated as an 
unavoidable inequality in sport. 
One exception to this rule might involve the availability of these technologies as medical 
treatments. Currently, the development of GM is seen as wholly a medical technology 
and its use for performance enhancement in sport, or enhancement in general, is highly 
improbable in the short term if the funding for such research derives from the public 
sector. As such, the most immediate genetically modified humans would be those with 
corrections to gene,related disorders and not those seeking an extra inch of height to 
play basketbalL Accepting that such therapeutic applications might also confer an 
advantage for physical competence, then it would seem unfair to place the engineered 
athlete against the non,engineered athlete because the means of gaining that advantage 
would not be available to alL 
However, it is not unethical in sports that some athletes are genetically more 
predisposed to performance than others. Indeed, it could be argued that competitive 
sport requires making such distinctions (Simon, 1984).20 Given that GM would only 
alter these, already, unfair imbalances, the claims to GM rendering disadvantaged 
athletes in competitive sport would seem rather self,serving for the naturally gifted 
athlete. Thus, the unfairness created by genetically modified athletes is no greater than 
the level of unfairness that currently exists in sport. Indeed, genetically modifying 
athletes could be used as a means to creating greater parity among athletes. A similar 
case can be made for drug use. The only possible way in which either of these 
modifications is unfair is if the opportunity to use such technology is not available to all 
participants. 
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One might argue that GM is unfair because this kind of difference has been afforded by 
a deliberate intent to gain an advantage, which is unacceptable. However, it is rather 
tenuous to claim that such advantage had been intended to place a person at an 
advantage within sport, since such a decision would likely not be made with any 
particular sporting career in mind. Genetic modifications would, most likely, have some 
general health motivation, rather than an interest to be good at sports. It is also rather 
excessive to ban a genetically enhanced individual from competition on the basis that 
they have an unfair advantage over other competitors. Apart from being prejudicial 
towards such individuals, one must be consistent and, as well, disqualify even those 
individuals who have a naturally enhanced genotype. Upon such a rationale, reductio ad 
absurdum, all genetic difference should be removed from competition (at least this 
should be the moral ideal). Alternatively, it might be argued that the sports competition 
is constituted by achieving as much as is possible with the genotype one has, which has 
been determined without any intervention. If such a position is credible, then it must 
be shown what actually counts as intervention. Following any such criteria, one might 
find it problematic to allow an individual into competition who might have had only 
therapeutic GM. 
The degree to which the unfairness provoked by GM is unethical depends upon how 
one theorises what is the accepted level of fairness in sport. It is, so to speak, to depart 
from a theory of justice in sport. On one view, organised sport is already inherently 
unfair in many respects, since it does not differentiate between genetic differences. At 
most, sports such as boxing or judo distinguish between body weight. However, there 
are many more sports that provide no opportunity for athletes of a disproportionate 
genetic predisposition than there are which do recognise that humans of different body 
types are equally worthy of elite sporting status. This is most clearly reflected in the 
constitutive elements of sport such as basketball or volleyball, where the net is at such a 
height that one must be at least 180cm if one aspires to elite level competition. In such 
sports, there are no divisions for shorter players. Thus, accepting that genetic difference 
already exists in sports, it is necessary to articulate what makes GM unfair. It would be 
unfair if the intention behind it was to gain an advantage over other players, though it 
need not be the case. If GM takes place to equalise the genetic pre..dispositions of 
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competing athletes, then there would seem a case for making it legal. As Breivik (2000, 
p.154) argues, 
Sports organisations have an obligation to make it possible for all, not only to take 
part in a certain sport but also to compete at a high international leveL .. classes 
based on body build should be introduced. 
Contract violation: A further claim from the non~user is that performance 
enhancements that are neither within the rules, nor excluded by them, violate a tacit 
agreement between athletes that they will all play by the same rules. The act of 
deception (which using any other means would imply) fails to acknowledge the other as 
an individual with their own interests and, thus, treats them as a means to an end, 
rather than an end in themselves. This contracdike approach to conceptualising sports 
competitions asserts that the non~user is cheated and deceived by the user. As Schneider 
and Butcher (2000) articulate the position, "When athletes enter a contest, they agree, 
and form a tacit contract, to test their skills in the ways permitted by the game 
concerned. On this account, unfairness or cheating is wrong, because it breaks the 
agreement" (p.7). A similar perspective is asserted by Arnold (1992, p.247), claiming 
that, 
when a person voluntarily chooses to enter a sport he or she makes a tacit 
commitment to abide by the rules that are applicable. To renege upon the 
agreement is rather like making a promise and then not keeping it. 
Contract arguments in relation to performance modification have also been alluded to 
in relation to an unfair advantage. From this position, it is claimed that the use of 
illegal performance enhancements breaks a tacit agreement between players about the 
acceptable means each will use to compete together. However, the position requires 
restating outside of the perceived unfair reasons that would make violating such a 
contract unacceptable. 
The argument is not without complication, as it is not clear whether a contract analogy 
suitably describes sporting competitions. As Butcher and Schneider (1998, p.7) note, 
"Fair playas contract is open on the content of the agreement. On some versions of this 
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view, the content of the contract is created solely by the rules. On other versions, it is 
the rules as practised and understood by the athletes". This cautionary note on the 
application of contract theory to the drug situation in sport derives from a contested 
version of how morality is formed in sports and whether it comprises only the rules or 
the added notion of an ethos. 21 Following Eassom (1998), the social contract analogy in 
sport is not a sufficient basis to conclude that using performance modifiers, which are 
outside of the rules, is unethical. Consequently, the claim to unfairness on the basis of 
agreed upon rules, does not apply. 
Nevertheless, on this view, rule,breaking is unethical because it is cheating the opponent 
and cheating is wrong because it treats the opponent as a means to an end, thus 
violating the Kantian maxim of respecting others. Even if this argument is credible, it 
cannot be used against OM because it is neither yet part of any rules in sport, nor likely 
to be reflective to any prescribed ethos. 
When comparing drugs and OM, if there are any grounds for arguing that athletes 
collectively agree drugs should be used, then there is even less agreement that OM is not 
included as acceptable means. There is no basis for supposing there to be agreement 
between athletes that they will accept the genetic pre,dispositions they are born with 
when competing in sport. Indeed, if some world,class athletes were to find out that they 
are genetically disadvantaged, they might be justified to claim the use of OM to level the 
playing field. Any decision about this matter is premised upon an understanding about 
whether genetic variance is a factor that gives value to sports competitions or whether it 
is athletically irrelevant. If it is the latter - that sporting value is not supposed to be a 
test of genetic pre,dispositions - then OM to level the playing field would seem 
acceptable. If not, then sport would appear to be valued for the effort it represents 
rather than for genetic luck, though claims might also be sought to eradicate natural 
variation in genetics. 
In the case of genomics, it would be easy enough - and expected - that sports 
authorities would simply place these drugs on the banned list without giving due 
consideration to their value of levelling any 'natural' genetic inequalities. Indeed, much 
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of the present discussion asks for a greater clarification of the bases on which such 
choices are made. Yet, even if genetic modifications were made illegal, to sustain the 
view of the athlete as a cheat, one must re,assess the concept of cheating as one that is 
independent of the actions of an individual. For example, on the conventional 
definition of cheating (the strict liability policy), the germ,line engineered athlete would 
be a cheat by virtue of having a genotype that has been augmented for competition. 
Such a disposition will have been afforded by a parent or guardian who chose to 
enhance this person's genetic constitution and having such a condition, would be 
outside of the rules. Yet, it would not be reasonable to label such a person as a cheat 
since they will have done nothing. 
Subsequently, one might argue that it is the guardian who is responsible for the cheating 
that takes place. Yet, this kind of perspective makes problematic penalising the athlete 
or banning them from competition, since it seems unfair to punish an individual for 
something that is not of their doing. Indeed, the very manner in which justice and anti, 
doping are constituted is by targeting the guilty person. Thus, it seems unjust that an 
athlete be banned from competition if the reason for being banned is not their 
responsibility or the consequence of their actions. To argue such enhancement as 
cheating is not a reasonable position to take. Indeed, it does not allow for the 
genetically modified athlete to be treated fairly. This begs the question as to whether 
penalties should be directed at the intentions or resultant consequences of an athlete's 
actions; whether someone has intended to cheat or that something has taken place that 
has resulted in cheating occurring regardless of intentions. 
In sum, the harms resulting from GM being unfair do not seem persuasively different 
from other kinds of inequalities that already exist in sport. Indeed, the use of GM 
might even tip the balance in favour of equality than render it further uneven. If GM 
does, however, make sport more unfair, then in response it might be claimed that GM is 
unacceptable because it only accentuates the inequality. Thus, although it might be 
disappointing that sport is already unfair, to make it even more unfair would be 
unjustifed. However, the arguments do not suggest that GM will make sport more 
unfair. At most, it will alter the kinds of athletes that are the most successfuL The 
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discussion changes somewhat if GM is brought into the anti-doping list, whereby it is 
seen as illegaL From this perspective, criticisms of it as being cheating are more justified. 
However, to do so without due reason would be equally unfair and prejudicial to 
athletes who might not have a particularly good genotype. As well, the restriction of 
freedoms that would derive from prohibiting genetically modified athletes from 
competition would also be an unacceptable harm and, perhaps, far worse than the 
resulting imbalances in sport that derive from permitting GM. 
Coercion: Finally, potential for harm arises for the non,user in terms of coercion. To 
remain competitive, it could be argued that the non,user would be forced into using GM 
and, for this reason, it would be unethical (Simon, 1984). Arguably, one might be 
inclined to construe the argument from coercion as 'health' in disguise. Indeed, 
Holowchak (2000) bases the main part of his argument about the unethically coercive 
technologies of steroids on the fact that they force other athletes to harm their own 
bodies. Yet, there are reasons for assuming that this is not sufficient to disqualify a 
performance enhancement from the acceptable means of attaining sporting excellence. 
After all, similar concerns are not articulated in respect of the amount of hours an 
athlete must train to be competitive, which is accepted as a necessary aspect of elite 
sport, despite it also carrying a similar health risk pvertraining). Within sport, it is 
accepted that athletes must train extremely hard, consume extremely strict diets, and 
make many sacrifices in other aspects of daily life if they hope to attain world class 
status. If coercion is health in disguise, then the argument seems to lack substance and 
it might be relevant simply to refer directly to whether the performance enhancement is 
dangerous for the athlete. 
However, it might also be argued that GM is unacceptable because it is the resu[t of 
coercion, which, itself, is inherently unethicaL On this view, the important point is not 
that the method of performance enhancement is harmful. Rather, it has to do with the 
choice to use the enhancement having been made in a coercive environment, as 
opposed to one that is free (Houlihan, 1999). Nevertheless, the importance of health 
risk is a critical factor in the discussion about coercion, since this latter claim is much 
more problematic to substantiate. In order to claim that a decision is not made out of 
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independent, autonomous choice is rather difficult to demonstrate. In contrast, 
physical harm can be shown by scientific research. However, it is also important to note 
that, even in respect of the supposed physical harm that is inflicted by the use of some 
banned substances, the scientific research is unclear. Nevertheless, such information 
might be used as a basis for asserting a paternalistic justification to legislating about new 
technologies such as OM in order to protect the non~user. 
In the cases of genomics, somatic cell and germ~line cell engineering, and genetic pre~ 
selection, a similar argument can be made to conclude that their legitimisation would be 
coercive. As such, the strength of coercion has an appeal that is implied by each kind of 
OM. However, it is still difficult to consider that the coercive harm deriving from OM is 
different from the coercive harm of other aspects of sport. Thus, if one accepts that the 
elite sporting environment is already a coercive one, then it is not clear how the coercion 
that takes place as a result of OM is any different from the coercion that takes place as a 
result of needing to train very hard. Indeed, there does not seem a basis for concluding 
that they are very different - if coercion is, in itself, unethical. As such, the harms from 
coercion do not seem sufficient to warrant the rejection of OM from sport. 
Other: Members of the Sporting Community 
Harms that affect the sporting community can be articulated from a number of 
perspectives, though clarification is first needed on what constitutes the sporting 
community to understand the limits of this category. Within sports, Morgan (1994) 
presents the notion of a sporting community in the form of a practice community. 
Defined in this way, practice community draws upon a Maclntyrean concept of practices, 
which asserts that a practice is 
any coherent and complex form of socially established co~perative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of 
trying to achieve those standard of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, v,"ith the result that human powers to 
achieve excel, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended (Maclntyre, 1985, p.187). 
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Morgan's categorisation has wrought some confusion within sports ethics as to what has 
been the ambition of this prescription. Arnold (1997) considers that the concept can be 
used to encompass the practice of 'sport' in generaL Conversely, Eassom (1998) views 
that the definition provided by Maclntyre delimits that a practice cannot be sport in 
general, but is reflective of specific sports. Thus, Eassom argues that sport is not a 
practice but particular sports, such as golf, soccer, or basketball are practices. 
Returning to Morgan's concept of practice communities, the problem of asserting the 
existence of a sporting community is more apparent. Accepting Eassom, it makes no 
sense to refer to a sporting community, as such an entity does not exist, because sports 
are so diverse. It is, perhaps, akin to referring to the community of human beings, who, 
by virtue of them sharing a species type might be perceived as being of a community. 
Aspirations for such a community might be admirable, though are somewhat ambitious 
and useless. Equally, in the present discussion the importance of whether specific sports 
or sport in general can be referred to as a community is not particularly relevant. 
Rather, it is sufficient to place the concept of a community in relation to sport as 
opposed to a community external of it (or them). Thus, Morgan's practice community 
is useful as it refers to those individuals who can be described as part of the sporting 
community and thus, have an interest in the condition of their practice. On 
Maclntyre's view, this entails a concern for the internal goods of the practice or those 
goods that are necessarily and exclusively tied to the practice. These goods are opposed 
to external goods, which, as Maclntyre explains, entail goods of property and possession 
such as financial benefits or prizes. Thus, in the context of the practice community, the 
following concerns can be raised about the prospect of GM. 
Expectation disappointment 
Schneider and Butcher (1998) describe that, in the context of drug use, the sporting 
community has an expectation that athletes will be drug,free and that harm incurred 
from athletes using drugs will be the realisation that they are not. The harm derives 
thus, from performances that are partly constituted by drug use, which collapse the value 
that is placed into sport by members of the sporting community. A solution they 
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consider is to remove the expectation and, consequently, to remove the harm. However 
still, Schneider and Butcher recognise that the spectators want a drug,free sport and that 
removing the expectation (legalising the drugs) is not a solution to preserve the value 
that is invested into sport. A similar case is more difficult to make in the context of 
GM, due to the ambiguity in what is legitimate in respect of technology. For example, 
the FastSkin swimming suit introduced by Speedo at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games 
was not clearly unacceptable or acceptable. It could not reasonably be claimed possible 
to speak on behalf of what the spectators wanted to see and use this as a basis for 
claiming that they would or would not be harmed by the use of this technology. 
In the case of GM, the claim is even more ambiguous. Currently, the possibility of 
genetically modifying athletes is not really in the public sensibility. Thus, to make claims 
about an expectation from the sporting community that athletes should be free from 
GM is not at all clear. Nevertheless, indications of this perspective are found in a 
number of speeches that have been made on the subject. Each of these tends to assert 
the similar view that sport should reflect the athlete's capabilities rather than any 
technology's. Wadler (1998, html) refers to George Will's claim that 'Sport, and a 
society that takes it seriously, would be debased if it did not strictly forbid things that 
blur the distinction between the triumph of character and the triumph of the 
chemistry." However, this distinction seems rather tenuous to assert in the context of 
elite sport, which rarely champions the status of character over chemistry and these 
reactions tend more to come from key sports persons in world competition, than from 
other members of the sporting community. 
Importantly, it is not clear that the various applications of GM ought to have a negative 
ethical connotation and thus, that their use could fuel this concern about cheating and 
marginalising the role of the human being. To genetically modify a human does not 
necessarily have a bearing upon the moral character of being human. Indeed, the claim 
to 'expectation disappointment' is subsequent to the moral evaluation of a technology. 
If GM is seen to be a relevant and important facet of elite sport, then there is no 
expectation disappointment when discovering that athletes have been genetically 
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modified. Consequently, the concern about expectations must succeed the discussion 
about whether OM is beneficial or not for sports. 
Role models 
It can be tempting to claim that a further harm to the sporting community would be 
that the acceptance of OM is unethical, as it might set a bad role model for young 
children. Indeed, such claims have been made in relation to other kinds of doping 
method, in particular drug use (Houlihan, 1999; Schneider and Butcher, 2000). Yet, 
although this might have strength in the context of drug use specifically, it is relatively 
weak in respect of other technologies. It is, after all, not particularly alarming for a child 
to see that an athlete is using a titanium tennis racket rather than a wooden one. This 
comparison suggests the articulation of an innovation as a socially situated technology is 
what makes it potentially harmful for children to see role models using it or not. In the 
case of drugs, parents are justifiably concerned about their children, if they aspire to be 
like the drug enhanced athlete because drugs can be harmful in numerous anti-social 
and physical ways (which also seems reflective of elite sport with or without drugs). A 
tolerance for drug use in sport, aside from the inherently dangerous health risks, is often 
linked to a more willing acceptance of using drugs in other contexts. However, in the 
case of, for example, a swimming costume, the negative connotations of this technology 
are far less clear. This identifies that the onus must be placed upon deciding whether, 
first, the innovation in question is morally problematic in itself. If the technology is not 
something that would set a bad model for children to use, then it need not be of harm 
to children that athletes use such technology. 
In respect of OM, this potential harm does seem alarming although it still depends 
largely upon how the technology is first evaluated. Should the aspiring young athlete 
recognise that, to become the best in the world, it is necessary to be genetically modified, 
then concern might be warranted for the welfare of youths if they consider that they 
must seek whatever means are possible to become genetically modified. In a similar way 
to there being concerns about drug use, one might be justified in being concerned that 
athletes who are not born with a genetic advantage might seek any means to become 
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competitive in sport, whether or not they are safe. In this sense, then, the concerns 
about GM parallel the concerns of drug use. 
Alternatively, for the young sports~fan, genetically modified athletes might cease to be 
role~models at all and this could have a conflicting effect. From one perspective, the 
concept of the elite athlete - performance enhanced or not - is not a particularly worthy 
role modeL The elite athlete is obsessive, selfish, egotistical, and poorly educated, 
having a relatively imprudent approach to life by investing into a relatively short career 
life with little chance of securing financial reward. Alternatively, the elite athlete and 
sport in general, holds values that are worthy of aspiration, perhaps for similar reasons, 
particularly the notion of sacrificing long term benefits for short term, highly prized 
ambitions. If one accepts the former view and young people no longer perceive the 
athlete as a role model, then this might be more beneficial for the sporting community. 
Subsequently, this might place more emphasis upon the importance of sport for reasons 
other than competition, such as for recreation. 
The ability of GM to alter the beneficial consequences of athletes as role models still 
depends, crucially, upon how the technology is evaluated in the first place. As such, it is 
difficult to speak clearly about whether GM in sport would be perceived as negative or 
not. Certainly, concerns arise about the misuse of GM by the young athlete and the 
potential harms this might have on their health. However, similar claims can be made 
about over~training harms and, on this basis alone, the rejection of GM does not seem 
justified. 
HARMS TO SOCIETY 
The inclusion of social harms that result from performance enhancing technologies is, 
again, different from the way in which Schneider and Butcher (2000) categorise the 
harms of doping. In their overview, they choose to include social harms as harms to 
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others in the sport community. Thus, their reference to the harms on children who are 
influenced by role models is used to argue against the tolerance of drug use in sport. In 
the categorisation here, it is considered that these children are a part of the sport 
community. As well, when the discussion is broadened to performance enhancement in 
general, social harms demand a category of their own, as they are not necessarily relevant 
to people who have a sporting interest. 
Aversion Harms 
An initial social harm deriving from the legitimisation of GM in sport is the potential 
revulsion that can be felt in wider society. As unlikely as it might be to conceive of 
sports authorities legalising GM, when society (more likely the medical community) in 
general does not agree, the merit of such a decision must be evaluated. After all, it is 
not necessarily the case that decisions about genetic research fall within the realms of 
what is acceptable at the public level. However, in some respects, the importance of 
public aversion to the use of such technology is a further harm that is important to 
consider. This harm is similar to the harm of 'expectation disappointment' in that the 
interest is to ascertain the degree to which a community deems the technology to be 
unacceptable. However, it is not a question of understanding the justification for the 
technology from a sporting perspective. Rather, the interest is to give due consideration 
to the feelings of the public about the use of genetic technologies in general. 
Birnbacher (1998, html) argues that, too often, the significance of public perceptions are 
not given moral consideration because they are seen as irrelevant, due to their not being 
founded on coherent moral arguments. It is claimed that the persuasive aspect of public 
feelings is not (and ought not be) their logical coherence, which, when clarified, amount 
to an emotive response to new technologies. Rather, it is the very fact of them existing 
that gives them moral weight. In establishing the means to assess such moral weight, 
Birnbacher asserts that, 
1. The emotional reaction must be sufficiently intense, sufficiently stable and 
sufficiently widespread to qualify, in want-regarding terms, as a valid objection 
against a practice that is otherwise unobjectionable on v,'ant-regarding grounds. 
99 
2. The actual and potential harm done by foregoing the practice felt to be 
unacceptable must be weighed against the "morality-dependent harms" 
(Honderich) caused by doing or accepting it. 
Considerations of the reaction to GM in sport must thus, balance the relative benefits 
and harms of utilising such technology in co--operation with the public perception of 
these technologies, which also reflects harm of some kind. Since it is not yet clear how 
GM might be used in sport, such perceptions are currently difficult to assume. If the 
representation of doping and drug taking is some indication, then it is conceivable that 
GM will be seen as unfair and contrary to the ideals of sport, which will lend weight to 
the removal of GM in sport. 
Technological Momentum 
A further social harm deriving from technologies involves the resultant effect of 
rendering society less resistant to the negative implications of the technology. This 
concern has often been termed as technological determinism and refers to the tendency for 
technological innovations to be rather difficult to remove from society once they have 
been implemented.22 For example, regardless of the harms that might have been found 
in respect of smoking, the use of cars, or nuclear arms, upon their being manufactured 
and employed in various capacities, technological determinism asserts that the removal 
of these technologies is incredibly difficult. Moreover, it argues that the technologies 
determine the patterns of behaviour. For example, in the case of space travel, it might 
be argued that the possibility of this technology renders a need or interest for society to 
continue investing into the technology regardless of the vast amounts of finance they 
require, which might be better spent on other social priorities. 
A less extreme version of this term is technological momentum, which argues there to be a 
more reciprocal relationship benveen society and technology, which does not necessarily 
place control in the hands of technology. In respect of the examples already u~cd, 
technological momentum recognises that society can determine the way in which 
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technologies are used and, thus, steer the regulation of them to social interests. For 
example, smoking can be heavily taxed so as to make it very difficult to afford, cars can 
be modified to become more environmentally friendly and restricted in speed to reduce 
automobile accidents. As well, the use of nuclear arms can be restricted by international 
agreements. 
In respect of GM in sport, it can be argued that the legitimisation of this technology in 
competition can set a precedent for other applications of genetics. By permitting and 
even encouraging the use of GM in sport, society demonstrates less resistance to the idea 
that it is morally legitimate to use such technology. In effect, this can provoke a greater 
tolerance about a technology that, in some contexts, might still be objectionable. For 
example, the tolerance of genetic pre~selection or the use of somatic~cell manipulation 
could make it difficult to distinguish between what is ethically unacceptable and what is 
ethically indefensible. In sport, the legitimisation of GM might make it particularly 
difficult to support the rejection of other forms of doping that were previously 
considered unethical. In this sense then, GM could be said to be determining what is 
ethical in sport. 
This kind of speculative argument, again, is rather difficult to substantiate and is not 
sufficient to draw any sound conclusion about the ethical status of GM in sport. If one 
accepts the technological momentum argument, then all does not seem lost. It would 
still be possible for sports to re~adjust to the detrimental consequences of legitimising 
technologies. Indeed, an example of this can be found in the development and mass 
production of carbon~composite tennis rackets (Brody, 2000). This technology, which 
has been partly responsible for the current dominance of the serve in men's professional 
tennis, is now being dealt with by introducing new kinds of balls to adjust to this effect, 
as was discussed earlier. Thus, while it would not have been possible to withdraw 
modern tennis rackets and return to wooden ones, the strategy has been to balance these 
effects with other technological changes. 
Yet, difficulties arise in circumstances where governing bodies of sport must justify the 
rejection of some technologies over the acceptance of GM. If GM is legitimised in 
101 
sports, then it seems inconsistent to ban other kinds of performance enhancers that are 
of a similar kind. However, this kind of discussion is to be encouraged and GM can 
have the positive consequence of provoking greater justification in sport for what 
delimits the acceptability of performance enhancements. Alternatvely, it can be argued 
that the legitimisation of GM in sport can produce a coercive environment in respect of 
GM in generaL As an increasing number of people utilise GM as a means to ensure an 
advantage in life for their children, then an increasing pressure is placed upon people 
who are against such technology to also engineer their children in a comparable way. 
This coercive argument is comparable to the case described previously of coercion for 
non,using athletes, though importantly speaks to the broader social community as well 
as athletes. It is not inconceivable that a couple might seek to provide their child a 
greater advantage in life by buying them a genetic upgrade, as they might spend money 
on a good education (Ayabe & Tan, 1995). Nevertheless, this sobering analogy does not 
seem much of a consolation in comparison to a future where one must genetically 
modify one's child for them to be minimally capable to engage in society. 
HARMS TO SPORT 
Finally, harms deriving from new technologies are effected on the sports themselves in a 
variety of ways. Philosophically, this is a contentious claim, since it is questionable 
whether abstract entities such as sports or, for example, chairs or tables can actually be 
harmed. As Glannon (2001, p.10) notes, "only beings with interests can be harmed, 
and having interests presupposes the capacity for consciousness and other forms of 
mental life that defines persons." In response, it might be argued that the harm done is 
not to the sport, but to the ability of people to enjoy it. However, Butcher and 
Schneider (1998) make a case for concluding that sports can be harmed and that they 
are, importantly, different kinds of harm than are effected upon people. However, theirs 
is only one way of phrasing harms to the sport. 
A number of the harms in this category are, again, explained in various capacities by the 
authors outlined at the start of this 'harms' section. In Schneider's and Butcher's (200(\ 
p.195) categorisation, some of these kinds of harm are seen as perversions of sport, as 
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they are "somehow antithetical to the true nature of sport". However, their subsequent 
category of "unnaturalness and dehumanisation" seems misplaced, since it would seem 
also that an argument about naturalness involves an argument about what kind of entity 
is sport. To argue that, for example, drugs are unethical because they are unnatural, is 
to assert something about what sport is and to also conclude that, for example, drugs do 
not respond to this ideal. Thus, their categorisation begs clarification, even if it can be 
argued that they do clarify various positions in previous literature. 
However, it has seldom been the approach for authors to derive a thematic and logical 
categorisation of these harms, as is being undertaken here. Moreover, such 
consequences of performance modification are not necessarily seen to be harms to sport. 
To some extent, this speaks to the tendency of ethicists to have considered harms 
deriving from performance enhancement in sport as related to substance abuse and the 
risk of biological or physical harm. 
Yet, drawing upon these previous works, it can be argued that harms to sport also entail 
some challenge to an alleged integrity or nature of the sport that takes place as a result of 
implementing the performance enhancer. In various readings, a threat to sport's 
integrity is often phrased as being a challenge to some essential facet of sport. For 
example, T amburrini (2000) includes the argument that performance enhancement 
"runs counter to the nature of sports competition" (p.209) as separate from harms. For 
Tamburrini, this idea states that the technology deprives sport of excitement and is 
incompatible with the idea of sports as contests between persons. Here, such a 
categorisation lacks derivation and seems motivated to respond to the various arguments 
that can be found in different articles about drug use and other controversial methods 
of performance enhancement in the sport philosophy literature over the last 30 years. 
Thus, it does not seem that the categorisation of these harms is given much 
consideration and it is argued here that the division of categories in Tamburrini and 
other readings does not suitably theorise the types of arguments that are used in relation 
to performance enhancing methods. 
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Although Tamburrini does make important distinctions between arguments about 
doping, the inclusion of the "essentialist argument" (p.209) as separate from others 
reveals a lack of awareness that many of his categories can be seen as harms to the sport. 
The argument that "doping is unfair" (p.208) is an argument about harm to sport, 
premised upon an idea about what is of fundamental value in sport. The credibility of 
the essentialist view has weakened over the years, though continues to be credited as 
having an intuitively plausible basis, though elusive it may be. 
As such, the categorisation given here argues that each of the following ideas is based on 
an essentialist claim about sport. For example, the first of the following categories 
identifies a compromising of fair playas a harm to sport. It asserts that fair~play is a 
characteristic of sport that ought necessarily to be sustained and, if its role in sport is 
weakened, then there are reasons for concern. Thus, harms to sport, tend to be made 
against threats to characteristics of sport that give it value. This is not to reduce the 
claims to a straightforward essentialist theorising of sport, as there is no presumed 
exclusivism about these values. It is not that they are claimed as being defining of sport. 
Rather, argument is made in the sports ethics literature to claim why these normative 
guidelines have value for sport. It is suggested that the following harms to sport all have 
a common characteristic of them asserting some inherent value in sport. At least, these 
arguments have each been argued by ethicists as describing important values in sport. 
Moreover, to claim that sport is harmed by their being threatened is, for different 
reasons, an argument to assert what gives sport value. 
Unfair Advantage 
Gardner (1989) argues that, to utilise specific kinds of performance enhancer is to adopt 
means that are, not immoral, but inappropriate as their employment negates the 
purpose of the activity. Utilising the technology renders, what he calls, an unfair 
advantage over the sport. This view is also found in Simon (1991), who considers that 
advantages are unfair for sports if they make the activity too easy, less challenging, or if 
they reduce the level of skill needed to perform them. For each of these, it is argued 
that advantage is taken of important elements of the activity-
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It is necessary to elaborate on this argument, as its claim is not without complications. 
What would it mean, thus, to have an unfair advantage over the sport? Leaving aside 
the epistemological dilemma of arguing whether a sport can be taken advantage 0(3 and 
retreating to the less problematic notion of unfair advantage. It could be argued, as is 
suggested by Gardner, that to have an unfair advantage over a sport would be to effect a 
kind of action that would be in contradiction to the aspects of that sport that make it 
interesting, worth perusing, and unique. Such actions might be comparable to 
circumventing the prelusory goal of the activity (as articulated in Suits' (1973) 
conceptualisation of sport). Alternatively, Butcher and Schneider (1998) argue that this 
effect shows a lack of respect for the sport and its constitutive elements. It is akin to 
using a motorcycle in a bicycle race. The moral weight of this position is contingent 
upon recognising that players have some obligation to show respect to sports and thus, 
the point of challenging the view is to question whether athletes do have any such 
obligation. 
In the context of GM, the advantage gained by using such means would seem unfair, 
only if sports were kinds of activity is where the genetic [ottery is a valued facet of the 
competition. However, Breivik (2000, html) considers that this is not relevant to sport 
and argues that "everybody should have the same chance of winning". Thus, if one is 
born with a genetic predisposition that is not the most ideal body type for any given 
sport, this kind of person should still have the opportunity to be the best in the world at 
this sport - for their particular body type. In his critique of the role that chance plays in 
sport, Breivik concludes that "Winning should be based on the relevant skills, and be 
the result of the sport~relevant skills and behaviour of competing athletes. Therefore 
chance has no place in elite sports." While Breivik does not extend his conclusion to 
suggest whether GM would, thus, be a beneficial means of performance enhancement in 
sport, it does suggest that the use of GM would not collapse this important aspect of 
sport. AB far as altering genes is concerned, there is no implied disadvantage incurred 
on the sport itself. To be genetically modified does not circumvent the test of a sport 
and the challenge of becoming an elite athlete. Equally, genetic pre~selection does not 
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alter any constitutive element of sport to an extent that one could claim it to be unfair, 
since it has no bearing upon the kinds of skills that are required to become good. 
RuLe Breaking 
One of the most straightforward reasons for why specific kinds of performance 
enhancements are unethical is because they are against the rules. In particular, this 
argument is used in the context of drug use and is premised upon the idea that sport 
only makes sense if the participants follow the rules. From this view, it is argued as 
sufficient to know that something is against the rules to conclude that it is unethical. 
Such a view is most relevant in the cases of banned substances and other methods of 
doping, such as blood doping. The perspective is argued by Feezell (1988) who 
considers that using such means are unethical because, failing to play by the rules, 1S 
failing to play the game at all. 
There is a relatively straightforward logic to this position that argues sport is necessarily 
comprised of arbitrary rules, to which it is necessary to adhere for the activity to have any 
meaning. As such, in the case of many of these rules, they are not questioned and a 
similar case should be made for those kinds of performance enhancements that are also 
banned, even if their justification is unclear. On this view, in a similar sense to why it is 
not questioned why a soccer team has eleven players, neither need it be justified why 
certain kinds of performance enhancement are not allowed. The position does not 
demand a justification for banning the innovation, as it is accepted as being for the good 
of the sport. 
However, this position lacks conviction since, ill accordance with Brown (1980), the 
proposed arbitrariness of rules in sport is not accurate. While it is true to say that the 
rules of any given sport could have been otherwise for a comparably playable game to 
have resulted, it does not follow that such rules could have been anything.24 
In relation to GM, the argument of rule-breaking does not yet have relc\·ance. GM is 
not yet within or outside of any rules. Consequently, if an athlete is currently min.~ GM 
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to enhance their performance, then it is not accurate to say that they are harming sport, 
since the rules of sport will not yet have responded to these technologies. As such, the 
ethical issue must be whether they should be outlawed. As Brown (19S0, p.lS) argues in 
relation to drug use, 
Another question is if the use of drugs is ever unfair. Yes, if using them is 
cheating; if one contender uses them against the rules, but others do not. But 
why should we ever outlaw their use? 
This is the question that underlies the current ethical dilemma in relation to GM. If, as 
Brown argues, there are grounds to claim that GM is unfair, then it can be made only 
on account of it being cheating, which requires for it to be against the rules. Fairchild 
(1991) makes a similar argument, claiming that the first question must be whether the 
innovation should be against the rules. As such, a rejection of GM based on present 
rules does not seem warranted here, which is also what makes GM particularly 
interesting to study. 
Compromise of Interna[ goods 
Within the last 10 years of sport philosophy, an attempt has been made to clarify an 
elusive nature of sport in relation to Maclntyre's theory of social practices and the role 
of internal and external goods. Earlier, it was explained how this approach to ethics can 
provide a basis for understanding how members of a sporting community might be 
harmed by technology. By extension, Brown (1990, p.72) argues that sports are 
"typically organized in terms of sets of rules that make explicit their purposes and 
regulate the means acceptable for achieving those purposes". As well, Brown recognises 
that a feature of practices is also "reflected in the typical relationship of novice to 
master" (p.7 3) where becoming an expert necessarily requires a process that is not easily 
attainable and requires time and commitment. Thus, in sport, 
the relationship is frequently between novice and coach and includes the 
transmission of skills and values through the careful application of standards of 
excellence, which are the product of the sport's own history and the coach's prior 
experience. It is submission to this learning and the standards that govern it that 
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is a prerequisite to mastery, just as it is the ability to extend and enrich the 
practice's techniques and goals that is the mark of achievement (ibid). 
Moreover, it is only through this process that one realises the valued aspects of the 
practice, or, as MacIntyre phrases it, the "internal goods" (1985, p.188). It is on this 
basis that it can be claimed how sport might be harmed if the internal goods are 
challenged. While Brown (1990) does not consider that much hinges on the 
external/internal division of goods, because they are so difficult to delimit, other 
ethicists have argued that this distinction can be useful to conclude what makes some 
kinds of performance enhancement unacceptable. This has been the case in relation to 
drug use, where it is argued that such enhancements are unethical on account of them 
prioritising individualistic values and for not being conducive to the promotion of 
internal goods in sport, which derive mainly from skill~related abilities (Schneider and 
Butcher, 1998). 
In this sense, GM does little to promote internal goods insofar as it does not promote 
the attainment of greater skills. However, neither does GM prevent an athlete from 
attaining the internal goods of a sport. Though here there seem to be two aspects of the 
claim about internal goods: whether it promotes internal goods and whether it prevents 
their attainment. It would not seem that GM prevents the experience of internal goods, 
but neither does it promote the experiencing of them. 
Upon this basis, and in the case of GM, it is important to clarify more precisely what 
constitute internal goods in sport. On this subject, Maclntyre is relatively ambiguous 
though includes such things as money, fame, power, and privileges as external as they 
serve to enhance an individual's status, which has little utility for the practice 
community at large. However, Brown (1990) recognises that the good of 'winning' must 
be a borderline case, because there are different kinds of winning that have different 
kinds of value. Winning, per se, is not a good that can be claimed as exclusive to a 
particular practice because its importance is thoroughly located in the kind of setting 
within which it is achieved. 
The goods of being able to SWlm faster, jump higher, or be stronger, are equally 
contentious to prescribe, which renders it difficult to claim that performance 
enhancements are harmful on the basis that they do not promote the internal goods of 
sport. A clarification of this, thus, requires an argument to specify whether quantifiable 
achievements are internal goods in sport and whether their attainment is reflective of 
sporting virtue. On one view, it might be argued that the importance of breaking 
known limits is a valued aspect of any sporting practice and that the employment of 
means to achieve this is also in keeping with this valued ambition. Accepting that this 
way of articulating goods is plausible, it can be argued that GM - similar to drug use and 
other methods of doping - does not prevent the attainment of internal goods and could 
even promote them by allowing more extraordinary performances. 
In contrast, the same might not be said of a technology that allows an athlete to be skilful 
without needing to train - as can be argued of Gardner's example of the U-groove golf 
clubs, which allow a novice player to appear more skilful. However, the distinction 
between this example and the example of drugs is unclear. In the case of drugs, it might 
be claimed that they do also allow an athlete to be more skilful. A long distance runner 
using epo to boost the production of red blood cells and enhance endurance capabilities 
is boosting the necessary skills of running. Thus, the distinction between this and the 
U-groove golf clubs might be founded on false premises. On this view, using 
performance enhancing technology to make the attainment of endurance capabilities 
easier would, indeed, be a negation of the internal goods. As such, it would seem that 
the potential harm deriving from GM in relation to the internal goods argument 
depends wholly upon an articulation of the internal goods that are specific to any 
sporting practice. 
Unnatural 
The argument of naturalness claims that certain methods of performance enhancement 
are unethical because they are unnatural. The argument is premised upon a distinction 
between what is natural and unnatural and stipulates that unnatural technologies 
should not be used in sport. The position reflects an early discourse in the philosuphy of 
sport in relation to drug use, which has been vigorously critiqued in recent years. The 
basis for this critique is twofold and can be summarised as: 
1. The naturalistic fallacy response 
2. The consistency problem response (that if naturalness is the condition then much of 
what we assume to be acceptable in sports is also unethical) tavin, 1987; Parry, 
1987; Perry, 1988) 
The naturalness argument lacks credibility as it consists of the invalid argument that 
what is the case, should be the case. It first makes the ambitious claim that human 
performances in sports are natural and follows with the equally ambitious conclusion 
that they should remain natural. Consequently, anything that is outside of this natural 
order is to be deemed unethical. As such, the argument moves from an 'is' statement to 
an 'ought' statement, which has no logical foundation according to Moore's (1903, cited 
in Pigden, 1993) naturalistic faHacy. 
The unnaturalness argument is also considered to be weak since it has definitional 
problems. As Schneider and Butcher (2000, p.196) summarise, "we do not have a good 
account of what would count as 'unnatural' and ... we are inconsistent". As Brown 
(1980) argues, the basis for concluding what kinds of substance are natural is infinitely 
difficult to apply. Inevitably, a definitional approach to banning substances in sport 
leads to the inclusion of other kinds of products that are recognisably conducive to good 
health. There are very few substances that do not alter the performance levels of human 
beings and thus, to conclude some as unacceptable on account of specific characteristics, 
serves only to provide an arbitrary system of differentiating between substances. 
Brown considers whether the conditions of the substance being of a 'chemical' nature, 
or 'not normally present in the body' or even the 'quantity of the substance' are 
sufficient as a basis for concluding which kinds of substance are unethical in sport. 
However, on all counts, the conclusions lead to an untenable system of acceptance and 
rejection that does not help in concluding the ethical status of. for examples, "blood 
doping, adrenaline injections, testosterone supplements, or hormone additives" ~Hd, 
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p.18). Even within anti~doping polic th b' f 1 y, e aSlS 0 natura ness is no longer a 
justification for banning specific methods or drugs from sport (Houlihan, 1999). 
Nevertheless, if there is any credibility left in the argument about naturalness, then it is 
worthwhile to consider whether GM is equally unethical for the same reason. 
To assist in this discussion, a similar question has been asked in bioethics, particularly in 
relation to reproductive technologies, such as in~vitro fertilisation. While in~vitro 
fertilisation is not considered by some as a 'natural' method of procreation, the resulting 
entity is most definitely something that is of the natural world - a human (or animal) 
life. Equally, it could be asked in what sense a human life that is conceived and born by 
natural means, though who might have been genetically modified to some degree, is also 
unnatural. In this case, it is uncertain whether genetic engineering serves to determine 
the natural or is itself unnatural given the close proximity to conception that such 
technology would be used. It is tempting to tend towards the former and argue that 
genetic engineering is natural since it is merely a difference in degree to how one's 
genotype is determined by conventional means. 
The conclusion to such questions depends upon where one draws the boundaries of 
intervention and causation as determinants of what is natural. If the sole criterion of 
naturalness is the conception of an embryo through heterosexual intercourse, then one 
must accept that many kinds of life are unnatural. Thus, the production of test~tube 
babies, surrogacy, and perhaps even pre~natal interventions, all lead to the conclusion 
that the resultant life is unnatural. Furthermore, the basis of concluding that 
heterosexual intercourse is natural is to purport a somewhat narrow perspective upon 
what can be natural to human beings. Such a view might also lead to concluding that 
individuals wearing spectacles or fitted with pacemakers are unnatural. Importantly, the 
significance of making such conclusions is highly questionable. 
The claim to GM as being unnatural is highly contingent on the kind of modification 
under discussion. For genomics and somatic cell modification, which entail 
manipulations on the adult (or at least, fully developed) human being, the claims are 
probably at their strongest. The argument considers that tampering with the biology of a 
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human being is unnatural and, as such, ought not to be done. The basis for this 
position varies, though includes a concern for 'playing God' and the consequences this 
might have for the human species. As well, it is argued that sport is an activity that is 
valued because it is a human performance, which stands opposed to anything scientific 
or technologicaL 
Because genomics and somatic cell alteration take place so late in the life of a human 
being, it is quite true that it entails tampering with the human body in a way that alters 
its biological condition. In this sense, it is unnatural inasmuch as it consists of using 
scientific technologies to bring about physical changes. Nevertheless, a similar case can 
be made about other factors that affect the performance of an athlete, such as diet, 
vitamins, sleep patterns, and so on. Regardless of the inadequacy of these distinctions, 
the cases of genomics and somatic cell manipulation are no more or less unnatural than 
drug use. However, in the case of germ~line manipulation and genetic pre~selection, the 
situation is more complex. 
Germ~line manipulation entails altering the individual very early on in life. Currently, 
legislation does not recognise the moral significance of the embryo until 14 days after 
conception (Warnock, 1987). Until then, the embryo is afforded only minimal moral 
significance and is not considered to be a life that can be treated as if it were a fully 
formed human being. As well, germ~line alterations must be made within days of 
conception for them to be safe and effective. With these two considerations in mind, it 
can be questioned whether germ~line alterations do actually interfere with the 
naturalness of the embryo. If it is not afforded 'life' status until after 14 days, then there 
might be a case for claiming that the natural life begins at this time and any 
interventions before then are negligible (in terms of identifying what is natural). Thus, 
anything taking place before this period might seem so early in the development of the 
embryo that it is an integral part of the life~forming process. Consequently, one might 
claim that germ~line manipulation, contrary to drug use, is a natural method of 
performance modification. 
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In the case of genetic pre~selection, there seems no relevant claim to it being an 
unnatural process at all, as it does not involve tampering with the human being. Thus, 
the claim to unnaturalness - not withstanding the critiques given above - seems 
plausible, at most, with respect to genomics and somatic~ell engineering. 
Not an earned advantage 
A further argument for how performance enhancements harm sport is by them 
providing an undeserved advantage for the athlete. For example, by using drugs or a more 
sophisticated golf club, the athlete is afforded benefits to performance that derive from 
the technology and not their own efforts. This is unethical since the value of sport is 
premised upon the attainment of excellence being through effort and hard work. Again, 
this view seems reflective of Maclntyre's social practice theory, which recognises there to 
be an important element of a practice relating to the relationship between the novice 
and the expert. It argues that, if being excellent in sport were easy to achieve, then it 
would have little value. Thus, technologies that collapse this process of becoming an 
expert, challenge the way in which one should participate and learn sport. 
Therefore, performances that use these kinds of innovations and that render the 
difference in results determined by machines rather than humans, ought not merit 
praise (Carr, 1999). Underlying such reasoning are two different ethical assertions. The 
first is that, only those methods that are derived from the work and efforts of the athlete 
are justifiable methods of performance enhancement, because only aspects of an 
athlete's struggle and sacrifice are what gives sport value. Second, the idea is premised 
upon a distributive theory of justice that claims people should get what they deserve. A 
response to these two perspectives, thus, requires answering the following questions 
1. Is it the case that only advantage deriving from effort and hard work has value in 
sport? 
2. Is it the case that everyone gets what he or she deserves in sport? 
For each of these, the harm done to the sport is in keeping with the theme of this 
'harms to sport' section and consist of circumventing the relevant challenges placed 
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before an athlete in sport. However, different from the other categories, the approach 
tends towards asserting that value in sport is defined by the characteristics of being 
human. Each is an argument that stipulates sport has value because it involves the 
evaluation of human;centred characteristics, rather than technology,centred ones. The 
difficulty of being able to identify the human in sport is dealt with more substantially in 
the latter section on 'dehumanising and superhumanising' effects. However, it is 
possible now to assess whether sport performance is premised upon meritocratic 
principles and how OM responds to any such claim. 
In relation to the former question, Carr argues that merit is all that is relevant in the 
evaluation of sporting performances. Where luck, chance, or factors that cannot be 
attributed to the performer determine results, then it is foolish to champion the athlete 
as being excellent. This perspective does encounter problems when faced with 
distinguishing where the athlete stops and where the technology begins, as in many 
sports the performance would seem to be a combination of both. Perhaps a modified 
position is to argue that any innovation that provides a capability that the athlete 
otherwise would not have, is not something that can have value for sports. This 
limitation fits well with innovations that must be appropriated into the skill patterns of 
an athlete and thus, which require training and effort to master. For example, the 
FastSkin swimming suit might only provide a performance advantage if the swimmer 
learns to adjust to the technology and master its benefits by adapting their swimming 
style. In these cases, perhaps Carr would accept that these innovations could have value 
for sport. 
However, this conclusion seems counter,intuitive as it leads to the acceptance of 
technologies that are, perhaps, at the core of Carr's criticisms. In the case of drug use, a 
great deal of work must take place to ensure one has the correct balance of substances to 
render a performance advantage. Moreover, the athlete must invest a great deal of risk 
into using such drugs. As such, it is not accurate to conclude that the athlete does not 
need to work hard to receive a benefit from taking drugs. Consequently, if one rejects 
this conclusion, then a modified conception of merit must be asserted. Yet, this is 
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where the argument about 'earning' one's advantage seems incomplete, since the drug-
enhanced athlete can still claim to have earned their advantage. 
Additionally, the notion that sport consists of an enterprise where people (in this case 
athletes) get what they deserve hardly seems accurate, though the aspiration might be 
admirable. The structures set-up in competitive sports are not there to ensure that 
goods are distributed justly on account of what each individual has invested into the 
activity. At best, the relatively objective performance measures serve only to reflect the 
athlete who has trained the hardest, though even this conclusion is rather questionable. 
Sports performance outcomes are not at all sensitive to the investment and sacrifice that 
each athlete has placed into their own performance. There is no account made for 
individual, cultural differences that must be used to assess people from different 
backgrounds. Rather, sport seems more about who can become the best with the means 
available to them. In this sense, it is not accurate to say that athletes get what they 
deserve. An athlete's performance is comprised of many chance circumstances within 
which they have been born and raised. Additionally, the argument must include the 
ability to take the opportunity to maximise these opportunities for which one can rightly 
ascribe a credit. However, this does not lead to the conclusion that sport consists in 
ensuring that athletes get what they deserve. In cases where sport does nothing to 
reduce indifferences of background and privilege, a similar argument for why this is not 
done might be made in the context of any new technology. 
In relation to GM, it is crucial to consider each kind of application separately. In the 
case of using genomics of somatic-cell GM, the athlete makes some kind of investment 
into the technology that might allow one to conclude that they have earned the 
advantage. Suppose that utilising such methods of performance enhancement involves 
taking a similar amount of time as might be invested into endurance training. 
Alternatively, suppose that the athlete must enter into a very strict diet for the 
modifications to have any benefit. Here, it can be argued that the athlete must undergo 
a regime that makes it difficult to sustain the 'unearned advantage' argument. 
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In the case of germ,line modification, if there is any sacrifice, risk, or hard work 
undertaken, it is from the perspective of the modified human's parents, most likely the 
biological mother. The athlete will not have earned their competitive advantage and so, 
if there is any strength in the claim to 'earned advantage' as a measure for legitimacy in 
performance enhancement, then it seems relevant here. However, the question must 
then be asked whether it is legitimate to penalise an athlete and ban them from 
competition on account of having a particularly good genetic predisposition. A 
comparable example that can reveal the problem with concluding that earned advantage 
is any basis to reject GM is found in the case of the 'gifted child'. For simplicity, 
suppose that a child is born to basketball player Michael Jordan and runner Cathy 
Freeman, who fell in love one day at a mixed basketball game between NBA veterans 
and Sydney Gold medal winners. Their resulting child, like many children, decides to 
follow in the footsteps of its parents and become an athlete. Neither of the parents is 
pushing Cathy Jr to become a basketball player or a runner, though Cathy Jr seems to be 
very good at high,jump, with her father's height and mother's strong legs. 
Arguably, this image is appealing and many fans of Michael or Cathy would probably be 
very pleased to see their child participate and excel in sport. At most people would take 
pleasure in seeing such an admirable couple parent an excellently gifted child. At no 
point would people seek some compensation for the athletes who have not been so 
fortunate to be born to two particularly gifted athletes. Nevertheless, this child - nor its 
parents - did anything to earn this advantage. Moreover, it is very likely that they will 
have done much less than would parents and prospective children who are using germ-
line modification to gain a similar result. At least, the parents of genetically modified 
athletes would be forced to make difficult choices and make a financial commitment to 
private health care. Thus, on the basis of earned advantage, germ,line genetic 
modification would actually seem more desirable than a couple of elite athletes giving 
birth to an exceptionally gifted child, as it would entail some moral evaluation of 
character. 
Finally, in the case of genetic pre,selection, the claim to an unearned advantage does not 
seem applicable. At most, the young athlete is given an opportunity that they might 
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otherwise not have had, if the talent identification processes had been dependent upon 
trials, and where the athlete did not perform well on the day. Equally, it might transpire 
that genetic pre~selection precludes the opportunity for a good, hard,working athlete to 
become elite, simply because their genes are not good enough. In this case, the selected 
super~child might receive an undeserved advantage since their being selected might have 
nothing to do with the effort they have already invested into sport. 
In sum, it is important to recognise that GM does not guarantee or determine excellent 
physical capability and to be aware of the dangers of genetic essentialism. However, 
such recognition can lead to conflicting perspectives about the acceptability of GM, both 
of which can be misinformed. If one concludes that GM is unethical because it will 
turn athletes into genetic~machines whose performances are solely the product of genetic 
engineering (yielding to genetic essentialism), then this would be mistaken. Equally, if 
one considers GM to be ethical because they do not guarantee elite performances 
(rejecting genetic essentialism), then this also presents an incomplete argument. One's 
genetic disposition does not guarantee that one will be capable of elite performances in 
sport. It is not possible to become an elite athlete by virtue of genetic characteristics 
alone. Rather, an athlete must hone these 'gifts', train hard to compete and endure all 
that the unenhanced athlete would need to become elite. AB such, the genetically 
modified athlete will still require the qualities of excellence associated with character 
that derive from training hard, however these might be articulated. The GM athlete will 
have to earn the benefit of their modification. 
Summary to 'o~d' harms 
These 'old harms' reflect the reactions within sport to the possibility of using genetic 
modification. They reveal what kinds of harms might ensue for relevant and interest 
parties or from the perspective of the good of a practice or community. However, they 
do not provide any indication of other kinds of harms that might derive from using 
GM. As such, the following section will detail other kinds of harms in relation to GM 
in sport that draw upon literature in bioethics to support the claims. It is important to 
note that, in so doing, it is distinct from what have been termed as the 'old' harms of 
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OM for sport, which have been premised upon ethical implications from the sporting 
perspective. Thus, what is stressed in this harms discourse, is a need for recognising the 
inter-connectedness of issues in bioethics and sports ethics to reach a conclusion about 
the ethical status of OM for sport. 
The new harms of legalising OM 
Categorising 'new' harms arising from OM has rather a different approach than the 'old' 
harms. In this sense, it is more difficult to discern harms to the athlete from harms to 
others, as it is more difficult to separate harms within sport and in society more 
generally. Moreover, the focus of these harms is deliberately tangential to sport, though 
the implications are made explicit and phrased within the context of the sporting 
examples. Nevertheless, as is the case with genetics more generally, these new harms 
speak more to broader social harms than to sporting ones. However, the categorisation 
is tentative, and endeavours more to relate to the previous categorisation of 'old' harms 
than to serve as a definitive guide. Arguably, the implications of OM are so varied that 
it makes little sense to identify specific groups that are harmed. For example, the harm 
of discrimination that might result from OM would seem both a harm to the individuals 
who are the subject of discrimination as well as to society at large for instilling a 
tolerance of such discrimination. Where possible, these different kinds of effect are 
integrated though the problem is inherently over~lapping. 
BOUNDARY HARMS: THERAPYVS. NON~THERAPY 
Although it remains contested (Pandya, 2000), if it is ethical to use OM for therapeutic 
purposes, the merit of OM for non~therapeutic purposes is highly controversial and, 
currently, unanimously condemned from the medical community. It is important not to 
confuse the distinction between therapy and non~therapy with the distinction between 
repair and enhancement. It is not that non~therapeutic applications of OM are similar 
to, what might be termed, genetic enhancements. Indeed, a much stronger argument 
must be made to support the use of OM for enhancing purposes, where already strong 
arguments are necessary to justify OM for non~therapeutic reasons. Oiven that some of 
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the arguments in relation to GM for sport are for enhancing purposes, it is important 
that this significant ethical barrier in medicine is clear, though its justification must be 
sought. 
One of the major concerns with non~therapeutic GM is that it will engineer, what might 
be called 'social' genes rather than biological ones. The case of sex selection is a 
particularly good example and would entail screening for the sex of an embryo so as to 
determine whether it is of the preferred kind. Further examples might include skin 
colour, eye colour, hair length, or body size. The resulting harm of this would be its 
eugenic nature, which implies reducing the value of specific kinds of people. Macer 
(1990, html) goes as far as to say that non~therapeutic alterations should be illegal since 
there is already a shortage of resources. Additionally, he argues that 
if we let society or parents chose characters in their children then it will have a 
harmful affect on social attitudes to people who fail to meet those 
characteristics .... genetic screening ... makes life more difficult for many parents and 
their children who suffer from the disease, who did not use screening. 
Recently, the example of sex selection has arisen as a present ethical dilemma in 
medicine and it is argued that legitimating the genetic engineering of such genes would 
condones a level of discrimination that is unacceptable. In this case, such 
discrimination takes place by the prioritising of a given sex over the other. 
Unfortunately, rational discussion of the issue has been overshadowed by emotive (and 
poorly articulated) concerns about the sexual bias that might result from such choice 
and the frivolous treatment of life that might ensue from allowing it (Benn, 2001). The 
strength of the arguments seem to hinge upon deriving 'good reasons' for wanting to 
make any such selection. If the choice is based on a perceived difference in the 
importance of one sex over another, then there would seem reason for worry. However, 
the position seems less strong when it premised on a non~sexist rationale. For example, 
a couple might have already had four births of one sex and seek to have an alternate sex 
for their fifth child. It is easy to be sympathetic to this perspective and it would not 
seem to raise any serious moral concern about the devaluing of certain kinds of life. 
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Nevertheless, the significant harm arising from this choice and other non~therapeutic 
modifications is that it could provoke an horrific abuse of the treatment of life, since it 
is inherently eugenic. There are concerns that particular kinds of people might be 
deemed to lack value simply on account of seemingly trivial characteristics. As Elliott 
(1998, html) explains, 
One possible worry about some enhancement technologies is what the 
Georgetown University philosopher Maggie Little calls the problem of "cultural 
complicity." The demand for certain technologies is created by cultural forces that 
many of us would see as harmfuL They are harmful because they make some 
people feel inadequate, or unhappy with the way they are. One example would be 
the desire of some Asian girls and young women to have surgery in order to make 
their eyes look more like those of Westerners. Another more obvious example is 
the pressure that many American women feel to conform to a certain body type, 
and which leaves many women and girls feeling that they are too fat, or that their 
breasts are too small, and so on. At the extreme end of the spectrum these cultural 
pressures help to produce psychiatric illnesses like anorexia nervosa. 
Ensuring that prospective parents have a 'good' reason for wanting a child of a particular 
sex might be particularly difficult to ensure, though pragmatics does not seem a 
justifiable reason for prohibiting such choices in such important matters. Conceivably, 
a system of counselling could be arranged and qualitative procedures of evaluation of 
each case might be sufficient. In such circumstances, at least the responsibility is taken 
by the medical community to ensure that not any reason is considered a good reason for 
selecting a particular kind of life over another. As a further concern, it is imaginable 
that couples will manipulate any such test, simply to have a desirable outcome to any 
evaluation. Thus, when asked about the reasons for making a non~therapeutic 
modification, candidates could disguise their prejudice to present socially acceptable 
rationales. However, this is their responsibility and need not raise any more of a 
dilemma from the medical community. In relation to sport, it is perhaps now clearer 
how difficult it would be to legitimate such modifications. To utilise screening for the 
intention of discovering athletic capability seems an horrific abuse of the technology and 
highly unethicaL25 
Similar claims can be made in relation to other applications of GM. To engmeer 
specific kinds of genes, or to remove specific kinds of dysfunction is inherently eugenic. 
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Even seemingly desirable modifications, such as the correction of genes that lead to very 
difficult or painful lives, the choice to use such technology is a choice of preference for 
one way of being human over another. As well, to ask for a justification of anyone who 
might be seeking to engineer themselves would also be problematic to apply. 
In sum, this section highlights the potential for harm that might ensue from allowing 
genetic manipulation or screening for non,therapeutic purposes. Regardless of where 
the line is drawn on therapy and non,therapy, harms will arise. Thus, the couple that 
seeks to have a boy as their third child, rather than a girl, would be harmed by an 
infringement of their freedom to exercise such choice, if it were prohibited. From a 
consequential perspective, this harm might seem more desirable than the many harms 
that derive from legitimising such choices. However, it is also alarming that the 
legitimate use of gene,therapy might lead to a greater tolerance for gene~nhancement, 
which itself might be an additional harm.26 Indeed, restricting the use of such 
technology can also be argued as eugenic. By not allowing individuals to make their own 
choices about their children is also to enact an institutional stipulation about what kinds 
of people should exist. In this case, the eugenic premise is that, 'only people who are 
not genetically modified should exist.' Consequently, if the criticism is that OM is 
inherently eugenic, then it must be asked why that particular form of eugenics is less 
desirable compared with the alternative, which forbids such people from existing. 
KNOWLEDGE AND ACCESS 
The implications of genetic selection (as opposed to pre,selection), which would derive 
from 'genetic,screening, are such that the screened individual would have an awareness 
of their genetic predisposition. In bioethics, this has been particularly relevant for 
knowing the probability of contracting certain kinds of gene,related disorders, which has 
extensive uses (}viacer, 1990). The identification of 'sport' genes has still a long way to 
go before it gains any kind of acceptance as a legitimate application of medical 
technology. Nevertheless, the potential for harms in this section is comparable. 
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Within bioethics, knowledge of one's genetic future has been discussed in relation to 
the harms that might derive from having such information. Questions have been raised 
about whether it is conducive to health for a patient to be aware of their genetic future 
for a number of reasons. For many kinds of genetic disorder, there is no possible 
therapeutic cure and so, arguably, it makes no sense to conduct such tests V\yabe and 
Tan, 1995). As well, for some kinds of disease, genes are not the only determinant of 
contracting an illness. In such cases, it has been argued that knowledge of the possible 
condition might be to the detriment of the patient's health and might actually increase 
the tendency to contract the illness, somewhat of a self,fulfilling prophecy. 
Similar arguments are raised in regard to the patient's family, whose health might also 
be affected by such knowledge (Hayry and Lehto, 1998; Macer, 1990). Ethical questions 
arise over whether family members or reproductive partners have a right to such 
information. An illuminating and relevant case is found in Macer (1990). Macer 
describes the case of trying to enforce married couples in Illinois, USA, to undergo 
mandatory premarital testing for HIV. As Macer explains, the premise was that "the 
spouse should know if the partner has HIV, and the public health motivation was to 
slow the spread of HIV." Macer continues, "however, it is ethically unacceptable to 
enforce such screening" (html).27 
Ethical issues also arise in terms of who should be given access to genetic information. 
The potential harms of this also derive from screening and selection, but also from other 
kinds of OM. However, currently the main concern in respect of this is screening as this 
application has the most likely utility in sport. Recently, this has become manifest in 
the context of the rights of insurance companies to have knowledge about the genetic 
constitution of the people that they are insuring. Before genetic screening was possible, 
companies could not claim a right to such knowledge. However, the possibility of the 
technology being used has provoked a claim to the right of an insurance company to 
request such information. In such circumstances, the individual will be condemned to 
know their genetic future and might even be prejudiced on account of a negative 
prognosls. 
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In the case of sport, the parallel case would be that sports authorities demand such 
information under some kind of anti-doping rationale. In this case, similar questions 
arise for GM as have arisen in the case of other kinds of performance enhancement. 
Whether an athlete is obliged to provide such information or whether the sports 
authorities over~step the athlete's rights by making such claims, is at the core of this 
debate. On account of the bioethical reasons for preventing a tolerance of the rights of 
insurance companies, it does not seem necessary that a simple argument can be made to 
support athlete's rights. However, it is likely that genetic testing would be limited to test 
only the kind of information pertinent to an athlete's performance in competition. As 
such, they would not be harmed by any other information that indicates future 
disorders. Nevertheless, the question must still be asked as to whether an athlete is 
obliged to undergo any such test and how this compares with other kinds of professions, 
where such demands cannot legally be made. 
Research has examined the possibility that employers would also have an interest in the 
genetic prognoses of their employers, in a similar way to how other kinds of medical 
information is required (Rothstein and Knoppers, 1996; Shapiro, 1991; Henderson, 
2000). In this respect, the harms can vary. For example, it would be particularly useful 
to know that if one is a haemophiliac, then a butcher's job is not the most ideal career 
choice. However, this is one very simple example, where others do not make such a 
clear link between a given kind of profession and the importance of genetic conditions. 
As well, it is less clear whether information would be used, predominantly, in the 
interests of the employee or the employer predominantly. In either case, it is possible to 
sympathise with the concerns, though arguably it is the individual that would suffer 
more from others knowing their genetic prognosis. A further reason for doubting the 
merits of such testing is that it would be prejudicial to those for whom a genetic disorder 
can be identified. Where the technology does not detect other kinds of disorders, those 
who might be susceptible to these are favoured - their genetic dysfunction is not 
noticed. Thus, the unrestricted use of genetic information poses a threats to the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights (Hendriks, 1997) and would seem to create concernes if 
applied to sport. 
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ENGINEERING FUTURE VALUES 
Embracing GM in sport would, indirectly, result in harms to society in the sense that 
they determine what is to be valued by future generations. As Mackie recognises, "if the 
Victorians had used genetic engineering, they would have made us more pious and 
patriotic" (Mackie, cited in Glover, 1984, p.149). This exemplifies the concern for what 
is alarming about allowing any use of germ,line genetic engineering. By prioritising 
performance,related characteristics in sport, one asserts a hierarchical framework for 
organising the value of various human characteristics. The emphasis is placed upon 
winning, being successful, and having an advantage over others. Being prepared to alter 
oneself to fit within such a framework of value is harmful to society because it instils a 
prescribed way of evaluating life. 
For example, Munthe (2000) assumes that genetics would be used to make athletes 
faster, higher, and stronger. Thus, it is performance enhancement - in the quantitative 
sense - that is most interesting in relation to genetic technologies. Munthe does not 
consider that genetics might be used to make athletes play more fairly or to be interested 
less in winning and more interested in acquiring altruistic tendencies and learning the 
value of, for example, team spirit. In response, it might be considered that the biological 
traits are the most likely traits to be altered by GM. Of the many ways in which future 
genetics might be used, it does not seem inconceivable that genes will be identified as 
determining various kinds of physical and psychological traits. Yet, accepting that 
genetic pre,dispositions are no more of a guarantee for becoming an elite athlete than 
they are for becoming an alcoholic, it would be unfair to suggest that emerging research 
that outlines possible genetic determinants for socially learned traits is not significant. It 
does seem possible that social characteristics could have some demonstrable genetic 
origin, at least in some cases. As such, Munthe's discourse reflects a particular ideal of 
sport, which is also reflective of taken,for,granted values in sport: those of performance 
and physical, quantifiable, achievement. Yet, it is the very content of this sporting ideal 
that is in need of question. 
As well, it can be argued as harmful to prescribe what must be valued by future 
generations. To engineer or enhance certain characteristics of an athlete is to assert 
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these characteristics as being the most valuable in sport. This prioritising of quantifiable 
measures of performance results in an emphasis upon specific kinds of characteristics, to 
the neglect of others. While this process of evaluation might be reversible in some cases, 
there seems something problematic about instilling a particular set of values in sport for 
future generations as might be said of OM. This harm is particularly strong in the case 
of germ,line cell engineering, which can be argued as altering evolution by engineering 
the genes of future generations. Additionally, there is also the potential for negatively 
affecting the human gene pool and a general equilibrium in nature. As Olover (1999) 
argues, germ,line gene therapy can be seen as, not just curing a disorder in one person, 
but also as changing the gene,pooL However, in response, Macer (html) claims that the 
argument of genetics as reducing genetic variability 
.. .is doubtful as to whether this sort of selection would really have much affect 
biologically. The major affect is on reduced social variability. If we want to 
maintain or should we say develop a society where people's autonomy is respected 
then we should not allow the acceptance of genetic restrictions on non,disease 
characteristics. This means that society could for the benefit of society, and 
protecting its members from developing narrow views whether they be sexist or 
intelligence seeking, restrict the freedom of individuals to use techniques to affect 
the children. We already limit the environmental freedom of parents, we also need 
to limit their genetic freedom to chose. 
Even if Macer's view is more accurate, engineering humans to become better athletes -
quantitatively - prevents aspiring to other values in sports, which is harmful to the 
possibility of freely choosing what matters to people. 
TYRANNY OF THE NORMAL 
Macer's ideas lead to a further harm that can derive from a liberal tolerance of using 
OM to alter humans. Arguably, from a liberal acceptance of OM, a process of 
normalisation (comparable in effect to institutionalised eugenics), is affected upon 
society. Expectedly, the cause for such normalisation will be different from an attempt 
from government to bring about specific kinds of persons. Rather, it is more likely that 
fashion and popular trends will lead to what is termed by Post (1991, p.225) as "the 
tyranny of the normaL" Post continues, explaining that it is 
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imperative to consider the possibility that our cultural definitions of normalcy 
might shift so that enhancement genetic engineering becomes increasingly 
attractive .... Our desire not to bring suffering into the world must be tempered by a 
recognition that suffering is a part of life (ibid). 
The probability of this occurring has been discussed in depth by Appleyard (1999) where 
it is considered how eugenic issues might not arise simply as a result of institutionalised 
eugenicide that might be comparable to Nazism. Rather, the tyranny of a liberal society 
where individual autonomy is prioritised and where people can choose how their 
children are brought into this world, can also have a comparably pessimistic ending. 
This would have, Appleyard suggests, a normalising effect upon people's choices about 
their children that is as destructive as institutionalised eugenics. Thus, when acting in 
the interests of their children~to~be, parents would seek to determine those 
characteristics that will render the child more predisposed to social acceptance and 
endeavour to remove those characteristics that might lead to social exclusion or, less 
dramatically, the possibility for ridicule. As Appleyard (1999, p.86) says, "people in 
general are powerfully driven to gain a competitive advantage for their children or, at 
least, to ensure that they are not at a competitive disadvantage." In this sense, the 
ethical issues arise from learning that legitim ising GM would lead people to engineer 
their children to be alike. In so doing - by eliminating difference - future generations 
are not burdened by the social injustice of being' different', but by the, perhaps, greater 
burden of 'sameness'. 
Appleyard's argument comes as a response to advocates who argue modern genetics to 
be entirely different from institutionalised eugenics, such as Ledley (1994) and Glover 
(1999). Appleyard's retort is that, while the method might be substantially different, the 
effect would be similar, and this is cause for concern. The possibility that difference 
could be removed from society seems quite contrary to a democratic, multi~ultural 
society, which continually seeks to embrace and nurture difference and where tolerance 
and morality is predicated on having to make a conscious decision to accept and 
embrace difference. It requires, as it were, the capacity for being an autonomous, moral 
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agent. While difference might not be inherently valuable, it can be argued that 
difference makes for a much more interesting existence and the prospect of similarity in 
physical and mental characteristics is alarming since it seems to reduce the value of being 
human by eliminating chance. Moreover, reducing difference may be argued as 
problematic given that it would seem that tolerance and co,operation are learned only by 
being required to accept difference. 
In sum, the widespread acceptance of enhancement technology would render an 
homogenising effect on the human species, where parents might select their children to 
ensure their normality and acceptance into society. Parents will seek to enhance those 
qualities that are culturally desirable and, consequently, genetic engineering becomes a 
mechanism of eugenics, even though it is left to the free will of individuals. The 
alarming scenario is presented whereby all humans might look, think, and behave alike, 
thus perpetuating the disturbing situation where human autonomy is removed and 
people cease to be individuals, unique, and creative. Within sport, this argument is 
relevant for it projecting a future for sport that is determined by present,Jay values. 
GENETIC ESSENTIALISM 
A further concern with GM is that it will lead to an investment of interests based solely 
upon genetics, when genetics is only one element of what constitutes the capabilities of a 
human being. Some authors have recognised that the genetics is already instilling a 
powerful essentialism that can be highly detrimental (Nagl, 1998). Neither the human 
being, nor the elite athlete is constituted entirely by genetics. Thus, to place so much 
importance upon genes would misconstrue the relationship between nature and 
nurture, to the expense of the latter (Elliott, 1999; Macer, 1990). In turn, this is 
harmful for it reducing the rich contexts of sporting performance to enterprises that 
place value only in results and performance rather than, for example, strength of 
character. This is alarming from a social perspective since it purports to reduce human 
practices to levels of quantifiable measures and impoverishing social experiences. 
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Ayabe and Tan (1995) explain how, in relation to 'knowledge and access' harms, genetic 
information can render an essentialism that leads to discrimination based upon genes. 
Indeed, Keyley (1996) illustrates these concerns by way of an example of the legal system 
in the U.S. Recently, custodial cases in family law have been re,defined by genetic 
essentialism. fu Keyley describes, "Under the rubric of 'genetic essentialism', the family 
is being redefined as a 'molecular, genetic unit' and social/psychological aspects of 
family identity and functioning are being ignored" (p. 717). Within sport, the 
implications of this are alarming for the very reasons that are given against the 
importance of performance~nhancement: the championing of quantifiable measures in 
elite sport is to the expense of other kinds of values associated with sport. 
Consequently, the discourse of genes, leads to an essentialist view of sporting 
performance, which marginalises other factors that contribute to an athlete's 
performance capacity. 
LIFE HARMs 
One of the broader claims against GM is the harm it inflicts upon the value of life. 
From such a view, the idea of 'playing God' reflects a deep,seated concern for the way in 
which life is treated by unnecessary technology. Thus, it is claimed that, to genetically 
modify life is to render it as a means to an end, to treat life as an artefact (or technology) 
rather than something that has inherent value. Thus, by altering a potential life for 
reasons other than health, one is objectifying it by imposing a template of how that life 
should be. fu Harris (1998, p.244) explains, 
.. .if genetic connections are established for things like musical ability, athleticism, 
and intelligence, there will be immense pressure to specialise in the education of 
children earmarked for success or failure in such areas. 
This has been raised recently in relation to cloning. The alarming possibility that 
parents might wish to clone themselves or others so that they can have a particular kind 
of child has been condemned for it being fanciful and exploitative. The idea that one 
can engineer people at all, thus raises concerns for the motivations of parents and how a 
child might be treated by such parents once it is born. In the case of pre,selection, this is 
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particularly alarming, though also has relevance for other kinds of GM. Again, 
comparable to sex selection, it is the motivations of the engineer (or parent) that are 
ethically alarming as opposed to the technology itself. 
In response to such harms, it has been argued that the pre-embryonic threshold might 
serve as some guide to acceptable engineering. Thus, if the life is pre-embryonic, then it 
cannot be harmed in the sense that one might understand a life to be harmed if it is 
altered after this 14 day period. Supposing that this 'primitive streak' (Warnock, 1987) 
stage is accurate and, providing that modifications take place before this time, then the 
life is not harmed. However, there does exist some basis for ascribing minimal rights to 
such lives to recognise that they are not just expendable. 
As well, the rejection of such technologies on account of them embodying some anti, 
Kantian maxim upon the treatment of life does not seem warranted. It does not follow 
that any parent that choosing to engineer their child will treat that life as means to an 
end. As Harris (1999, p.70) argues, 
There is no evidence for. .. the supposition that if people choose to use a cloned 
genome in order to create their own children, that these children will not be loved 
for themselves, let alone not treated in a civilized way. 
An additional concern from the life harms is of a more practical nature. It has been 
argued that GM is far too experimental and wasteful of life to be ethically sound. In 
response, it can be argued that all advances in medicine and technology require some 
degree of experimentation and that it is simply a case for finding at what point a 
technology is deemed to be overly experimental. As Macer (1990, html) says, 
The answer to the question how much experimentation is ethical, could be none, 
or some depending on the age and the experiment in question, or it could be any 
up to a certain age. One moral assumption that can be made is that it is 
completely unacceptable to make use of a child or an adult as the subject of a 
research procedure which may cause harm or death .... The argument whether an 
early embryo is of the same status as a fully developed fetus is a slippery slope 
argument. 
129 
From this harm, however, emerges a concern for the sanctity of life and its protection 
from exploitation through commercialisation. In the last two years, this has been of 
great concern due to the emergence of companies that wish to buy and sell human eggs 
and sperm Miah, 2002). Such companies appear to be gaining a stronghold for 
prospective parents who might wish to buy their way into parenting - in a comparable 
manner to the way in which one purchases private health care (Resnik, 2001). 
SUMMARY TO 'NEW' HARMS 
This overview of new harms cannot be exhaustive of the various harms that arise in 
relation to GM in general. Rather, it speaks to the specific genetic technologies that are 
most likely to be relevant to the application of genetics to sport. Collectively, they 
provide a substantial level of argumentation for concluding that the application of 
genetics to sport is ethically suspect. Nevertheless, before deriving such conclusions, it is 
important to recognise that they provide only one component of the ethically relevant 
consequences of genetics in sport. Thus, it is first necessary to conclude this analysis of 
the ethical issues arising from the various technological effects in sport. 
DE-SKILLING AND RE-SKILLING: Does GM de-skill or re-ski11 sport? 
The implications of de-skilling and re-skilling effects do not seem to raise any ethical 
issues in respect of GM. In none of the possible applications is there a consequence for 
the skills required to perform in sport (GM does not provide athletic skills). However, 
this conclusion depends somewhat upon how skill is defined. If the capability for 
endurance is defined as a skill for long distance runners, and GM can promote 
resistance to fatigue, then GM does de-skill the activity. Simplistically, the technology 
will make the attainment of excellence a more easily attainable goal for athletes. 
Perhaps to illustrate how this is evidence of the utility of the conceptual framework, it is 
possible, for example, that de-skilling and re-skilling does have implications for a 
different kind of technology. Thus, a U-grove golf club (Gardner, 1989) or polara golf 
ball (Gelberg, 1996) do alter the kinds of skills that are necessary to be good at sport. 
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Indeed, for each of these cases, they can be said to de,skill the activity, making it easier. 
As such, they do raise ethical issues in relation to this construct of technology, since 
making a skill easier does affect the value of the sport. However, it is not the case that 
the athlete, by simply being genetically modified, will have an elite level of skill 
capability. Rather, they will still be required to complete the necessary training to 
become a competent athlete. Consequently, in no way does OM alter the kinds of skills 
that an athlete needs, nor does it diminish the level of skills that is required. Thus, it 
does not seem that OM de-skitLs or re-skitLs sports. 
DEHUMANISING AND SUPERHUMANlSING: How does GM challenge being 
human? 
To assist in concluding whether OM in sport alters a notion of humanness it is useful to 
draw upon perspectives in sports ethics and bioethics. The initial difficulty with 
establishing whether any technology affects such a construct (and thus, whether it might 
be considered unethical for this reason), rests with the business of defining the human. 
Within sports ethics, this has entailed seeking to identify what is the human performer, 
as a basis for arguing why specific performance enhancements are unethicaL In 
bioethics, the same issue has been raised in the context of considering what kinds of 
intervention on the human condition are consistent with a prescribed view about the 
authority of humans to alter their bodies and minds. Such discussions have been of 
particular relevance for issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and the use of genetics, 
which centre upon an articulation of the value of life. 
The argument from humanness implies that there is a recognisable entity called 'the 
human' that can be argued as the valued aspect of a sporting performance. As well, it 
prioritises the 'human' role in performance over any other (such as, the technology). If 
it is the case that technology seems to remove the human (dehumanise) or augment it in 
some way that ought to be of concern ~uperhumanise}, then it is paramount that a 
perspective about the acceptability of such technology is given. 
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In the case of sport, identifying how and whether the human has been dehumanised or 
superhumanised is the critical factor in the discussion about humanness, as it depends 
upon identifying what is meant by the term 'human'. Attempts at, what would seem to 
be, a relatively essentialist answer have been made outside of sport in a number of ways. 
Similarly, in the case of GM, to conclude that the human has been de~humanised or 
made Less human, seems to require an assertion about what counts as being an athlete. It 
requires being able to assert that it is humanness that give sports performance value. 
Finally, the bolder statement must be made that, without the human, sport would have 
less value. 
On finding some tentative conclusions to these questions, the latter point can be raised 
to argue whether GM does tend to dehumanise or superhumanise the athlete. In the 
case of de~humanisation, it argues that reducing the role of the human (de~humanise) by 
making the attainment of achievements in sport more easily accessible, unacceptably, de~ 
value the practice. For example, employing the use of depth~finders in fishing to allow 
the angler to detect the best places to cast, removes the skill of locating a place to fish 
based upon an acquired knowledge. Equally, to use something like the polata 
asymmetric golf ball to reduce the hook on one's swing, would be to provide a skill that 
is not acquired through practice and thus, which unacceptably reduces the challenge of 
the activity by using technology. From these descriptions, it can be seen how affecting 
humanness can be considered conceptually similar to affecting the skills within the 
sport. However, in respect of humanness, the technology need not reduce the role of 
skiU in the performance, but the role of the human in the performance. For 
dehumanising to occur, the technology must replace the human in some manner, not 
simply make it easier to perform. Conversely, to super~humanise the athlete by 
enhancing the capabilities for performance is regarded as unacceptable since it provides 
the athlete with capabilities that are not warranted and that do not provide a reflective 
account of the athlete's own abilities. 
Schneider and Butcher (2000) and Loland (2000) recognise that defining the human has 
a bearing upon what kinds of technologies are acceptable for use in sport, since value in 
sport is inextricable from being human. This perspective is articulated in respect of drug 
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taking and the use of other kinds of technologies, and is premised upon wanting a sports 
performance to be reflective of 'human' capabilities rather than 'technological' ones. 
However, within sports ethics the position has not really been tackled for it being a 
particularly difficult matter to resolve. As Schneider and Butcher (1998, p.196) 
recognise, there is not "an agreed~upon conception of what it is to be human" and so, 
from their perspective, it is not possible to appeal to such a concept. Yet, some attempts 
must be made to elaborate on this important concept, which seems so frequently a basis 
for drawing conclusions about the acceptability of technologies in sport. Attempts at 
any such definition are replete with contradictions, though have endeavoured to isolate 
humanness by contrasting it with other kinds of entity, such as animals, machines, and 
automata. 
ISOlATING THE HUMAN CONDITION 
An early theme within philosophy that reflects the attempt to distinguish humans from 
other entities is in the context of non~human animals. The works of Michel de 
Montaigne (1533~92) argue that beasts are more natural than humans and, moreover, 
that there is a greater difference between humans and humans than between humans 
and animals. Ideally, Montaigne argues, humans should aspire to be more like animals 
rather than to mark themselves of as being distinct and superior to non~human animals. 
Subsequently, the work of Rene Descartes (1596~ 1650) marks a significant development 
in philosophical approaches to understanding the human being. Descartes rephrases 
the question in the context of animal intelligence, placing at the fore the discussion 
about an animal's ability to reason, rather than its possession of a soul. By identifying 
the perfection of animal actions, Descartes concludes that animals, unlike humans, do 
not have free will and the ability to determine actions. Whereas animals are perfect, 
humans have the ability to chose imperfection and make mistakes, represented by the 
story of the Garden of Eden. Additionally, humans must strive for perfection through 
reason and, from here, Descartes concludes that the method through which humans 
reason is rational doubt and arrives at his canonical approach to philosophy, rational 
deductivism, and its resultant legacy, 'cogito ergo sum', I am thinking, therefore I exist. 
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Distinguishing humans from animals, is not the only way in which philosophers attempt 
to reveal a coherent articulation of the human. Far from being a progression from the 
human,animal distinction, ideas seek to distinguish between humans and non,living 
entities or automata. Arguably more distinct and enduring than the literary articulation 
of the distinction between animals and humans; mythical and fantastical ideas about 
human/machine hybrids are present from stories of Icarus and his wings, to Chinese, 
Greek, and Arabic text that are rich in the subject of automata (Mazlish, 1993). The 
mixing of fact and fiction is an important factor in these discussions, which plays an 
important role within the ethical consideration of new technologies. The ability to 
conceptualise the abstract being, the automata, the cyborg, or the genetically engineered 
human, are all useful ways to approach a clearer understanding of what constitutes the 
human and what might constitute a desirable circumstance for the future of the human 
being. 
More distinct than ideas about humans and animals are the fears attached to automata 
and the insecurities that are evident through conceptualising the living machine. The 
automaton has been represented as posing an irrational threat to human beings, calling 
into question their identity and powers of domination. Literary examples abound, 
including Hans Christian Anderson's Fairytale story, The Nightingak; Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein; and more recently, Isaac Asimov's robot stories. 
Within each of these examples, there is a degree to which the new being creates a 
problem for the humans around it. Anderson's Nightingak tells the story of a 
mechanical nightingale that charms a Chinese Emperor far more than the real 
nightingale that had been with the Emperor for many years. Its greater beauty and more 
pleasant song, results in the real nightingale being banished and fleeing from the 
Emperor's side. However, a year later, the artificial bird breaks down and cannot be 
repaired. The Emperor begins to die and, hearing of the news, the bird returns and the 
Emperor returns to good health once again. The story symbolises that it is biological life 
that endures and not machinic life. The difference between humans and automata is 
simply that the former represents life, and the latter death. 
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Other texts hold a similar message, most notably with Shelley's Frankenstein, the monster 
is a human creation that is comprised of part biological and part mechanical methods. 
The resulting being is grotesque and alien to the human world, within which it soon 
becomes monstrous and violent. Interestingly, the monster of Frankenstein becomes 
terrible only when it is rejected from human society and so the inherent monstrosity of 
the being is unclear. It is not that the monster is terrible in itself, but only because other 
humans do not embrace it. On this point, Mazlish (1993, p.44) identifies that the story 
provokes the following warning about the future of the human species 
.. .if humans insist on their separateness and superiority in regard to machines (as 
well as other animals), viewing them as a threatening new "species" rather than as a 
part of their own creation, will they, indeed, bring about the very state of 
alienation that they fear. 
These and many other stories that write about automata, cyborgs, or robots, are 
conceived by humans as originating either at the hands of gods, or by humans using 
magic or science. They all pose the same compulsive question: how do automata differ 
from humans, or more simply, what is human? 
In its most recent incarnation, the classical period of Enlightenment marks the triumph 
of humanism over theology and many of the scientific discoveries of previous years are 
reworked and understood by scientists of this time. However, defining the human did 
not end during these times and new technologies provide the means for further kinds of 
discussions about the human being. 
The Machinic age provoked a significant development in writing about the relationship 
of humans and other entities. The discourse reflects a scientific concern with automata 
and the Romantic revulsion against the mechanical Newtonian worldview. It illustrates 
the range of curiosities, embodied in scientific inquiry and legendary stories, concerning 
the creation of life from inanimate material during this period of re-constructing the 
value of technology. Intuitively, one might not conceive of machines as entirely 
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different from automatons, though the period and the writings within it deserve a 
separate categorisation. 
The subsequent years would see the works of some profound philosophers and 
scientists, with a far more sophisticated sense of science than had existed before. This 
period of 'isms' (Transcendentalism, Idealism, Existentialism, Nihilism, Realism, 
Pragmatism, Socialism, Communism, Liberalism) included such great icons of western 
history as Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and Schopenhauer. The presence of machines in 
daily life made the distinction between humans and non~living entities more acute, 
particularly during the late 19th century and early 20th Century, where machines would 
be far more confrontational to a worker's life than ever before and increasingly within 
the family home. 
The machine became an object of human interests, a means to an end, accentuating the 
role of the human being as a tool user. Tools were used to extend personal power and 
freedom, at the same time as subjecting individuals to its impersonal organisation 
(Mazlish, 1993). Tools became the mediator for humans and the environment; an 
artificial skin separating humans from other animals. 28 The division of labour 
transformed the human into a mere body part - a hand - and reduced a worker's 
relationship with each other to functional, economic value. From here, it was a small 
step - conceptually - to the computer revolution. The computer reflects the pinnacle of 
machinic automation, extending human faculties as well as replacing humans and 
making humans more machinic, physically and cognitively. 
Darwin's biological humanism allows the human to be reduced to a level of mechanics 
and, arguably, this view pervades contemporary understandings about humans. The 
classification of species, and the surviva~ of the fittest hypothesis reduces the complexity of 
life to relatively simple relationships. However, it is here where the barriers between 
animals and humans collapse, identifying the difference between them as being one of 
degree, rather than of kind. Indeed, in Darwin's view, the most fundamental difference 
between humans and animals is that humans possess a developed sense of morality, or 
conscience, and religion. From here, the debate about whether humans are comprised 
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mainly by genetic, inherited qualities, or whether humans are more socially determined 
- the nature versus nurture debate - begins to ensue. This dialogue becomes 
increasingly pertinent with the emergence of psychology and the work of Freud and 
Pavlov. 
Moving from modern to post,modern articulations of the human condition also plays an 
important role in understanding how humanness as it is articulated in present day 
ethics. Such authors as Aldous Huxley in his classic text Brave New Wor~d or George 
Orwell's 1984 (1940/83), are continually present within discussions about the 
biogenetic revolution and their ideas (or prophecies) continue to haunt humanity and 
its scepticism about the genetic revolution. This period of redefining the human 
condition as distinct from other entities is not limited to any specific technology. It 
encompasses biotechnologies, but also includes such innovations as artificial intelligence 
and virtual reality. Nevertheless, the symbiosis of the organic and machinic takes place 
in its most extreme form through the merging of humans with medical technology, 
allowing the transplantation of limbs, and the re.-constructing of life, which utilises 
technology and biology.29 
The works of Alan Turing (1950) and John Searle (1980) attempt to distinguish the 
human mind from a computer programme and the dialogue of whether human minds 
are entirely machinic in their functioning, has its roots in Descartes. However, unlike 
Descartes, scientists of this time show that the mind is not a reliable measure of 
existence. This is most evident from Damasio (1994/6), who argues that Descartes' Error 
was in supposing that cognition and an awareness of thought are the real substrates of 
being. In contrast, and through the utilisation of medical cases that speak contrary to 
Descartes, Damasio argues that the mind and brain cannot be separated. Rather, beings 
begin only as beings; they then gain consciousness, a simple mind, then the possibility of 
thought, followed by the possibility of using language to communicate, and finally the 
capability to organise thoughts in order to think more coherently. 
Descartes, Damasio concludes that being precedes thought. 
Thus, contra 
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It would seem that any conclusion to the question 'what is human?' does not demand an 
answer for it to be a meaningful question to ask. It might be possible to conclude which 
characteristics are defining of a particular species, such as language, rationality, self~ 
awareness, a sense of morality, the capacity to reason, culture, the recording of history, 
or the creation of machines. However, identifying characteristics is not a particularly 
defensible basis for building ethical conclusions about technology. Indeed, this is most 
evident from contrasting this analytical history of defining humanness with a moral 
inquiry into the same questions. 
WHAT WE ARE AND WHAT WE DO. 
Subsequent to the unsatisfactory definitional approach to characterising humanness, 
philosophers argue for a more pragmatic method to its definition. AB Mackie (1977, 
p.20) recognises, "It would be a mistake to concentrate second order ethical discussions 
on questions of meaning". Thus, the human is categorised, not by what it is, but by 
what it does. The work of the Protestant theologian Joseph Fletcher is most relevant 
here, in stating that a human entity is something with "self~awareness, selfcontrol, a 
sense of the future, a sense of the past, the capacity to relate to others, concern for 
others, communication, and curiosity" (cited in Singer, 1993, p.72). 
In respect of sport, this way of viewing the human recognises the dynamic and 
insufficient approach of biological definitions. On such bases, contemporary elite 
athletes can be argued as already being superhuman, or beyond traditional notions of 
humanness - they are the present~ay cyborgs. The expectation upon athletes to 
perform increasingly spectacular performances made explicit by the emphasis upon 
results and world records is some indication of this. Moreover, it could be argued that 
this expectation predisposes the athlete to change, where change is to be construed as a 
linear progression towards greater physicality and achievement capabilities. However, as 
questionable as the way in which sporting bodies have been already augmented is, the 
technology that is under development will be far more profound in challenging notions 
of humanness. 
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As such, seeking a biological definition to the question of humanness is not the most 
useful way to allow any meaningful dialogue about the degree to which technology 
should augment the human. In contrast, the richness of ideas about human identity, 
which derive from the moral philosophical approach of understanding humanness 
allows a more informed awareness about which aspects of humanness are worthy of 
protecting. The scepticism for being able to isolate 'humanness' is reinforced by post' 
modern critiques of being human, which reject any attempt on conceptualising the 
human condition as bunk (I-Iayles, 1999). Accepting such a critique, any attempt to 
premise ethical conclusions upon an alleged notion of humanness is desperately 
misconceived and leads to concluding that elite sport tends more to argue that anything 
can be human. 
Retracting from the biologically,based articulation of what is human, sports ethics has 
begun to utilise the concept of 'persons' rather than humans, which serves as a useful 
starting point. Conceptually, the links of this perspective can be traced to the work of 
Emmanuel Kant and it fits with the Darwinian ideas about humans being distinct for 
their characteristic of morality. The claim is premised upon identifying that sport is a 
measure of persons. This move from humanness to personhood also responds to 
Schneider and Butcher's (2000) conclusion that there is no such accepted articulation of 
what is being human. To the contrary, such a discourse exists within both sports ethics 
and bioethics, premised upon personhood. Indeed, Kantian ideas have informed a 
substantial amount of work in sports ethics in regard to understanding what can be 
considered as a desirable moral character in sport, and are useful in this approach. As 
well, DeLattre (1975) and Bailey (1975) develop an appreciation of personhood and 
agency, which would inform later debates departing from a notion of agency as 
determining ethical conclusions about performance enhancing technologies. It is 
important to note the distinction between this use of Kantian ideas and the previously 
referenced 'respect for persons' rules that were identified in the 'old' harms of GM 
within the 'Safety and Harms' section. In contrast to this classical articulation of 
Kantian ethics, the present discourse isolates respect for personhood as following a similar 
approach, but to different ends. 
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Thus, the conclusions tends more to align themselves with Tuxhill and Wigmore (1998), 
who seek elaboration upon what are the aspects of personhood that give it value. Their 
approach is distinct from others in sports ethics, which have been restricted to 
addressing respect as an attitude to be held between persons. Previously, Simon (1984) 
argues that the notion of personhood is best thought of by recognising the sporting 
attitude as a mutual quest for excellence through challenge. This notion of a quest 
implies a level of agency that considers it insufficient that only bodies matter - it is 
necessary that there is a mind and character that struggles to bring about the 
performance. This perspective is used to argue that drugs reduce the sense of 
humanness by making the body solely responsible for the performance, as opposed to 
being the consequence of the athlete's resolve. Despite some weaknesses, the position 
has attracted a number of ethicists seeking to cite the morality of athletes within a 
Maclntyrean notion of practices. 
However, such respect has not been extended to the abstract human or humanity in 
generaL In contrast, Tuxhill and Wigmore (1998) problematise the concept of a person 
and lean more towards understanding what the notion of respect entails from a 
perspective of understanding personhood rather than simply applying Kantian principles 
to the ethical issue in sport. From this view, to hold respect for personhood is 
considered as having respect. However, this notion of respect is not directed towards 
specific individuals (although individuals are implied by the claims). Rather, it is to have 
respect for the species called 'human' in spite of its fuzzy boundaries. This notion of 
personhood might serve to identify what is important about an athlete's performance 
that is under threat by GM, and assist in deriving ethical conclusions. 
A similar approach can be found in bioethics and the importance of broadening the 
literature that informs this discussion is paramount to a satisfactory articulation of 
humanness (Brown; 1990, p.71; Burke. 1997, p.100). Macer (ibid) raises the matter in 
the context of two central kinds of question: 
There are two basic approaches that have been used in discussing questions of life 
and death. One centres on whether it is ever morally permissible to take the life of 
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any human person; and draws parallels between abortion, warfare, self.-defense and 
capital punishment. The other centres on asking the question of what constitutes 
a human person, and ranges over the issues of brain death and permanently 
comatose patients, abortion and the quality of life. 
Macer argues that the question can be emotive, but that it requires a rational approach 
to understanding "whether we view ourselves as a member of the human species, or as a 
person". Personhood is a much safer term than humanness, since the latter raises 
difficulties of biological comparison with other species. Macer continues, saying that, "a 
person is generally referred to as someone who is rational, capable of free choices, and is 
a coherent, continuing and autonomous centre of sensations, experiences, emotions, 
volitions, and actions". From here, he identifies two traditions, one deriving from an 
Anglo~Saxon reductionist philosophy that considers the person as acting "in certain 
characteristic and identifiable ways" and a Greek idea, present in Christian speculation 
and language about the human soul. Thus, the human in possession of a soul is a 
person. Macer identifies a number of characteristics of personhood: 
1. Capability for change 
2. Social interactions 
3. Self~awareness of personal identity 
4. Spirituality (or some special status). 
Similar ideas can be found in sports ethics, where T uxhill and Wigmore (1998) utilise 
Kantian notions of 'rational will' and 'self~determination' as delimiting personhood. 
This perspective extends to ideas of 'human dignity' which are often used as a means to 
justify moral conclusions in respect of genetic technologies. 
In relation to the genetics issue, the questions about when one can conclude 
personhood to exist and thus to conclude when and how it might change, have been 
developed within a number of applied issues. In particular, the discussion of abortion 
has raised perspectives that seek to conclude when a human life becomes morally 
relevant - when it can be considered as deserving treatment of respect. From one 
perspective, this point in time is considered to be conception, particularly from views 
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with specific religious origins, such as the Roman Catholic tradition. Nevertheless, from 
other views, such as Islamic religion, becoming human is a process that takes place over 
time during gestation (Macer, 1990). Modern, western medicine tends more to follow 
the latter of these views, as has been explained in the 'Life Harms' of the 'new' harms of 
GM. Nevertheless, the foundations for this conclusion are, importantly, not religious. 
The primitive streak period is enough for bioethicists to conclude that, "the biological 
qualities of personhood are not present at conception" (ibid). Importantly, what is being 
articulated here is not a vision of when life begins, previously rejected in this section as 
being a biological approach to defining humanness. Rather, this argument is premised 
upon when a life becomes morally relevant or, in other words, when it attains 
characteristics of personhood. Thus, the pre.-embryonic life is what can be called a 
potential person, 
There are sufficient doubts over the commencement of human personhood until 
the cerebral cortex begins to function, not to consider the embryo a person until 
at least 8 weeks and possibly up to 24 weeks. We await further scientific 
knowledge. Before this period, the status is lower than a human person, and 
should be recognised as such in law. After this period, the next clear mark is 
viability, and during this period the fetus takes on the status of an individual 
human being. Our scientific data does not allow any finer demarcation than this. 
As previously stated, a society may put earlier limits to protect the human embryo 
or fetus because of social or religious reasons, but they will not do so because of 
scientific reasons. (Macer, ibid). 
However, the notion of personhood is also not straightforward to isolate. The 
characteristics offered by Macer provide a starting point, though they are also challenged 
by various kinds of life that would be considered as human, though which might not 
fulfil the requirements of personhood. In particular, the characteristics have been 
critiqued in respect of comatose patients, or patients with substantial mental disorders, 
who do not seem to exhibit the characteristics of personhood that are being argued as 
requisite of humanness. From such a view, it would be necessary to conclude that such 
lives are not human, which does not sit well for some ethicists. Indeed, Tooley's (1986) 
controversial paper about abortion and infanticide is some indication of how 
philosophical premises about personhood lead to counter,intuitive conclusions about 
the value of some lives and how they should be treated. Here, Tooley (1986, p.64) 
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argues that a right to life is determined by having a serious claim to life, where the life 
"possesses the concept of a self as a continuous subject of experiences and other mental 
states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity". In this respect, Tooley 
concludes that, neither foetuses, nor infants have any such claim, despite the prima facie 
obligations that such lives would seem to demand. Interestingly, Tooley also concludes 
that, on this basis, it is possible for some animals to have a serious right to life. 
Equally, in sporting literature, Brown (1995) considers that the notion of persons is 
problematic on a number of levels. Initially, it omits to consider animal sports, such as 
horse racing, cock fights, or bear baiting. (Admittedly, one might challenge whether 
these are sports at all, though Brown's point does seem important to note.) As well, 
Brown recognises that the notion of personhood does not distinguish what it is about 
being a person that makes it necessary for sports to have value. In some respects, the 
distinction is not useful in as much as one can argue that a technology that alters 
persons in some biological sense, can also be said of food and training. 
Additionally, this approach to humanness does not sit well with ideas that seek to locate 
a rejection of new technology in a discourse about what humans are biologically. The 
arguments of naturalness and normality identify such a view, and wish to conclude that 
a technology might not be acceptable on account of it changing the biological 
constitution of an athlete in some immoral manner. From the present perspective, it is 
considered that such a basis cannot be given. If GM allows an athlete to run 100m in 
five seconds, then the rejection of this technology cannot be based on biological 
humanism. Admittedly, such a human would not fit within what is commonly 
recognised as human limits, though this seems simply a case of boundary,drawing. After 
all, the breaking of world records in sports at an, does not fit within what is known as 
humanly possible either. 
In respect of the genetically modified human in sport, the discussion must be phrased 
rather differently. Despite some seeming contradictions about the utility of personhood 
as a measure of humanness, it provides the best available theoretical perspective about 
such a definition. Thus, using characteristics of personhood, it must be asked whether 
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the genetically modified athlete can be said to be any less of a person (or any more of 
one), by virtue of them being modified. 
Perhaps the only case of genetic technologies where this might not have any relevance is 
for the pre,selection of individuals, where embryos or young children are chosen or 
rejected for elite training on the basis of their genotype. Nevertheless, one might still 
question whether the use of such technology fits with a moral view of humanness, given 
its implied objectification of human life. Although the affected human might not be any 
less human by using such technology (it is not altered at all), the tolerance of such 
eugenic technologies might seem somewhat immoral and uncharacteristic of humanity 
therefore. Yet, a rejection of this technology on account of it altering the affected 
human does not seem justifiable as they are not altered in any way. 
In respect of somatic,cell GM and genomics, the use of such technology does imply an 
alteration of personhood - at least in respect of the morality of the character choosing to 
use the enhancements. On Macer's definition, it does not seem that the individual is 
altered as a person, or is any less or more human. Yet, Shapiro (1991) considers that 
performance enhancement in sport alters a sense of identity that is morally problematic 
because it is not possible to know who has made the performance possible - the 
technology or the athlete. Genetic modification challenges this because it provides 
human capabilities that did not previously exist. Thus, on account of these applications 
having been the choice of the athlete to use them, it can be argued that they do threaten 
a sense of what it means to be human, by bringing into question what separates 
humanness or personhood from technology. On such a basis, they would seem ethically 
problematic. 
In the case of germ,line GM, the issue is rather more difficult to conclude. There cannot 
be any reflection on the notion of personhood for the altered individual, since no 
choice has been made by the person to engineer themselves. Indeed, if an enhanced 
embryo matures to become an elite athlete, posing the question of whether they are any 
less human is non,sensicaL It is akin to asking somebody who has a naturally enhanced 
genotype, whether they feel any less human than somebody with a more 'average' 
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genotype. As such, the basis of humanness as a means to reject germ~line OM does not 
seem justified. Such claims made about personhood, respect, and agency, have lead 
sports ethics and bioethics into virtue theory as an ethical framework for deriving moral 
conclusions. Yet, in respect of GM, it is also problematic to argue that the technology is 
detrimental from this perspective. It does not seem possible to claim that an individual 
who has been genetically enhanced before birth is unable to be a virtuous athlete 
(whatever that might mean). Neither does it seem feasible to claim that the individual 
could not experience internal goods of competition simply because they are engineered. 
One might simply draw a parallel between athletes with a particularly capable genotype 
(that has not been enhanced) and ask a similar question. It could not be claimed that 
having an enhanced capability for athletic performance precludes the appreciation of the 
internal goods of a sport. Again, this relates somewhat to the condition that the genetic 
advantage is not chosen by the individual and thus, cannot be seen as an act that reflects 
a particular attitude (treating people as ends, or valuing competition for external goods). 
CAN SPECIES' BE PERSONS? 
Applying the question to the broader perspective of humanness outlined by Tuxhill and 
Wigmore (2000), it must be asked whether OM is problematic from the perspective of 
the human species. This perspective asks whether respect must be held for the 
characteristics derived from a notion of personhood, and for the abstract entity of 
humanness that embodies these characteristics. This matter is not dissimilar to the 
previous question about whether harm can be committed to non~life forms, such as 
sports. In this case, it is under question whether an ethical argument can be formed on 
the basis of concern for dehumanising an entire species. For this reason, questioning the 
humanness of specific individuals is considered less important than the broader 
question about how humanity is changed as a consequence of using such technology. 
From the biomedical perspective, Anderson (1994) elaborates on this condition, asking 
whether genetic engineering might change the human species in some morally 
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significant way. Underpinning this discourse is an assumption that, if it does change 
humanness, then it ought not to be done because it will render the species no longer 
human. Again, this position seems to restate the unnaturalness argument, which has 
been previously refuted. 
Within the philosophy of sport, Paul Weiss (1973) provides some form of response, by 
recognising that athletic records are objective summaries of what people have done. 
They serve as indications of human capacities and as a medium of comparison among 
people of different times and places. On Weiss' view, records are measures of the 
human condition, though also offer a normative representation of the human species. 
In many respects, this concern is appealing and fits with the intuitive view that some 
kinds of technology might not be good to employ for the survivability of the human 
species. From such a perspective, the previously noted concerns about' genetic diversity' 
are also relevant. 
INCREASING PARTICIPATION: Does GM increase participation? 
The final 'category of effect' to discuss in order to complete the overview of how GM 
raises ethical issues in sport, is the category of participation. fu was identified in the 
conceptual framework, a technology can raise moral issues in respect of it altering the 
level of participation in sport. It is important to recognise that the justification of 
'increasing participation' or the rejection of a technology that 'reduces participation' are 
not, in themselves, particularly important in a discussion about elite sport. Indeed, it 
does not seem plausible to conclude that elite sport can aspire to inclusivity in any way. 
Consequently, to base arguments about technologies on account of them increasing 
participation does not merit much strength. 
Nevertheless, OM might be a case that does give rise to reasons for further concern 
about inclusion, even within elite sport. Put simply, to allow GM would be to make 
sport, necessarily, a genetically modified pursuit. If modified athletes were allowed to 
compete, then athletes who are not enhanced would, probably, be excluded, since they 
would not be of sufficient excellence to be elite. They simply would not be attaining 
sufficiently good results. This would seem quite unsettling, since it implies the absence 
146 
of many current athletes to whom spectators and fans have a strong emotional 
affiliation. Recalling the assumptions made at the outset of this analysis of OM in sport, 
genetically modified athletes would exist alongside the non~ngineered. As such, the 
latter would find themselves unable to remain competitive in elite sport and would thus, 
be disadvantaged. Again, we might concur to genetic essentialism and argue that the 
likelihood of this happening is remote. Yet, occasions could arise where persons might 
be justified to make such claims. However, it is less persuasive when one realises that 
similar kinds of exclusion are present already in elite sport. After all, genetic differences 
already exist. Indeed, recognising that elite sport is premised upon selecting the best 
and eliminating the others, it seems farcical to conclude OM is unacceptable on account 
of it having a similar effect. 
It is speculative to conclude precisely how OM would affect participation. Conceivably, 
if genetically modified athletes were allowed to compete, it would reduce the attraction 
of sport for those athletes who were not modified. Though importantly, whether this 
would affect participation in general seems very much to depend upon the availability of 
the technology. Certainly, such modifications would be very expensive at the outset. 
However, this is still not a sufficient basis upon which to reject the technology. 
Currently in sport, there exist financial inequalities that lead to the unfair advantage of 
some over others. 
From the spectator's perspective, it is also speculative to consider whether an interest in 
sport will wane from performances being genetically modified. It might be argued that 
sport will become less interesting if athletic performances are not determined by the 
athlete. Alternatively, elite sport seems interesting to watch specifically for the 
spectacular performance that it displays. If an athlete were sprinting 100m in 5 seconds, 
this would still attract spectators' attention. 
Certainly, there exist ethical concerns about participation in relation to OM. However, 
rejecting such technology on account of it reducing participation does not seem 
sufficient in this case. At most, it points to a fundamental inconsistency within elite 
sport between striving for egalitarian principles of fairness, and being inherently 
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exclusive. Certainly, genetically modified athletes might make it more difficult for the 
non~modified athlete to succeed. However, that can already be said as true, since genetic 
differences currently exist between athletes. 
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5. Conclusions: Balancing Harms and Elaborating on 
Humanness 
At this stage, it is important to make the connections between the ethical analysis of GM 
in sport and the broader conceptualisation of technology in sport more explicit. 
Initially, it was argued that there is no coherent conceptual framework within which to 
understand how technologies alter sport. Moreover, the ways in which technologies 
alter the ethical status of sporting performance is, comparably, untheorised. As such, a 
framework of technological effects was derived, based upon the available literature in 
sport that has spoken to these matters. From this, emerged clear categories of effect 
which, while not claimed as exhaustive, provided a representation of the ways in which 
technology alters sports. Subsequently, 3 brief case studies were used to identify how 
these effects give rise to ethical issues, from which it was concluded that an over,riding 
approach to understanding the ethical implications of technology in sport is not 
possible. Rather, it is necessary to locate a discussion about the ethical implications of 
new technologies in detailed case studies. Importantly, it was also recognised that this 
need not prevent inferring broad normative rules about the ethical use of technology in 
sport. Instead, it is simply to claim - in accordance with the casuistic approach to ethics 
- that the significant ethical issues are found in detailed cases, rather than overarching 
analyses. 
Subsequently, a detailed analysis of GM in sport was given, framed by the conceptual 
framework about technologies. It has been argued that the more substantive ethical 
concerns arise from their propensity to alter levels of non-injurious harm and of humanness. 
For each of these effects, the ethical conclusions hinge upon some prescriptive premise 
about what constitutes value in sporting performances. As such, these conclusions will 
be directed towards these 3 elements: the sustaining of sporting exceUence through 
discussions of harm and humanness. Importantly then, the ethical investigation has - in 
the case of GM - led to dismissing the importance of other technological effects that 
appeared in the conceptual framework. In the case of other technologies, it might have 
been necessary to focus on other technological effects. It is also important to recognise 
that the categories of interest in respect of GM derive from the conceptualisation of 
technologies. Without such a conceptualisation, the ethical analysis would - like many 
other analyses before it - be part of an unstructured theorising about technology and 
performance enhancement in sport in general. It is critical that discussions about 
technology can be cited within a theory about performance enhancement, so it is 
necessary to restate these links. 
On the basis of these deliberations, there are three central ethical concerns: one about 
sport, another about harm, and a third about being human. Consequently, the 
structure of the conclusions will speak to these strong themes in relation to the ethical 
status of GM. 
5.1 On Sporting Excellence and OM 
Following Kretchmar (1992) and Schneider and Butcher (1994), it has been argued that 
sporting excellence is not defined sufficiently by considering solely performance~related 
characteristics. Nevertheless, there remains a tension within the philosophy of sport to 
establish whether competition is valuable for it being a test of physicality, character or 
some combination of both. This tension is heightened and clarified by the case of GM, 
which reveals a weakness in the assertion of physical performance as being the aim of 
elite competition. If the test of character is given greater importance, then the value of 
genetics is lessened and the utility of GM seems reduced. Yet, in some important 
respect, sport is also about quantifiable performance and striving to improve upon 
physical, quantifiable, measurable, achievements.3o In particular, the value of improving 
performances is of central importance to elite sports for which GM is most likely to be 
relevant. For Munthe (2000), GM can provide more physically competent athletes and 
this appears to be his benchmark for excellence in sport or, at least, his justifications for 
rejecting possible arguments against genetic enhancement depart from this basis. 
However, such characteristics are surely too narrow and do not question what kind of 
enhancement is reflective of sporting ideals. Munthe seems aware of this when he 
outlines his argument about athletic tradition and notions of fair play. Indeed, it is also 
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within elite sports that there is the greatest expectation of fair play, even if it does not 
always seem to transpire. There is an aspiration for elite athletes to be good in character 
as well as in performance. It is the mediation of performance enhancement with 
character excellence that can be said as capturing what is valued in sport. 
On this view, it does not seem that GM necessarily devalues these qualities. Moreover, 
the negativity surrounding the use of GM as a method of performance enhancement is 
contingent upon it being rejected from sport. If it is banned, then GM becomes a form 
of cheating and unethicaL However, until such a time, an evaluation of its worth 
remains open and, on the basis of the ethical discussions herein, it would be inaccurate 
to conclude that GM cannot add to the value of sport. One of the more significant 
challenges to the way in which the issue of genetics in sport is addressed is to observe 
whether the approach from governing bodies is one of openness to considering whether 
it can be an ethical means of performance modification. The discussions here suggest 
that there are substantial reasons for recognising the importance of such a perspective. 
The utility of biotechnologies in society is evident from the various applications it has 
for benefiting health and improving standards of life in generaL Consequently, to 
dismiss genetics from sport would be to reject the ways in which it could improve sport. 
For example, if genetics can create an athlete that is less likely to sustain injury in sport, 
then this would seem advantageous (from a sporting perspective). Indeed, such an 
application would seem similar to using various kinds of padded clothing to prevent 
serious injuries, which do not seem unethicaL Nevertheless, within such discussions of 
any given sport must be an analysis of what is the role (and thus, acceptable level) of risk. 
Additionally, it must be recognised that performance enhancement is not necessarily an 
ideal to strive towards with any method. Rather, it is the way in which the enhancement 
is achieved that gives value to sport. More importantly, it is necessary to understand the 
specific kind of enhancement under discussion in order to conclude its value. Such an 
inquiry requires understanding what are the characteristics of sports that give it value, 
even if the task is, as Munthe suggests, difficult. 
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As a tentative conclusion, it would seem that sports are interesting because they 
constitute the performances of human beings; individuals engaged in practices that are 
challenging and which competency reflects years of training and commitment. As well, 
sports performances are enterprises which comprise an extraordinary integration of skill 
and talent, which is devalued if athletes can be given such abilities (which seems possible 
at least, in the case of talent) by performance enhancing technologies such as OM. With 
this in mind, it is possible to address the second component of the ethical concerns _ 
the way in which OM gives rise to harms. 
5.2 On Harms and OM 
The arguments concerning possible harms related to OM in sport suggest that the 'new 
harms of OM in sport' are the most persuasive concerns. The harms raised about OM 
from sporting values - the 'old harms' - seem mostly contingent upon the negative 
evaluation of OM, which is the very question that is being asked. At this stage, it is not 
clear that GM is morally problematic and so it cannot be dismissed as an unethical 
method of performance enhancement. The risk of injury is not sufficiently substantial 
in the case of GM. However, this does not rule out the possibility for abuses of the 
technology - for which there is a stronger case of making such applications unethical. 
Nevertheless, where the technology is deemed sufficiently safe - at least by medical 
standards - then it is not possible to raise harms on the basis of harms to health. Quite 
the contrary; the technology would be desirable because it promotes health. 
As well, contract harms, rules harms, and fairness harms in relation to non~using 
athletes are contingent upon the technology being ruled illegal, which is still a secondary 
ethical issue. Harms deriving from negative role models or expectation disappointment 
derive from the initial moral evaluation of the technology. The concerns about coercion 
seem to be of no greater or no worse consequence - from the sporting perspective -
than do similar concerns in relation to other aspects of becoming an elite athlete. 
However, it might be necessary to question whether the coercive tendencies of elite sport 
are, at all, morally justifiable. The harms to society lack persuasiveness except for where 
the applications seem contrary to a tacit, but strong sense of public rejection. In such 
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circumstances, this is not a basis for negating the value of the technology, but more for 
understanding ways of conveying its importance and value. Through such processes, it 
would also seem possible to guard against technological momentum harms. 
Harms to sports are also dependent mainly upon how the technology is evaluated. 
There is no negating the challenge of sport, even if OM is used. It is still necessary to 
overcome the gratuitous obstacles that are placed before an athlete, even if they are 
genetically modified. Indeed, the genetically modified athlete will not be so different 
from the non~genetically modified athlete. It is not expected that athletes will be able to 
leap over high~junlp bars of 3 metres simply by being genetically enhanced. As well, the 
internal goods of the sport are not compromised by the technology, since the athlete will 
still be required to train and learn to develop skills. The claims of OM as crossing over 
some natural barrier do not seem persuasive either, since elite athletes seem already to 
train their bodies in a manner that could - on similar arguments - be concluded as 
unnatural. Indeed, in the case of germ~line engineering, it can be questioned whether 
the intervention is at a point where it can be said to interfere with the natural. There 
seems more strength in considering that the natural is defined through a process of 
becoming rather than by a point in time, and that OM takes place during this process of 
becoming human. Finally, concerns about the enhancement not having been earned by 
the athlete seem contingent upon the way in which 'earning advantage' is conceived. If 
it is based upon having to train for such enhancements, then the position seems 
reasonable. However, with a more elaborate notion of sacrifice and what earning 
involves, it can include other kinds of challenges that must be overcome in order to use 
OM. From such a definition, it seems plausible to conclude that OM is earned by the 
athlete or by the guardian that is choosing such modifications. 
This is not surprising, since, within sports ethics, there continues to be a scepticism for 
the persuasiveness of arguments deriving from sport that seek to outlaw the use of drugs. 
Indeed, Brown (1990, p.7l) considers that, 
the primary cause of so much concern about drugs in sports is that drug use in 
general, primarily of euphoria~inducing drugs, remains a topic of national 
hysteria. The vast treasures we spend, the civil liberties that are threatened, and 
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the propaganda that is distributed, all tend to mask deeper social problems of 
which dr~g use is. a symptom .... the search for a 'rational' position concerning 
drug use In sport 1S no more than the desire to give one's own position or the 
position held by one's own community, a legitimacy that is socially ~nd not 
rationally, constructed. ' 
Thus, while it is not surprising that greater strength is found in the arguments from 
bioethics, it is an important conclusion because it is precisely these kinds of harms that 
are not being considered by sporting authorities. The various 'new harm' arguments can 
be summarised thus: 
1. Boundary Harms 
2. Knowledge and Access 
3. Engineering Future Values 
4. Tyranny of the Normal 
5. Genetic Essentialism 
6. Life Harms 
For each of these categories, it is possible to raise harms that derive from the use of GM 
in sport. This is not to neglect the importance of sporting values, but rather to 
understand how a broader harms discourse can contribute to yielding greater strength 
for positions that rely upon a notion of sporting excellence. 
The boundary harms imply that the distinction between therapy and non,therapy will be 
insufficient to prevent the legitimate use of genetic technology for reasons that are not 
medically justifiable. In particular, a concern for engineering 'social genes' is alarming 
for it giving rise to eugenics and the devaluing, removal of particular kinds of persons. 
This also raises concerns for how particular kinds of people (the genetically inferior) will 
be treated and valued in society. 
Know[edge and access issues have been raised in sport in regard to doping tests and the 
importance of protecting an athlete's privacy through dope,testing procedures. For GM, 
the potential harms are even more significant because of the variety of interested bodies 
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that might desire access to genetic information. There is a danger that providing access 
to the genetic information of athletes will provoke (or derive from) a policy that 
prioritises rights to information rather than of rights to privacy of information. The danger of 
the kind of discrimination that could ensue from this use of genetics is of substantial 
concern for sports organisations and society in generaL Even if genetic information is 
used to exclude the genetically modified athlete from competition, governing bodies of 
sport will have to consider provision for such persons if they do not wish for stipulations 
to conflict with emerging human rights legislation (see, for example, Unesco, 1997). 
A further harm arises from the implied values that are associated with likely uses of GM. 
The most immediate possibilities for isolating performance,genes or boosting muscle, 
mass are directed at the improvement of physical characteristics. As such, the priorities 
of such technology are performance,related. This effect is harmful for it conferring a 
system of values in sport onto future generations. It asserts that what matters in sport is 
how fast an athlete runs or how far they can jump. This kind of message does not seem 
to enrich what is valuable in sport and can be considered as detrimental and as an 
encouragement to neglect other kinds of value. 
The tyranny of the normd speaks to the harms that derive from allowing the free choice of 
any kind of genetic modification. The position argues that such freedom will lead to the 
homogenisation of genetic characteristics and, subsequently, the removal of other kinds. 
It is important to recognise how this is distinct from institutionalised eugenics, though 
the concerns are equally alarming. 
Related to the tyranny of normalness is the concern for genetic essentiaUsm. The 
misconception that engineering children of a certain genetic disposition will necessarily 
lead to super,humans is dangerous for it being untrue and compromising valued aspects 
of being human. Through genetic essentialism, there are pragmatic concerns in relation 
to the expenditure of important resources. As well, it can cause misunderstandings in 
relation to what it means to believe that humans might be predisposed to be good 
athletes. In no way should such information lead to the false conclusion that one can be 
good at sport simply by having a well,disposed genotype. At most, GM can be seen as an 
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edge to performance, rather than consisting of the main determinants of being good 
athletically. 
Finally, the Hfe harms caused by permitting the application of GM to sport derive from 
an interest to treat life with a sufficient amount of respect. GM threatens this interest 
by raising the possibility for commercialising the value of life or treating lives with an 
inappropriate level of objectification. To consider enhancing one's child to become an 
athlete raises a concern for how such a child might be treated and allowed the 
opportunity to direct their life by their own choices and preferences. 
These harms extend sports ethical discussions premised upon Kantian notions of respect 
for persons by problematising the notion of personhood to include respect for life. 
Identifying these broader bioethical harms that derive from GM in sport reveals a 
weakness within sports ethics for isolating itself from broader debates in medical ethics 
(at least in relation to performance enhancement). Indeed, it can be argued that debates 
in respect of drug taking and doping must engage with broader bioethical ideas to gain a 
greater sense of coherency. For example, the importance of 'boundary harms' is critical 
in the ethical evaluation of drug use. Yet, rarely do such discussions in sports ethics 
borrow from literature in bioethics to derive coherent arguments about why such 
technologies are ethically problematic. 
From these various harms, it would appear that a critical and defining distinction about 
the legitimacy of GM is premised upon the limits of personal freedoms and the 
restriction of individual liberty. For example, the harms associated with genetic 
normalisation (tyranny of the normal) must be off,set against harms derived from 
preventing freedom over one's body and the lives of children. 
For GM, the importance of a casuistic approach gains strength from the many and 
conflicting effects of the technology. It has not been discussed what harms arise from 
banning GM, though certainly some people will be worse~ff from prohibiting its use. 
Nevertheless, while there are substantial and significant harms in relation to legitim ising 
GM in sport, there are comparatively few harms associated with banning such 
156 
technology. However, this reveals the inadequacy of a consequential approach to the 
discourse of harms. Indeed, it is not surprising that the integration of a technology has 
far more consequences than does its rejection, since the latter implies no new 
consequences for society. Yet, the broader question about what kinds of freedoms, if 
any, should be restricted in respect of technologies must be considered central to the 
harms debate, even though they might not be as visible. 
This leads the ethical discussion to consider the limits of personal freedom and 
individual rights - whether athletes should be allowed to use GM to improve their 
performance. Answering this question, however, is complicated by the broader 
implications of genetic technology that do not involve sport. In many respects, and 
certainly in the context of early applications of the technology, GM can have a socially 
relevant and medically justifiable function - its therapeutic possibilities. As such, a 
restriction of freedoms to use GM implies a number of additional restrictions that go 
beyond sport and which can impact upon the human rights of athletes. Kidd & 
Donnelly (2000, p.lO) provide an overview of how such rights have evolved, recognising 
that, 
Human rights legislation has also inspired increasing respect for athletes' rights, 
the recognition that athletes must be afforded the same protections enjoyed by all 
citizens, particularly with regard to freedom from discrimination, selection for 
representative teams, the allocation of other benefits, and discipline and 
punishment. 
Similar discussions can be found in legal discourse about drug~taking and other methods 
of doping, though it is surprising to realise how such perspectives have not been raised 
very much in respect of sports ethics. One exception is Thompson's (1982/88) overview 
of the conditions in which it is morally justifiable to require athletes to submit to 
urinalysis examinations. Thompson considers that the issue is, fundamentally, a matter 
of elaborating on rights to privacy. Thompson is not alone. Burke (1997, p.50) also 
highlights the possibility that the 'imposition of drug laws restricts the personal 
freedom of the athlete to explore the limits of performance, without any significant gain 
for the practice community." Various articles detailing issues in relation to doping test 
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procedures, recognise that there is a fundamental privacy issue at stake that must be 
weighed against the importance of fair play in Sport (Palmer, 1992). 
Within this broader, social scientific study of sport, concerns have arisen about the use 
of anti~doping measures for catching 'cheaters' in competitive sport. In particular, the 
"Court of Arbitration established by the International Olympic Committee, National 
Olympic Committees and the International Sports Federations in 1983" «idd and 
Donnelly, p.10) has been proactive in raising the protection of athletes' rights. 
Balancing the harms of drug use with the harms inflicted upon the athlete in respect of 
the invasiveness of doping test procedures has been of significant concern. Parallel 
ethical issues arise in respect of the provision for sporting opportunities for people with 
disabilities. Indeed, the way in which disabilities is separated from able~bodied sport 
might serve as some guide for the treatment of the genetically enhanced (or deficient). 
If genetically modified athletes are excluded from competition, then this could exclude a 
proportion of athletes, who have been modified for medically justifiable reasons. 
Alternatively, it could exclude a number of athletes who have been engineered before 
birth and who cannot, thus, be said to have been responsible for the modification. The 
exclusion of such persons would seem to conflict with an individual's rights to be free 
from genetic discrimination, as advocated by the United Nations Education, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights (Unesco, 1997, html). In particular, the Declaration makes the following 
stipulations relevant to the present discussion, 
Article 2: Everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights 
regardless of their genetic characteristics 
Article 5 e): If according to the law a person does not have the capacity to consent, 
research affecting his or her genome may only be carried out for his or her direct 
health benefit, subject to the authorization and the protective conditions 
prescribed by law .... provided such research is compatible with the protection of 
the individual's human rights 
Article 6: No one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic 
characteristics that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity 
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With these articles in mind, the requirement upon sports authorities to be reflective of 
their legislation in relation to GM seems unequivocal. A priority in biomedical ethics 
and sports is to arrive at ethically informed policies about genetics. Legislation made 
within the context of sport and in the absence of recognising broader bioethical debates, 
will be insufficient to protect individual freedoms. For this reason, it cannot be 
concluded that it is straightforward for sporting authorities simply to reject GM from 
sport on the basis of sports ethical arguments. Banning genetically modified humans 
from sport implies discriminations that have implications beyond the sporting case. 
Unesco's declaration must extend to the sporting context, particularly since sport aspires 
to the championing of moral rights and equality norms. There has to be a space where 
the genetically modified athlete can compete, even if it is separated from non~genetically 
modified sports. Consequently, in the discussion about paternalism in respect of GM in 
sport, it is necessary to consider arguments from within sport and in the broader 
bioethical community. 
It is also important to recognlse that paternalistic arguments have their roots 
(particularly within the doping issue in sport) in the salience of physicai harms, a 
perspective that does not have such strength in the case of GM (except in respect of its 
abuses). It has been dismissed that GM would be overly detrimental to the athlete's 
biological health. Consequently, other kinds of harm are the basis upon which the 
discussion of paternalism must be premised. Yet, as well, the paternalist view is 
premised upon seeking to protect individuals from themselves. Such positions consider 
that social authorities are justified in restricting freedoms on account of wanting to 
protect individuals from themselves (Brown, 1985). From the sporting perspective, this 
approach has been particularly relevant in the context of drug taking and doping. In 
this respect, the perspectives of Simon (1984) and Brown (1984) are summarised by 
Fraleigh (l984a, p.24), 
they locate the issue in whether or not it is morally right to restrict the choices of 
an informed consenting adult athlete in taking drugs for the purpose of enhancing 
performance while accepting serious risks of harmful side effects. 
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However, the justification of paternalism in the case of GM has a quite different basis. 
It is not so much a concern for harms to the individual, than it is a concern for harms to 
others (in the broad sense). Admittedly, within Simon's and Brown's formulation of the 
issue, they consider the importance of issues related to fairness and coercion, thus 
recognising the harms to others. However, it is an important distinction to recognise 
that GM does not respond to the kinds of harms that have built a case against the use of 
drug,taking and doping in sport. In this respect, the arguments have their roots in John 
Stuart Mill's (1859, pp.73,74) 'harm principle' that states, 
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of 
others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general 
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to 
discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a 
person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not 
affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the 
ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect 
freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences. 
Importantly, the balancing of these harms requires more than Mill's classic 
utilitarianism for deriving ethical guidelines regarding GM in sport. The degree of 
restrictions to personal freedoms that are implied through banning GM in sport have far 
broader implications than does banning drug use. At most, a similar claim that can be 
said of banning GM is paralleled in the prohibition of recreationat drugs from sport. For 
example, in 1998 at the Nagano Olympic Winter Games, a controversial case arose in 
respect of Canadian snowboarder, Ross Rebagliati, winner of the first~ver gold medal in 
the snowboarding giant slalom at Nagano. Only three days after winning the gold, the 
l.O.C. asked Rebagliati to return the medal after it was discovered that he had tested 
positive for marijuana. 
Further details about his innocence or guilt are less relevant here than the notion that a 
recreational drug (non,performance enhancing) is of interest to an anti,doping policy. 
The example was controversial since it brought into question whether the list of banned 
substances ought to be extended to non,performance drugs. For some, the Rebagliati 
case entailed an unwarranted violation of the individual's personal freedoms and 
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overstepped the realms of the paternalistic power of sports authorities to restrict what an 
athlete can and cannot do. Marijuana is a depressant and, arguably, not considered as 
enhancing of a snowboarder's performance. As such, it is not clear why it was deemed 
illegal ror specl'fl'C sports. 31 F GM h . r d 
11 or , t ere IS an even stronger case lor consi ering 
whether sporting authorities should be entitled to discriminate against genetically 
modified athletes as the following overview conveys. 
In respect of genetic testing and pre~selection, the banning of such technology implies 
substantial restrictions upon parental freedoms. Currently, parents enjoy a freedom to 
raise their children as they see fit, excepting some important, fundamental legal 
requirements in relation to the protection of a child's right to welfare. In comparison, 
the restrictions in regard to the participation of children in elite sport, are few. Indeed, 
Kidd and Donnelly (2000, p.12) recognise that "no one has yet taken this approach [a 
legal means to address human rights violations] to pursue children's rights in sports". 
There exist no restrictions to prevent parents of young children from placing them into 
elite sports training clubs and it is only recently that age limits are being set to outline 
the extent to which children should participate in elite sport. As well, the process of 
talent identification and competitions, which leads to the selection of elite teams is 
integral to and a respected aspect of sport. Again, for these kinds of practices, it is not 
considered unethical (or something to be prohibited) that parents ought to be restricted 
from placing their children into such clubs. Genetic pre~selection and selection involves 
a similar kind of process and so similar claims to their being accepted can be made. 
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between these two kinds of talent 
identification process in the way in which they are achieved. The kinds of process that 
might go into testing a child or embryo for genetic characteristics can be more invasive 
than are traditional scouting methods. For this reason, there might be grounds for 
concern. However, if genetic screening is justified and used on a health~related basis, 
then such information might already be available to talent scouts. In such 
circumstances, the child will not have to go through any additional or harmful 
procedure to that which is medically necessary. Rather, it would simply be a case for the 
parent to authorise the use of such information as a basis for selection in elite sport. 
161 
Again, this brings into question who should have access to genetic information, and 
upon what basis its use is justified V\yabe and Tan, 1995; Burley, 1999; Gomer, 2000; 
Keyley, 1996; Knoppers, 1999; Sandberg, 1995). Where the freedom to use such 
information resides with parents, its use could be immoral in a similar way to how one 
might consider the use of abortion on account of sex-preference as immoral. 
Consequently, it must be questioned whether parents and other interested parties are 
entitled to use the genetic information of their children in ways that they see fit or 
whether such information does not belong to them. Raising doubt for such use implies 
a substantial rethinking of biomedical ethics. Regardless, the potential for 
discrimination that can derive from genetic screening is substantial. Indeed, Harris 
(1998) considers that, if genetic screening is used, then there is a need for legislation to 
control the potential for discrimination. This could imply a significant restriction of 
parental liberties. 
A similar issue arises out of germ~line GM for sport. In this context, the significant 
challenge for bioethics, gains greater clarity. On the current ethical premises of 
bioethics, legislation would confer responsibility upon the discretion of parents to 
restrict their authorisation privileges in relation to their child's health. Importantly, this 
does not imply that a parent could choose to create a super~athlete. Such sensational 
ideas are not even near what is immediately alarming about such technology and what it 
means for parental freedoms. Rather, recalling the Unesco (1997) Article 5, parents will 
retain the right to consent for their child in respect of those applications of genetics to 
dependants, where such applications are deemed conducive to health. Thus, the use of 
GM at all is governed by the ethical limits of parenting and medicine. 
This conclusion presents a significant and controversial barrier to the discussion. 
Parental freedom is of critical importance in bioethics, which has a tradition premised 
upon the legal definition of autonomy, particularly within the U.S. which has driven a 
great deal of biomedical law. Wolpe (1997) recognises that bioethics prioritises 
individual autonomy and that this must be understood as problematic for resolving 
discussions about ethics in medicine. This consideration is relevant in the discussion 
about paternalism and freedoms in sport by critiquing whether indiYidual freedoms 
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should be prioritised. Wolpe and Platt (1998) suggest that individual rights should not 
champion other kinds of rights, despite the tradition of doing so and the pragmatic and 
democratic appeal that such principles imply. Thus, challenging parental freedoms by 
restricting what kinds of technologies are legal - as has been the case through IVF _ 
conflicts with a significant principle within bioethics: autonomy. As Harris (1999, pp.89~ 
92) explains, 
matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to a person's dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment .... decisions to reproduce in 
particular ways ... constitute decisions concerning central issues of value, then, 
arguably, the freedom to make them is guaranteed by the constitution (written or 
not) of any democratic society, unless the state has a compelling reason for 
denying them that control.. ... European Union ... would have to show that more 
was at stake than the fact that a majority found the ideas disturbing or even 
disgusting. 
GM in sport challenges the sanctity of such a premise by raising doubts about the limit 
of parental freedoms. Parenting in western societies has enjoyed a relatively loose level 
of regulation in the past. Indeed, the concept of 'informed consent,' which serves as a 
fundamental tool in health care, confers authority upon parents to make decisions on 
behalf of their children. However, the degree to which this is useful where GM is 
available, can be questioned. The utility of practical ethics here can be to advocate 
more of a discursive approach that involves a process of deliberation between respective 
interest parties, rather than appealing to such tools as informed consent. While such an 
instrument has great importance in the ethical provision of medical care, Elliott (1999) 
recognises that it has important limitations in cases where consent does not necessarily 
concur with the best decision. Consequently, it is essential that further investigations 
within sports ethics, particularly from the perspective of sports authorities, recognise this 
broader implication of implementing restrictions upon what kinds of person are allowed 
to play sport. 
It is necessary to re~visit the moral and legal limitations of sporting authorities as a step 
towards concluding the ethical status of OM in sport. A question must be asked about, 
whether governing bodies of sport can prohibit certain kinds of freedoms for athletes. It 
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is relevant to consider what kind of role athletes hold within sports organisations. If 
athletes are considered as professionals and Sport is recognised as a work environment, 
as it is for many professional athletes, then this might have a bearing upon what can be 
asked of the athlete. While it is not possible here to expand upon what kind of human 
practice sport is, it is a critical discussion in developing a legal and ethical response to 
the freedoms of sporting authorities. Such conclusions will also provide greater clarity 
on the requirements upon athletes to submit to the professional codes that might ensue 
as a result of such circumstances. 
In the absence of a clear articulation of sport's 'special' status, sporting authorities must 
be sensitive to the broader implications of decisions about genetics. If governing bodies 
of sport reject any form of genetic manipulation from competition, then this has 
implications for the rights of the modified athletes. Undoubtedly, current trends 
indicate the need to submit sports ethical principles to medical ethical ones. However, 
this does little to expand upon the rights of sports persons. Rather, it simply retreats 
from problematising the issue, to applying inadequate medical ethical principles to 
contexts for which they have not been developed. 
The freedom to use genomics or somatic~cell GM rests solely with the athlete and the 
freedom of sports authorities to limit such choices. In this respect, the discussion is 
conceptually similar to the issue of drug use. Again, recognising that the use of such 
technology would not imply a detrimental effect upon the athlete's health, then the 
position favouring the paternalism of sporting authorities seems relatively weak. 
Nevertheless, if the intention is also to ensure that an abuse of such technology does not 
take place, then it would seem important to consider recent trends within anti-doping 
discourse, which recognise that the athlete is not an isolated human being. In respect of 
drugs, it requires a significant number of people to create the drug~nhanced athlete. As 
such, anti~doping measures must take into account the potential for the athlete to be 
manipulated by others into using new methods of doping, which is the ethical basis for 
paternalism. A stronger claim can be made in respect of GM, where the athlete will be 
dependent upon medically cognisant professionals. Again, isolating the athlete as solely 
culpable for using GM would be naive. 
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The argument from harm and the subsequent discussion on the moral limits of 
paternalism and individual rights, requires further elaboration. Thus far, it seems clear 
that governing bodies of sport are in a rather difficult predicament, where harms will 
ensue in whichever decision is made about the ethical status of GM in sport. For this 
reason, it is critical that the ethical status remains open to the possibility that legalising 
GM might be more desirable than banning it. It is not sufficient to expect a concise 
answer to the question of whether GM is appropriate for sports. Some of its 
applications seem, at most, as harmful as currently accepted methods of performance 
enhancement. Others raise new harms, but their rejection from sport on account of 
some idealised conception, conflicts with the sustaining of individual rights. Further 
discussion must take place to problematise the relationship of the athlete with the sports 
organisation and as a human being in society, who also is beholden to medical ethical 
dictates. 
One initial response to this harmed group is to question whether one has an entitlement 
to expect not to be disadvantaged by one's genetic disposition. Such a view is affirmed 
by the Unesco (1997) Declaration, though it is not clear that such entitlement is 
sustainable or that it leads necessarily to legalising GM for sport. Nevertheless, this is 
where the inconsistency of sporting values is revealed. If the aspiration is for equality of 
opportunity and to ensure the possibility of fairness in sport, then sports ought to aspire 
to such circumstances. It is not sufficient simply to dismiss from sport, persons who 
were not born with the right predisposition. Organised sport adopts responsibilities by 
purporting to be aspects of human practice where ethical policies are important. Thus, 
sports authorities could not simply ban all kinds of genetically modified humans as they 
could neither neglect genetically deficient humans in sport. 
A further consideration to understand what harms arise from disallowing the use of a 
given technology can be identified within the bioethical context of allowing or 
preventing treatment. Indeed, this argument relates back to the consideration of harms 
deriving from banning GM. Where technology is available to treat a patient with some 
genetic disorder, and such treatment is not administered, it can be said that this person 
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is harmed by not having been treated. The example raises a different approach for 
understanding harm, which has yet to be recognised in the context of sport. This is not 
surprising since the harms are not obvious, but rely upon a projection or speculation 
about what might have existed had such a ban not been implemented. This is not a 
straightforward example, since the question about whether one is harmed by inaction is 
contested. Nevertheless, it is recognised by Rachels (1986) that such claims can be 
made. In the case of euthanasia, Rachels considers that inaction is more reprehensible 
than active euthanasia. As Rachels describes it, inaction is doing something, it is doing 
nothing. Consequently, a patient who has not been treated for their condition can have 
a justifiable claim to have been harmed, because there is an expectation that, if 
something can be done, then one has a right to it being done. Alternatively, if doing 
anything implies more suffering to a patient than would terminating the life, then the 
former is less humane and thus, more immoraL 
This tendency to translate issues of morality into a rights discourse can be limiting 
insofar as it empowers the individual rather than the practice. In the case of euthanasia, 
if the patient has a legal right to expect doctors to do something, then the medical 
profession has no choice but - from one perspective - to commit murder. However, 
this consequence for the medical profession is a matter on which its members might also 
claim a moral right to abstain from accepting any responsibility. Thus, while a 
discussion of rights is important, it also marginalises concerns related to the good of a 
community. A more communitarian approach to morality might thus, be a direction for 
future research concerned with GM in sport. As well, premising moral debates about 
GM upon a rights discourse gives priority to a deontological framework for 
understanding ethical issues, which does not seem useful where cases of genetic 
technology seem to vary substantially. The derivation of (and hope for) a system of 
moral decisions about medical issues cannot be an aspiration of an ethical analysis of 
GM in sport. In this context, any such moral theory seems confounded by the variety of 
interests that are served by the technology and by the various kinds of technologies that 
might be used. 
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However, the current argument tends towards concluding that the basis upon which 
GM in sport must be evaluated, is upon a notion of human autonomy. The degree to 
which an athlete (qua human) is entitled to use genetics and, importantly, be genetically 
modified in such social practices as sport, involves raising the difficult question about 
the extent of freedoms. It also requires problematising the epistemological basis of 
autonomy. Kahn (1997, p.119) defines autonomy as a component of human dignity 
that consists of the "indeterminability of the individual with respect to external human 
will". However, as Harris (1998) points out, the definition is hopeless, as it would 
include as autonomous, individuals in a persistent vegetative state and even newborns. 
Consequently, deriving guidelines about the legitimate use of OM in sport on the basis 
of the current articulation of autonomy is insufficient. While the right to procreative 
autonomy is a strong one, it is not beyond question. Thus, in this respect, further 
research must seek to problematise the medical definition of autonomy, in order to 
arrive at coherent policies about the ethics of OM in sport. 
5.3 On Humanness and OM 
In respect of humanness, it has been argued that understanding the acceptability of OM 
relies upon an elusive notion of what constitutes the human being (in sport). The 
analysis reveals a theoretical weakness with the way in which previous research has 
approached the question of humanness, particularly in sports ethics. Thus, seeking to 
base a concept of humanness upon some biological articulation of what is natural is 
insufficient, particularly within sport where the integration of humans and technology is 
extensive. In response, the argument develops a notion of personhood premised upon 
ideas within sports ethics and bioethics. Within sports ethics, arguments that have 
sought to ground a rationale for understanding why drug use is unethical, build upon 
Kantian notions of respect for persons. Yet, the problematising of personhood has 
received only limited discussion. Moreover, the importance of understanding 
humanness through the notion of personhood has been overlooked as a basis for 
arguing how performance enhancing technologies alter what it means to be human. As 
~ll(h, if rational arguments are sought to support reasons why GM is unethical upon a 
basis of what is human, then they must be grounded in arguments about personhood. 
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Within sport, the concept of personhood is threatened by the use of GM because it 
implies circumventing that which seems to give sports value: the human. GM provides 
capabilities that are not derived from the human athlete. As such, it brings into 
question the degree to which sports performances are interesting because of them being 
human performances. The basis for this disturbing consequence is, importantly, not 
that technology is responsible for breaking world records. Rather, it is alarming since it 
raises questions over the personal identity of an athlete. Yet, as was recognised in the 
discussion, this is not a sufficient basis upon which to reject GM. Indeed, in many 
respects, athletes already use commonly accepted methods of performance enhancement 
that could also be said to compromise their performances as being human. This might 
simply beg the question as to whether such technologies should also be allowed. In this 
case, if the appeal of ethics is, indeed, to such a concept of humanness, then it would 
seem reasonable to question the relevance of performance enhancement at all in sport. 
From the discussion, it seems clear that there are fundamental contradictions in the way 
in which different kinds of technologies are made acceptable or not, which do not 
follow some clear articulation of what makes sports valuable. 
For now, appealing to an obtuse sense of what is human as a basis for rejecting GM lacks 
persuasiveness given the current state of elite sport. As well, to consider the athlete as a 
person in isolation of the athlete as a technology user, misunderstands the way in which 
an athlete engages with sport. From this view, the use of GM and other technologies fits 
within a notion of personhood that places the athlete at the centre of using the 
technology. In this way, it continues to be the athlete who is utilising the technology. 
They remain autonomous in the situation and can be said as exhibiting characteristics of 
personhood. 
Nevertheless, the concept of personhood is offered as a starting point for the discussion. 
Its utility is not prescribed by the arguments raised in relation to sport, nor essentialist 
in these conclusions. Rather, the notion of personhood has evolved in the discussions 
about OM in sport from trying to understand how to make sense of defining humanncss 
from the perspectivcs of sport and bioethics. 
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From sports ethics, personhood has been explored further and informed by perspectives 
in bioethics, where its importance has been critical in problematising conventional 
ethical conclusions that derive from bioethical principles in various applied contexts. In 
particular, issues of euthanasia, abortion, and genetic experimentation with embryos, 
have been alarming for the very reason that they seem to threaten an intuitive feeling 
that they are contrary to what is being human. From these discussions, personhood has 
evolved as a means towards recognising that the moral significance of life evolves 
gradually, as an embryo develops, and entails the possession of certain attributes (Macer, 
1990). The qualities attributed to personhood provide some basis for establishing 
whether OM in sport violates some articulation of what it means to be human. 
However, there still lacks agreement about whether personhood is an adequate concept 
upon which to base ethical discussions in medicine and technology. 
For example, the characteristics of personhood do not preclude affording the same level 
of treatment (or respect) to non~humans as is given to humans. From personhood, the 
conclusion could follow that a sentient animal is morally equivalent to a human being. 
This is because the basis of the argument towards the protection of humanness is not 
based upon some species barrier. The basis of distinguishing humanness (or the species 
argument) has been rejected along with the biological articulation of humanness. 
Consequently, if another entity possesses the characteristics of personhood that give it 
moral significance, then such an entity is also included considered to be worthy of 
respect and to be afforded certain rights. The clarification is important since it is often 
used to reject the approach from personhood for leading to an insufficient articulation 
of what is human. Indeed, it is accurate to accept that the conclusions do not lead to an 
articulation of what is human say, in comparison to what is non~human. However, this 
very manner of phrasing the argument has been rejected. The discussion and the 
conclusions that now follow, dismiss seeking a distinct notion of humanness and 
respond to such discussions as being conceptually flawed. Consequently, the thesis is 
not vulnerable to critiques of speciesism. 32 
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Yet, the argument does lead to counter,intuitive conclusions about the status of some 
kinds of life compared with others, as was noted by Tooley ( 1986). Tooley rejects the 
idea that humanness has a special status and argues that personhood is a concept served 
simply to assert an unjustified superiority of some kinds of lives over others. 
Personhood prejudices the value of lives that do not have such characteristics, but which 
can certainly be called human. Thus, in cases of human life where the characteristics of 
personhood might not be satisfied, it would, on Tooley's view, lead to the treatment of 
that life as subhuman. Indeed, from the view of personhood as a basis for establishing 
what is valuable about sporting performances, it would not find any difficulty with 
terminating lives on the basis of them lacking certain personal qualities. 
In response, it can be argued that Tooley's work points more to a need for a greater 
articulation of personhood than to its rejection. In the cases raised by Tooley, it might 
be satisfactory to concur with Egonsson (1998, html) that, 
I do not think that it is possible to give a rational defense of speciesism, since all 
the attempts in that direction that I have seen have failed. But given the fact that 
the speciesistic attitude exists among us, whether or not we are able to justify it, 
then I believe it has to be taken into account. 
However, if one still finds weaknesses in the moral importance of a feeling that 
humanity has a special status, then it must follow that non,human persons are deserving 
of respect and that some kinds of humans might not be. This does not mean treating 
such lives without any respect at all. Rather it might simply entail applying Warnock's 
(1987) notion of minimal rights, where it is identified that the embryo has a special status, 
demanding special rights that respect it as being human and definitely alive, though 
which recognises that it is far from being fully human. A comparable conclusion is 
made by Fleming, who endeavours to make more explicit the extent of the rights to be 
afforded to the human foetus rather than the embryo. In re,stating the Minimal Rights 
position, Fleming identifies that the interests of the human foetus for continued 
existence make problematic the use of experimental genetics that would allow the 
development of enhancing techniques. Similar conclusions are implicit of UNESc ~c J's 
(1997) declaration on the human genome, though still does not necessitate the inability 
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to engineer the human genome accepting - at least - Warnock's 14 day limitation upon 
the human embryo (that until 14 days after conception, the human embryo cannot be 
harmed and could thus, be used for experimentation - providing such research is 
respectful of the humanity of the embryo). Adopting the minimal rights position and 
the special status of the embryo (though not to treat them as the same) does not appear, 
necessarily, to violate the rights of the embryo and thus, can be argued as satisfying the 
first assumption of this paper. 
A further challenge that must be reconciled is for expanding notions of respect for 
personhood, to the abstract entity rather than the specific person. Schneider and 
Butcher identify some recognition of the importance of affording respect to entities 
other than lives, by introducing their notion of respect for sport Thus, further work must 
account for how personhood, and the characteristics ascribed to it can apply in greater 
strength to the concept persons or humanity in general. Birnbacher (1998) describes 
such a process as moving from a discourse of want-regarding to idea~regarding. It entails 
moving from an ethical discourse that prioritises individual rights to use certain 
technologies, to those that recognise there are some applications of technologies that 
must consider the importance of issues beyond the specific, individual preferences. 
However, the latter of these perspectives (ideal,regarding) is far more difficult to sustain 
within the current ethical climate. As Birnbacher (1998, html) explains, 
You are on much safer ground, epistemologically, in claiming preference, 
satisfaction as an objective value than making the same claim for preference, 
independent values like human dignity (in some of its senses), sanctity of life or 
ontological harmony. 
From bioethical articulations of personhood, the importance of human dignity is often 
given as a benchmark for the ethical limits of genetic technologies (outside of sport). As 
Rendtorff (1998, html) describes, 
The principle of human dignity signifies that human beings have a special position 
that places them over the natural and biological position in nature. As a moral 
being and because of its status as a human being the notion of 'Clignitas" is 
contributed to its intrinsic value and place in the world. From the beginning it 
emphasized this out,standing position of the human being in the universe. 
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The concept considers that being human has an inherent, objective value; it is not 
simply that humans regard themselves as special, but that there exists some measure 
external to the human judgement that would also ascribe such special status to being 
human (Egonsson, 1998). Nevertheless, the concept of dignity also encounters 
difficulties of application in relation to medicine. Harris (1999) outlines how dignity is 
but a starting point in the discussion of what is valued about personhood. He considers 
that, while human dignity is a universally attractive concept, it is also terribly vague. In 
respect of genetic technologies, Harris argues that the onus must be upon demonstrating 
how human dignity is challenged by the technology. Simply applying Kantian principles 
does not suffice in this respect because it, too, is rather ambiguous. The principle of 
treating persons as ends in themselves implies an unsustainable requirement upon 
interpersonal relationships. fu Harris (1990, p.70) argues, 
almost all commercial relations people have with one another are basically 
instrumental .... there is a difference between treating someone as a mere thing and 
recognizing his or her humanity. 
Consequently, it is misleading to conclude that the ethical issues concerning GM m 
sport are resolved simply by applying the principle of protecting human dignity in order 
to preserve some valued aspect of sport. 
5.4 Summary: Autonomy, Dignity and GM 
On the basis of these central moral issues in relation to GM in sport, there would 
appear to be some common characteristics. The discussion about harms identifies that a 
critical aspect to develop is the notion of autonomy and the salience of it as a guiding 
moral principle in relation to the use of scientific and technological innovations. From 
this perspective, determining whether GM in sport should be allowed requires 
concluding what is an acceptable balance between the prevention and restriction of 
individual freedoms. Concluding whether GM in sport is ethical, relies upon the limits 
of personal autonomy. 
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The discussion of humanness leads to a concept of personhood that seems inextricable 
from the notion of human dignity. In this respect, Kant (1785) would seem to offer a 
common context for understanding how each is related. Specifically, Kant asserts that 
"Autonomy .. .is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature" and 
"dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative" (html). 
For each of these concepts, there is a lack of consensus that they are sufficiently 
articulated to be of use to bioethical issues, which is rather pessimistic for the aspiration 
of reaching ethical conclusions about the sporting case. The overuse of human dignity 
lacks depth because of the incoherent articulation of what constitutes personhood and 
how it 'hangs,together' in respect of a variety of moral issues. On Kant's view, the 
discussion might seem somewhat tautological as the concept of human dignity consists 
in it reflecting a capability (and desire for) autonomy as a fundamental moral principle 
and human right. Again, it is important to recognise the dangers of the discussion 
being reduced to discussions about human rights, to which each of these concepts is 
closely associated. 
Presently, human dignity seems to entail giving a respect to the autonomy of the 
individuaL However, human dignity is also contingent upon a statement about what is 
human and thus, what is deserving of autonomy. It is the latter of these issues that 
requires further articulation. Thus, further research must investigate the concept of 
personhood and understand how it can apply beyond a rights discourse - beyond 
empowenng the individual to empowering the status of abstract concepts such as 
humanness. The final section of the analysis of 'dehumanising and superhuman ising' 
recognises that a further challenge to the application of ideas from personhood and 
human dignity rests upon their extension to abstract persons or a community of 
persons. As is shown by the 'new harms' of GM, a number of the significant harms in 
relationship to genetics are harms to future generations and the development of 
disturbing eugenic tendencies that might derive from any regulation on using such 
technology. Unfortunately, the concept of human dignity and the discourse of rights 
does not offer much by way of solutions to these concerns since they only empower 
individual rights. Comparatively, the rights of potential persons is a weak argument 
(Birnbacher, 1998) if, indeed, it is an argument upon which to base any decision about 
the use of technology. Consequently, work is necessary to consider what kinds of 
modifications to rights discourses might be necessary to account for harms that are not 
demonstrably inflicted upon individuals. 33 
A rights discourse seems useful to employ to negotiate these concepts, but a ret1ectill'~ 
rights discourse is needed, which recognises that conventional human rights as indicated 
by such international instruments as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) 
do not account sufficiently for genetically modified humans within social practices. 
Indeed, it reveals that human rights are premised upon relatively shallow articulations of 
what is being human and the limits of claims to freedom. 
Dignity and autonomy provide some basis for inquiry and so, contrary to Schneider and 
Butcher (2000), there is a starting point for entering into discussions about what makes 
humanness an important factor in considering the ethical status of performance 
enhancement in sport. Importantly, this call for sports ethics to enter into a rights 
discourse that is informed by bioethical arguments, evolves from the case. It is not the 
end of the discussions, but a starting point that follows from a conceptual framework 
about the ethical issues arising from technology. It serves as a basis for the deliberations 
of harms, from which it is possible to discuss what is meant by being human. As such, 
the discussion should not be limited by the importance of rights, but should be 
preceded by a greater articulation of what are dignity and autonomy. 
In sum, it would seem that sporting authorities would find it difficult to prevent harms 
or sustain sporting values, regardless of the decision to ban or legalise OM. The harms 
of legalising a technology do seem more transparent than the harms of banning the 
same technology, perhaps because legalising presents new kinds of harms for people. 
Further people will suffer by the implementation of a technology, but only the same 
kinds of harms remain by not allowing it. Here, the approach has been to show that 
GM is not necessariiy an unethical method of performance enhancement in sport. It has 
not been to champion the positive aspects of OM or to consider broader sn(ial 
questions about GM in general, each of which is relevant to the implementation of G\1 
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in sport. Rather, it has been to demonstrate why OM might be an acceptable method of 
performance enhancement and reveal what should be the focus for ethical research in 
relation to sport technology 
Within this thesis, it has been suggested that arguments based solely upon sports ethics 
are not sufficient. At best, the current positions within sport seem to assert a self-
justifying and hypocritical position about what kinds of performance enhancer should 
be made illegal or legal. Additionally, there has not been a sufficient level of analysis 
within sports ethics to locate a variety of performance enhancements within a common 
conceptual framework. Indeed, discussions have been focused solely upon the drug 
issue, to the neglect of a vast number of other technologies that confer a similar kind of 
effect. Only recently have the ethical issues deriving from performance enhancing 
technology in sport been given serious attention. It is not that sports values are 
insufficient to derive conclusions about why OM is unacceptable, but that bioethics 
indicates a broader literature that is not dealt with through the current arguments raised 
against drugs, and other enhancements. Such arguments inform and strengthen the 
claims to what is valued in sport and provide a more substantial basis upon which to 
derive conclusions about the ethical limits of OM in sport. 
From the sports ethical perspective, banning OM is not justified. However, if sports 
ethics borrows from perspectives in bioethics, then OM in sport gives nse to some 
significant ethical concerns, which then sharpen the credibility of the sporting 
arguments. Such analyses allow a clearer articulation of values in sport, as demonstrated 
by concluding the ethical limits of OM in sport as reliant upon the philosophical limits 
of autonomy and dignity 
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6. Post .. Script: Avoiding "Gene Doping" 
AB a post~script to the main conclusions, it seems useful to provide some final 
recommendations for the preceding discussion about the use of genetics in sport. These 
comments have been formulated on the most recent developments in regards to the 
genetics issue in sport, which have not been possible to include within the main 
framework of the thesis. While it is fundamental that ethical inquiry works towards 
dealing with the conflicting freedoms of individuals and institutions, and expands upon 
humanness in relation to medicine and sport, it seems necessary to recognise the 
immediacy of the issue in respect of sport. Within the sporting community and within 
medicine, this debate has already begun to take place, though is already clouded by a 
fear and condemnation of GM for sport. Nevertheless, an interest in genetic 
modification for sport has gained a substantial amount of academic attention within 
science and ethics. Subsequent to this research, there is a need to more clearly 
investigate the broader implications of how genetic technologies raise issues for the 
rights of athletes (Miah, 2000b; 2001b). AB well, research must look more closely at the 
legal implications of genetic~policy in sport. Each of these issues would appear to have 
passed unnoticed thus far and have not been the explicit intention of the present study. 
However, the Unesco (1997) declaration and a recent paper published by the Australian 
Law Reforms Commission (2001), flags each of these issues as a priority in relation to 
ethical and legal issues about genetics and sport. 
6.1 Review of current positions 
Scientific Research 
Over 2000 and 2001, there have been a number of academic and professional meetings 
d d h 'd' f GM ' t These include, but are not that have evote time to t e conSl eratlOn 0 m spor . 
exhaustive of the following: 
• 
July 2000, European College of Sports Science 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
September, 2000: Pre~Olympic World Congress of Sports Science & Medicine, 
Brisbane, Australia. 
September, 2000: International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, Melbourne, 
Australia. 
March, 2001: Playing the Game, Denmark. 
June 6, 2001: IOC Working Party, June 6. 
November, 2001: Genes in Sport: A Seminar, School of Medicine at University 
College London and UK Sport, London, UK. 
Additionally, WADA had planned to hold a closed meeting in Spring Harbour in 
September 2001. Due to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 
11, this meeting did not take place and was re~scheduled to March 2002. The meeting 
consisted of a number of experts within genetics and sport. Dr. Theodore Friedmann, 
geneticist and member of WADA's medical research committee stated that, "The 
geneticist doesn't know a lot about the world of athletics, and the world of athletics 
doesn't know what is happening in the gene therapy world". As such, the meeting 
intended to provide an "opportunity for both camps to bring themselves up to date on 
the state of the art and what the potential dangers are in athletics through genetic 
manipulation" freidmann, cited in Wilson, 2001, no page). What has not been 
apparent from the planning of this meeting is the degree to which ethicists will be 
involved or the degree to which ethical inquiry - rather than the straightforward 
implementation of ethical rules - will take place. It is possible to argue that geneticists, 
most of whom are medical doctors, are cognisant with principles within medical ethics. 
However, to claim that a doctor is also an ethicist is grossly misconceived. Indeed, it 
might be akin to claiming that a bioethicist is also a medical doctor, which is clearly not 
the case. 
The main part of this thesis intends to demonstrate that the issue of genetics in sport 
cannot rely solely upon medical ethical principles. Thus, if the geneticist depart~ ~olely 
from conventional medical ethics, then this is not a sufficient basis upon which to 
consider the ethical status of genetics in sport. Indeed, it is paramount that any ~uch 
discussions include members who are aware of ethical i~~uc~ in relation to sport and 
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medicine and who have expertise m ethical reasoning. This does not imply the 
championing of the ethicists as moral guide. Indeed, the trend in genetic counseling 
that is pervading medical ethics is not to utilise the ethicist as a decision maker, but 
more as a facilitator of understanding and clarifying ethical dilemmas. Thus, it is to 
recognise that the ethicist has an important role to play and an expertise that requires 
consideration in the making of policy. This perspective is consistent with the \\'ay in 
which genetics is being dealt with on an international basis outside of sport. The 
presence and role of ethicists is of immediate relevance to such bodies as the UK 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, 
and many others. Again, the ethicist is not the sole voice on such matters, though is 
one that has something unique and interesting to add to these discussions. 
The perspective of geneticists outside of sport remains sceptical. Indeed, it is not clear 
that genetics will give rise to effective therapeutic techniques at all. Professor Steve Jones 
of UCL, one of the world's leading geneticists, spoke at the 'Genes in Sport' meeting 
hosted by University College London and UK Sport. No fan of sport, Jones was 
thoroughly dismissive of the possibility that genetic technology might be applied to 
sport, saying that 
There is a massive quantity of hype when it comes to gene therapy in sport. I put it 
in the same ballpark as the babbling nonsense talked about a baldness cure based 
on gene therapy. Oones, cited in Powell, 2001, no page). 
One might take this response to be rather jovial, as Jones also adds that he wished 
"genetics had never been invented" Oones, cited in Hamlyn, 2001, no page). Thus, 
Jones' reaction suggests more a contempt for any of the speculations on how such 
information might used, rather than specifically directing his response to the application 
to sport. However, Jones is not alone. Professor Tom Murray, of the Hastings Center 
for Bioethics Research in New York, said isolating a gene for any characteristic, sporting 
or otherwise, is too simplistic a notion. He argues that 
Those that believe you get simple effects from genetic manipulatio.~s see our ,~L'nL'S 
as beans in a beanbag - you add or pull out a bean and get the etfect you seek. .... 
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see it as a complex ecosyste~ with each gene influencing and being influenced by 
others and the external enVlronment (Murray cited in Morgan 2001 ) 
, "no page. 
Consequently, the serious consideration of how such technology might be used for 
something so 'trivial' as to enhance sporting prowess is regarded as being far-fetched. 
In this respect, scientific opinion is divided, though is erring on the side of caution. 
Nevertheless, genetic research is taking place in relation to sports perfonnance and will 
be informed by other kinds of research that can have findings that will be useful for the 
elite athlete to enhance performance. 
Media 
These academic considerations of genetics in sport have been accompanied by a wealth 
of media attention from around the globe, reaching publications in medicine, science, 
ethics, and sport. On many occasions, this attention has been sensational and has 
sought to ground hysteria about the possibility for creating super-humans in sport. 
Indeed, one might attribute the rather dismissive response from scientists such as Steve 
Jones to the amount of bad press that has been written about genetics and sport. This is 
neither surprising nor unusual, though is important to consider. A similar argument 
can be made in respect of cloning, which has gained vast amounts of press attention in 
the last 3 years, but which remains relatively innocuous as a new application of genetics. 
Interestingly, academic responses to cloning tend to be rather dismissive of it as raising 
significant ethical issues. Arguably, it has become typical within academia to dismiss the 
ethical issues of cloning as special and thus, deserving of specific consideration. It might 
be questioned whether media hysteria tends to provoke sobering reactions among 
ethicists, or whether there really are no vastly significant ethical issues in relationship to 
cloning. In respect of sport, a similar claim can be made. The press has given risc to 
some vast speculations that are not in keeping with near likely scientific applications. 
Had such reports been rather more cautious, then there might have been a more 
considered view about the ethical issues and scientific possibilities a.ssociated with 
genetics and sport. 
Nevertheless, there have been some credible articles that have interviewed key persons 
within international Sport and genetics research. In particular, Morgan (2001) speaks 
with eminent scientist Claude Bouchard, director of the Pennington Biomedical 
Research Center in Baton rouge, Louisiana. On the possibility of isolating performance 
genes Bouchard is no longer convinced, stating that, "the human genome map has 
shown the situation is more complex than we believed .... Even clear targets, involving a 
single gene or small group of genes, may require another century of research." (no page). 
Athletic Community 
As well, there have also been responses within the elite athletic community that provide 
some awareness and expressions of concern for GM in sport. In general, these responses 
are from the usual key, political figures, though still offer some context for 
understanding the athletes' views. In particular, Johann Olav Koss, the 1994 Olympic 
speed skating champion from Norway, member of the LO.C., and medical doctor, 
asserted that, "methods could have already started (cited in Longman, 2001, html). 
Koss, also claims that there is a need for aggressive strategies in the development of gene-
doping policies. 
We have to do this in the early stages before any athlete starts using this. We need 
to act quickly to define the rules. I don't think sport has anything to benefit from 
having genetically enhanced athletes. This is not only an issue for sport, it's a 
broad ethical issue for human beings (Associated Press, 2001, html). 
Additionally, Sydney 2000 Olympic Gold Medal winner for the men's 100m, Maurice 
Greene raised the issue pertinent to the potential for engineering germ-line genes, 
asking, "what if you're born with something having been done to you .... you didn't have 
anything to do with it." (cited in Longman, 2001, html). It is reassuring that the athlete's 
perspective, at least from this brief statement, recognises that the ethical conclusions are 
not foregone or straightforward to apply. Also from the sports field, US women's 
. I h Harmut Buschbacher has claimed that it would be desirable to natlOna team coac 
obtain the genetic profiles of young rowers: 
As a coach, I'm interested in performance ... and if this information would giw me 
a better oppor~nity to .select the athletes for my team, I would like to u~e that. 
[That way] you re not gomg to waste so much time and energy on athletes who may 
not be as successful. (cited in Farrey, 2001, htm}). 
A similar interest in genetic screening is offered by one of the US national team rowers, 
Amy Fuller, who said "I mean, my mom started me in ballet .... What a nightmare that 
was. Didn't have the grace gene, obviously" (Farrey, ibid). However, Amy also admitted 
an apprehension for having her future told to her at such an early age. To be told that 
one is not going to be an elite ballet dancer, could be psychologically traumatic. 
International Sports Organisations 
Presently, the two central, international sports organisations in respect of policy making 
are the International Olympic Committee (lOC) and the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WAD A). Currently, they have begun to create working groups to prepare for dealing 
with the problem of genetic modification, though to some disappointment, the presence 
of ethical research to inform these discussions is unclear. Central members of these 
organisations such as lOC President Jacques Rogge and lOC Medical Director Patrick 
Schamasch have expressed a concern for how genetics might be abused for sporting 
purposes. Rogge and Schamasch, both of whom are medical doctors, have already 
entered into the discourse of condemnation associated with likely abuses of genetics in 
sport. Importantly, their reaction derives from a perspective on abuse rather than use. 
This distinction is important, as it ought to allow for the possible applications of 
genetics as having ethical merits. However, any application sought within sport seems 
condemned by these two key persons within international sport. As Rogge states, 
"Genetic engineering in sport will foster not only a greater potential health ri::;k fur 
athletes than does conventional doping, but also a greater potential for performance 
enhancement" (cited in Longman, 2001, html). 
Not surprisingly, there is a feeling in the International Olympic Committee for not 
wanting to be left behind, as has been the case for other kinds of doping technique. A~ 
Schamasch (cited in Longman, ibid) states, "for once, we want to be ahead, n\)t behind". 
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Indeed, the statement of other key figures within international sport and medicine 
reinforces this sense of urgency. Pr f A L' 'IOC b o. rne Jungqvlst, mem er and board 
member for W ADA said that , 
The gene responsible for EPO has already been identified by the Human Genome 
Project and could, theoretically, be injected into the muscle. An EPO gene will 
promote the body's production of EPO and some people will say this can never be 
detected. There may be other parameters we could identify that tell us whether a 
person has injected this gene. (cited in Wallace, 2001). 
Additionally, Professor Bengt Saltin of Sweden gave a paper at the conference titled 
'Play the Game' held in Denmark (2001). Within this keynote speech, Saltin stated that 
the title for his paper, "Gene Doping: Science Fiction or Impending Reality?" might 
already "be outdated." Saltin continues to assert that, 
There is no doubt the medical technology is in place. Certain problems exist but 
they will be overcome. There are already possibilities for sportsmen. Within five 
years, commercial gene therapy will be available to everyone (cited in Walsh, 
2000, html). 
However, it is unclear whether this amount of time will be filled with the necessary 
philosophical and ethical consideration of the technology. Indeed, the depth of ethical 
issues that will arise from any kind of testing is of substantial concern. Even if the 
aspiration is to derive methods of testing for genetic modification, it is not clear that 
such procedures will be ethically sound and possible to apply. As Peter Schjerling, 
senior genetic researcher from Copenhagen, admits, '/\ doping test based on taking 
pieces of the athlete's muscle is not likely to be ethically accepted" (cited in Powell, 
2001). Such a process would involve an invasive muscle biopsy for which no athlete is 
likely to provide consent. As Peter Hamlyn, consultant neurosurgeon at St 
Bartholomew's and the Royal London Hospital notes, "peeing in a pot is one thing, but 
having your legs cut open is another" (l--Iamlyn, 2001, html). Scherling continues to 
explain that, 
therefore gene doping can be arranged so that detection, in practice. will be 
impossible .... Artificial genes can, and most likely will, be abused by athktl'~ as a 
means of doping .... Detection is extremely difficult since the artificial gl'ncs will 
produce proteins that are identical to those in the human body (cited in Powell. 
2001, no page). 
Some sympathy for the ethical and philosophical issues is found in the public statements 
of Theodore Friedmann, who questions the rationale behind genetic manipulation for 
sport. Friedmann asks, 
What are the endpoints of manipulation? . .ls the hope to incrementally sneak up 
on the one~and~~half~minute mile? Or six seconds for 100 meters? Is the question, 
How fully can we engineer the human body to do physically impossible things? If 
it is, what do you have at the end of that? Something that looks like a human, but 
is so engineered, so tuned, that its no longer going to do what the body is designed 
to do (cited in Longman, 2001, html). 
Interestingly though, Jacques Rogge considers genetic screening to have merits in the 
application to sport, though draws the line at GM (Clarey, 2001a). While an 
explanation for this position is not clear, it seems to neglect the ethical concerns raised 
by genetic screening. For each of these institutions, the approach is already to condemn 
genetic technology in sport. Apart from Rogge's admission that genetic screening is 
ethically sound, there does not seem to be any acceptance that certain kinds of GM 
might be ethically justified. Yet, there is no real engagement with how medical ethics 
responds to applications of genetic technologies to techniques that are not strictly 
necessary. Thus, a response about the use of gene therapy to repair muscle tissue has 
not been given specific consideration. Statements tend to have been made in respect of 
the general issue of genetic modification in sport. On the basis of the present thesis, 
such an approach is simplistic and overly committed therefore. If it were deemed 
medically sound to use gene therapy to reduce the injury time of an athlete, then it 
would seem contradictory to retract the claims about genetics that have been made. 
Importantly, there is a greater need for precautionary statements regarding the use of G~ 1 
in sport though not just to their use, but also to their rejection. Certainly, there is SUl1ll' 
merit for ensuring that a message is clear and straightforward and, in the case of 
genetics, it might serve a better purpose to make such a message one of rejection and 
condemnation. For the lOC President to state publicly that some kinds of GM might be 
acceptable would surely be harmful for ensuring that the abuse of GM does not take 
place. Yet, in so doing, international sports organisations must be careful not to simply 
retreat into ideological perspectives about what sport is and expect the perspective to be 
shared around the world. In the case of drug use, this does not seem to be the case. As 
well, in the case of GM, it is less likely to be the case because of the number of leaitimate 
b 
applications it can have. 
By not entering into a public debate about the ethical issues in Sport arising from GM, 
sports organisations are in danger of making similar mistakes as have arisen in respect of 
formulating policy about drug taking and doping. GM is not to be understood in the 
same way as other doping methods, because of its broader utility for medicine and 
society at large. Observing the way in which governments around the world are 
addressing the use of genetics in society more generally, there is a realisation that the 
problem of genetics is not temporary. It is not sufficient simply to reject its utility and 
condemn all kinds of applications. Rather, some kinds of GM will have great benefits 
for various kinds of people and are being legitimised by bioethical committees. 
In order to develop a policy on the matter of GM in sport, it is important to consider 
what theoretical perspectives can be useful. Without any coherent theoretical basis for 
such discussion, it is useful to draw upon policy within sport and bioethics, which has 
been the ambition of the latter part of this thesis. Despite anti-doping policy departing 
from a biased perspetive - that doping is wrong and, as such, to be removed from sport 
- there are some merits that are worthy of attention, notably within recent 
developments. The ambitions for harmonization of an anti~doping policy are important, 
though seem also to omit the important consideration of what it is that is being 
harmonised. What seems to be missing from anti-doping campaigns is the philosophical 
and ethical groundwork that is necessary to inform the ant~doping argument. 
1 1 1: h bid b t organl·satl'ons does not aSIllre to some T lis appea lOr et ics to e va ue y spor s 
ideological aspiration for philosophers to be the gatekeepers of ethical decision makin~, 
To consider that the ethicist must, suddenly be used as a privileged source of knmdell,~e 
is both unrealistic and inaccurate. However, the claim asserts that anti-dnping is 
l~i 
fundamentally misconceived because it is overly generalis tic. Arguably, there is not a 
sufficient definition of doping within sport that can yield a solution to the problem 
(which seems to be, how to remove cheaters from sport). Indeed, Barrie Houlihan 
(1999), one of the world's leading theorists on anti--doping policy, recognises that the 
absence of a clear definition leaves sports authorities reliant upon simple rule-violations 
as a basic rationale for developing anti-doping policy. However, this cannot continue. It 
is the very justification of rules - particularly new rules and new doping methods - that 
is under question. In respect of GM, the primary question is whether the enhancement 
should be against the rules at all. 
Currently, Angela Schneider, former president of the International Association for the 
Philosophy of Sport and current Co-Chair of the Ethics and Education Committee of 
WADA has been involved with discussions concerning the revision of the Anti-Doping 
Code, the basic instrument for discriminating between different kinds of substances. 
Thus, the definitional work that is suggested as needing to precede harmonisation (or, at 
least, to accompany it), is being addressed within anti--doping meetings. A similar 
process must ensue for the analysis of GM in sport. However, it is also important that 
such discussions borrow from the format of deliberations about bioethics outside of 
sport. 
GM in sport is not solely a sports issue in a similar way that it can be argued that drug 
use in sport is also not solely a sports issue. For the latter, the abuse of drugs is 
inextricable from the broader social concern about how drugs are used. Similarly, the 
use of GM in sport must be congruent with broader policy decisions in respect of 
genetics. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the format for the discussions about 
genetics must learn from how such discussions are taking place outside of sport. It is 
not sufficient for sports organisations to implement a working party that will exist for 
three or four years to formulate its anti-genetic policy. Issues and applications in 
genetics are not finite and, this thesis demonstrates the issues cannot rely only on 
1 l ' 1 ' t h' 'h i~ itself in generalised medical principles about w lat is et 11ca or not in spor , w lL 
continual redefinition. 
6.2 Considerations for a Policy on OM in Sport: Towards a Draft Statement 
For these reasons, the following tentative recommendations are given in respect of 
developing legal policy in respect of GM in sport, based upon the content of these 
conclusions. 
1. The creation of a transnational ethical committee comprising expertise within 
sport and bioethics. 
The format of this committee must, at Least, ref/,ect a similar composition of expertise that is found 
in other bioethicaL committees. The internationaL status of any such committee must be in scope 
and in constitution. In recent years, the Internationd Association of Bioethics has raised the 
profile of concerns arising from the dissemination of genetic research in devdoping countries. 
Between countries, there are important differences in relation to how the patient-doctor relationship 
is structured to empower the roLe of the doctor in varying ways. ConventionaL notions of informed 
consent, thus, might not suffice to ensure that decisions are made with the interests of the patient 
in mind. For this reason, and given the internationaL status of elite sport, it is paramount that, 
within any sport/bioethics committee, there is awareness about the differing relationships between 
doctors, coaches, and athLetes from different worLdly perspectives. 
The positioning of bioethicaL research and sports ethics is criticaL in respect of GM. The exclusion 
of either within a bioethics committee wiLL be detrimentaL to the perspective of deriving coherent 
understanding about how genetics is best used in sport. Thus, the composition of a bioethics 
committee must encompass expertise from ethicists in sport and medicine, notabLy drawing upon 
emerging theoreticaL perspectives in bioethics that speak specificaLLy to the ways in which genetics 
challenges the sanctity of medicaL ethicaL principLes .. 
2. Negotiation of principles in relation to research and arguments found within the 
broader bioethics community. 
It is important that a policy on the use of GM in sport is not std tiondn'. Indeed, the \'ery 
suggestion of formulating a single policy is misinformed. The arguments raised in this thesis 
1~6 
identify that there are a number of different applications of genetics to sport and that each rais~ 
different kinds of ethical issues. As such, it is important that any such poUcy differentiat~ b:ttlccn 
the different kinds of GM for sport and that it does not assert any prescribed ethical conclusion 
from its definition. ConsequentLy, the concept of gene-doping or the creation of anti-gene-doping 
policy is to be avoided. 
3. Continual investment into independent working parties and research. 
The ethical issues arising from GM in sport are not fixed. As new forms of genetic technology 
arise, so too wiLL new kinds of ethical issues arise for sports organisations to face. A prescriptit1e 
approach to GM in sport would thus, weaken the credibility of any such policy as being founded 
upon sound ethical deliberations. Research concerning the ethical status of GM must not be 
considered as a temporary or absolute measure. Where resources are Limited, emphasis must be 
focused on drawing initial guidelines that can serve to Lead to coherent policies and the possibility 
of implementing research funding for developing more sound policies. This does not eliminate the 
utility of working parties focused upon specific applications or particularly alarming developments 
in genetic science. However, such working parties should be seen as within a general and ongoing 
research committee in bioethics for sport. 
4. Engagement of broader sports community in respect of whether specific kinds of 
GM in sport are unethical. 
Issues arising from genetic technologies are not pertinent to oniy elite sportspersons. Rather, 
genetics is one of the few social issues that are of ethical concern for humanity in generaL 
AdditionaLLy, sport is not the practice of an elite few, but concerns individuals beyond the sports 
organisations that are involved with making policy decisions. Given the broader social 
implications of genetic technologies and the multitude of interests within sport, it is paramount 
that policy decisions are preceded by an opportunity for open and public dialogue Tt',~Ll1"Lli n,~ its 
ethical status in sport. 
5. Employment of modified precautionary principle. 
1~7 
OfficiaL statements concerning the use of OM in sport must be sensitive to the evolution of genetic 
technology. In many respects, there is a Lack of consensus about the extent to which genetics should 
be used as a means of altering human beings. In the case of sport, where an insufficient amount of 
knowledge is known about the technoLogy, and where the ethical condusions do not allow for any 
dear condusions, it is criticaL that a dear statement is made to this effect. The outright rejection 
of genetics without any sound ethical foundation is not justifiable and more Likely to raise further 
problems in relation to harmonising policy. Clear statements about the uncertainty of the 
technoLogy and the need to prevent its abuse are preferabLe to basing reactions upon unfounded 
appeals to ethical ideals. 
6. Towards and Integrated Policy on Performance Enhancement. 
Within the bioethical discussions concerning OM in sport it is also important to recognise that any 
such condusions - if they are founded upon sports ethics - must endeavour to work towards a 
policy that recognises genetics as one of a number of technologies that are available to enhance 
performance. Currently, there is a Lack of any consistency between different kinds of performance 
enhancements - not only between different kinds of drugs, but, for example, between drugs and 
sports equipment. In many cases the ethical arguments arising from OM can be made in respect of 
other kinds of technology in sport. Consequently, a general policy must depart from coherent 
statement about the kind of performance enhancement that is desirable in sport. 
Importantly, the stipulations specified by this policy strategy do not inquire into the 
composition of bioethical advisory committee outside of sport. The aim here is not to 
problematise the notion of a bioethics committee, which would far exceed the ambitions 
of the current thesis. Rather, it is to assert that discussions within sports organisations 
about genetics must, at least, concur with discussions about genetics outside of sport. 
188 
References 34 
Anderson, W.E "Genetic Engineering and our Humanness." Human Gene Therap\' 5 no. 
6 (1994): 755;759. - , 
Appleyard, B. Brave new worLds: staying human in the genetic future. London: 
HarperCo llins, 1999. 
Arnold, P.]. "Sport as a Valued human practice: a basis for the consideration of some 
moral issues in sport." JournaL of PhiLosophy of Education 26, no. 2 (1992): 237-255. 
Arnold, P.]. Sport, Ethics and Education. London: Cassell Education, 1997. 
Associated Press. "Sports Threat: Gene Transferring." Wired 2001. Available from: 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/O. 1282,41428,00.html 
Australian Law Reforms Commission "Issues Paper 26 Protection of Human Genetic 
Information; 12. Other services and contexts." Sydney, AustraUan Law Reforms 
Commisssion (2001) Available from: 
http://www.austliLedu.au/au/ other/ alrc/ publications/issues/26/ 
Aveni, A. F. "Man and Machine: Some Neglected Considerations on the Sociology of 
Sport." Sociology Bulletin 5(1) (1996): 13;23. 
Ayabe, S., and S.Y Tan. "Entering the Age of the New Genetics with Eyes Wide Open." 
Hawaii MedicaLlournaL 54, no. ApriL (1995): 460463. 
Bailey, C. "Games, winning and education." Cambridge Journa[ of Education 5, no, 1 
(1975): 40;50. 
Beauchamp, T.L., and] .F. Childress. PrincipLes of Biomedica[ Ethics, 4th ed. New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Benn, P. "The sex selection question." Spiked-OnUne, 16 NoQ)ember 2001, Available from: 
http://www.spiked;online.com/Articles/00000002D2D1.htm 
Bijker, W.E. Of Bicydes, BakeLites, and Bu[bs: Toward a theory of sociotechnica[ change. 
London: MIT Press, 1995. 
B' b 1 r D "Embryo Research as a Paradigm of Ethical Pragmatics." In 20th Wortd lrn ac le, . 
Congress of PhiLosophy, 1998. Available from: 
http://\\\\w,bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe/BioeBirn.htm 
Bjerklie, D. "High;Tech Olympians," Techno[ogy Re~'it:H', January 199), 22-10. Available 
from: http://www;white.media,mit.edu/- intille/;t/olympic.html 
Blake, A. The Body Language: The Meaning of Modern Sport. London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1996. 
BMC. Training: G.P.S. and Mobile Phones British Mountaineering Council, 1999. 
Available from http://www.thebmc.co.ukltrain/gps.htm. 
Breivik, G. "Against Chance: A causal theory of winning in sport." In Values in Sport: 
Elitism, Nationalism, Gender Equality, and the Scientific Manufacture of Winners, edited 
by T. Tannsjo and C. Tamburrini, 141~156. London: E & FN Spon, 2000. 
Brody, H. "An overview of racket technology." In Tennis, Science, Technology, edited 
by S.A. Haake and A.O. Coe, 43A8. London: Blackwell Science, 2000. 
Brohm,]. Sport: A Prison of Measured Time (2nd Edition). Translated by Fraser, 1. Paris: 
Pluto Press, 1989. 
Brown, W.M. "Comments on Simon and Fraleigh." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XI 
(1984): 33~35. 
Brown, W.M. "Ethics, Drugs and Sport." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport VII (1980): 15~ 
23. 
Brown, W.M. "Paternalism, drugs and the nature of sport." Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport XI, (1985): 14~22 
Brown, W.M. "Personal Best." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XXII (1995): 1~10. 
Brown, W.M. "Practices and Prudence." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XVII (1990): 71~ 
84. 
Burke, M.D. "Drugs in Sport: Have they practised too hard? A Response to Schneider 
and Butcher." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XXIV (1997): 47--66. 
Burley, ]. "Bad Genetic Luck and Health Insurance." In The Genetic Revolution and 
Human Rights, edited by]. Burley, 54~60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Butcher, R., and A. Schneider. "Fair Playas Respect for the Game." Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport XXV (1998): 1~22. 
Cardwell, D. The Fontana History of Technology. London: Fontana Press, 1994. 
Carr, D. "Where's the Merit if the Best Man Wins?" Journal of the Philosophy of S/'(lr[ 
XXVI (1999): 1~9. 
Carr, R. "Technology and the Nature of Sport: A neo~luddirl' runs ~\(lllil ()( Rorschach." 
Soaring, 1995. 
Carter, M.A. "Synthetic Model of Bioethicaiinquiry." Paper presented at the 20th \\"'CJ1<,l 
Congress of Phi/,osophy, Boston, USA 1998. Available from: 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe/BioeCart.htm 
Challoner, J. The Baby Makers: The History of Artificia~ Conception. London: Channel Four 
Books, 1994. 
Cislunar Aerospace, Inc. "Technology and Tennis ~ The Balancing Act." In Aerodynamics 
in Sports Techno~ogy: Cis~unar Aerospace, Inc., 1999. Available from: 
http://wings.ucdavis.edu/Tennis/Features/ coe~O l.html 
Clarey, C. "Chilling New World: Sports and Genetics." Intemationa[ Hera[d Tribune 
2001a. 
Clarey, C. "If Doping is Banned, Should Sleeping in Altitude Tents be Allowed?" 
Intemationa~ Herala Tribune 7 December, 200 lb. 
CNNSL "That special touch: Despite Technology, 'natural' sailors still rule." , 1998, 
January 22. Available from: 
http://cnnsi.com/whitbread/ news/ 1998/0 1/22/ seat_pants/ 
Coe, A. The balance between technology and tradition in tennis. Tennis, Science, 
Techno [ogy. S. A. Haake and A. O. Coe. 3AO. London, Blackwell Science, 2000. 
Cogan, A. "Sporty Types." In New Scientist P[anet Science, 1998. Available from: 
http://www.newscientist.com/ns/9805 23/ nsport.html 
Collingridge, D. The Socia[ Contro[ of Techndogy. London: Frances Pinter Ltd, 1980. 
D'Agostino, F. "The Ethos of Games." ]ouma[ of the PhHosophy of Sport VIII (1981): 7-lK. 
Damasio, A.R. Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. London: Papermac, 
1994/96. 
Davis, P. "Ethical Issues in Boxing." ]ouma[ of the Phiwsophy of Sport XX-XXI (l993A): 4K-
63. 
Delattre, E.J. "Some reflections on success and failure in competitive athletics." ]ouma[ of 
the Phil.osophy of Sport (1975): 133~139. 
Dubin, C. L. Commission of Inquiry into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to 
Increase Ath[etic Performance. Ottawa, Canadian Government Publishing Ccntrl'. 
1990. 
E SB "G 1 d '(Intracts" In Ethics and Sport, edited h-\1.J. \1,-;--,hmcc assonl, ., anles, ru es an l ~ . . 
and S.J. Parry, 57~78. London and New York: E&F.N. Spl)l1. 19l)~. 
191 
Egonsson, D. "The Importance of Being Human." Paper presented at the 20th World 
Congress of PhiLosophy, Boston, USA 1998. Available from: 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/OApp/OAppEgon.htm 
Elliott, C. A Philosophical Disease: Bioethics, Culture and Identity. London: Routledge, 
1999. 
Elliott, C. "What's wrong with enhancement technologies?" In CHIPS PubUc Lectur~, 
1998. Available from: http://www.gene.ucLac.uk/bioethics/v.Titings/Elliott.html 
Elliott, R. "Environmental Ethics." In A Companion to Ethics, edited by P. Singer, 284, 
293. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. 
Ellul, J. "The Technological Order." In Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the 
philosophical problems of technology, edited by C. Mitcham and R. Mackey. New York: 
The Free Press, 1983. 
Ellul, J. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1964. 
Fairchild, D.L "Sport abjection: Steroids and the Uglification of the Athlete." Journal of 
the Philosophy of Sport XVI (1989): 74,88. 
Fairchild, D.L "The Days Were Longer Then: Some Simple Thoughts About Sport, 
Philosophy?" Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XVIII (1991): 59,73. 
Farrey, T. "Genetic testing beckons" ESPN, 15 July, 2001. Available from: 
http://espn.go.com/ otl/ athlete/ monday.html. 
Feezell, R.M. "On the wrongness of cheating and why cheaters can't play the game." 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XV (1988): 57,68. 
Fickling, D. "Lesbians 'engineer' deaf designer baby." Metro, Glasgow, April 8, 2002, 11. 
Fotheringham, W. "Cycling: Hour of pain, shame or glory." The Guardian, SePtemb~r 6 
1996, 14. 
Fotheringham, W. "Cycling: Obree outraged at 'Superman' ban." The Guardian, Octob~r 
10 1996, 23. 
Fraleigh, W.P. "Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport: The Ethical Issue." Journal of 
the Philosophy of Sport (1984a): 23,29. 
Fraleigh, W. Right Actions in Sport: Ethics for Contestants. Champaign, It. Human 
Kinetics, 1984b. 
Fleming, L. "The Moral Status of the Foetus: A ReappraisaL" Bioethics 1.1 (1987): 15~34. 
Gardner, R. "On Performance~Enhancing Substances and the Unfair Advantaae 
Argument." Journa~ of the PhiLosophy of Sport XVI (1989): 59~7 3. 0 
Gardner, W. "Can Human Genetic Enhancement Be Prohibited?" In Journal of Medicine 
and PhiLosophy, 20 (1995): 65~84. 
Gelberg, J.N. "The Lethal Weapon: How the Plastic Football Helmet Transformed the 
Game of Football, 1939~1994." BuLLetin of Science, TechnoLogy, and Society 15, no. 5-6 
(1995): 302~309. 
Gelberg, J.N. "The Rise and Fall of the Polara Asymmetric Golf Ball: No Hook, No 
Slice, No Dice." Techno~ogy in Society 18, no. 1 (1996): 93~ 110. 
Gelberg, J.N. "Tradition, Talent and Technology: The Ambiguous Relationship between 
Sports and Innovation." In Design for Sport: The cult of performance, edited by A. 
Busch, 88~ 110. London: Thames and Hudson, 1998. 
Gibson, J .H. Performance vs Results: A Critique of Values in Contemporary Sport Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1993. 
Glannon, W. Genes and Future People: Philosophical Issues in Human Genetics. 
Oxford, Westview Press, 200L 
Glover, J. What Sort of PeopLe Should There Be? Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984. 
Glover, J. "Eugenics and Human Rights." In The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights, 
edited by J. Burley, 101~124. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Gorner, P. "Parents suing over patenting of genetic test." In Chicago Tribune, 2000. 
Available from: http://chicagotribune.com/news/metro/chicago/article/O,2669,ART~ 
48233,FF.html 
Gray, B. "Bigger, but Better?" Tennis 1999, 12~14. 
Guttman, A. Sports Spectators. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
Hamlyn, P. "Gene genie casts ominous shadow." The Tdegraph, December 3, received hy 
emaiL 
Haper, W. "On Playing SporL" P.E. Review 6, no. 1 (1985): 52~57. 
H 
. J "CI Genes and Human Rights." In The Genetic Ret'olution and Human 
arns,. ones, ' 
Rights, edited by J. Burley, 61~94. Oxford: Oxford Uniycrsity Press, FN9. 
Harris, J. C~ones, Genes, and Immortality. Oxford: Oxford l'niwrsity Press, 1998. 
Hayles, N.K. How we became Posthuman. London: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Hayry, H., and T. Lehto. "Who should know about our genetic makeup and why:" In 
20th Wor~d Congress of Phaosophy, 1998. Available from: 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe/BioeHaY1.htm 
Heidegger, M. The Question Concerning Technowgy and Other Essays. Translated by 
William Lovitt. London: Harper & Ro, 1977. 
Henderson, M. "Insurers to check for genetic illness." The Times, October 13 2000, 17. 
Hendriks, A. "Genetics, Human Rights and Employment: American and European 
perspectives." Medicine and Law 16 (1997): 557-565. 
Ho, M. Genetic Engineering - Dream or Nightmare?: The Brave New World of Bad Science and 
Big Business. Bath: Gateway Books, 1998. 
Hoberman, J .M. Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport. 
New York: The Free Press, 1992. 
Hoberman, J.M. "Sport and the Technological Image of Man." In Phiwsophic Inquiry in 
Sport, edited by W.J. Morgan and K.V. Meier, 319-327. Illionois: Human Kinetics, 
1988. 
Holowchak, M.A. "'Aretism' and Pharmocological Erogenic Aids in Sport: Taking a shot 
at the use of steroids." Journa~ of the Philosophy of Sport XXVII (2000): 35-50. 
Hood, W.F. "The Aristotelian versus the Heideggerian Approach to the Problem of 
Technology." In Philosophy and Techno~ogy: Readings in the philosophical problems of 
technology., edited by C. Mitcham and R. Mackey, 349-363. New York: The Free 
Press, 1983. 
Houlihan, B. Dying to Win: Doping in Sport and the Development of Anti-Doping Policy: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 1999. 
Hummel, R.L, and O.S. Foster. "A Sporting Chance: Relationships Between 
Technological Change & Concepts of Fair Play in Fishing." Journal of Lcistnc Research 
18, no. 1 (1986) 40-52. 
Inizan, F. "Masters and Slaves of Time." Olympic Review 320 (1994) 306-310 .. i\.\'<libhle 
Online: http://www.aafla.org 
I . 1 H Id T 'b A Q&A with Jaques Rouge. Inknwtl('))dl Herald Tribune, nternatlona era n une, to 
(2001, August 9). 
International Table Tennis Federation. "The Future of Table Tennis Begins Th' 
k " ~ Wee . . Lausanne, 2000. Available from: 
http://www.ittf.com/press/pressO 100.html 
International Tennis Federation. "ITF AGM Adopts tennis ball rule change." In The 
News Bulletin of the International Tennis Federation, 1999. Available from: 
http://www.itftennis.com/html/new/this_week/archive/1999. 
07/12th/newballrule.html 
Jamieson, D. "Method and Moral Theory." In A Companion to Ethics, edited by P. Singer, 
4 76A87. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. 
Johnson, W.O. "From Here to 2000." In Sport Sociology: Contemporary Themes, edited by 
A. Yiannakis, R.D. Mclntyre, M.J. Melnick and D.P. Hart: Kendall/Hunt Publishing 
Company, 1976. 
Kahn, A. "Clone Mammals ... Clone Man." Nature 386 (1997, March 13): 119. 
Kant, 1. Fundamental Principles Of The Metaphysic Of Morals. Translated by Thomas 
Kingsmill Abbott, 1785. Available from: 
http://www.knuten.liu.se/-bjoch509/works/kant/princ_morals.txt 
Kearney, J.T. "Training the Olympic athlete: Sports science and technology are today 
providing elite competitors with the tiny margins needed to win in world~lass 
competition." Scientific American 274, no. 6 (1996): 52,57. 
Kelly, K. Out of ControL London: Fourth Estate, 1994. 
Keyley, J. "Using Genetic Information: A radical problematic for an individualistic 
framework." Medicine and Law 15 (1996): 715,720. 
Kidd, B., and P. Donnelly. "Human Rights in Sports." International Review for the 
Sociology of Sport 35, no. 2 (2000): 131,148. 
Kinley, D., and L. Rafferty. "Drug Testing, Human Rights and the Law." Paper 
presented at the How You Play the Game: The Contribution of Sport to the Promotion of 
Human Rights, Sydney, Australia 1999. 
Kirsch, A. "Human Limits in Sports." New Studies in Athletics 1, no. 4 (1986): 17,23. 
K B M 
"Who Should Have Access to Genetic Information?" In The Genetic 
noppers, . . ,. . 
Revolution and Human Rights, edited by). Burley, 39,53. Oxford: Oxford lnl\"cr~lty 
Press, 1999. 
Kretchmar, R. S. "Philosophy of Ethics." QUEST 45 (1993): 3,12. 
195 
Kretchmar, R.S. "Nagging questions about the pursuit of Excellence as a justification for 
enhancing performance in sport." In Enhancing Human Performance in Sport, ~'c:H 
Con~ep.ts and Developments, The American Academy of Physica~ Education, edited by R.\X'. 
Chnstma and H.M. Eckert, 136~150. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1992. 
Kretchmar, R.S. "Soft metaphysics: a precursor to good sports ethics." In Ethics & Sport, 
edited by M. McNamee and S. Parry, 19~34. London: E & FN Spon, 1998. 
Kuhse, H., and P. Singer, eds. A Companion to Bioethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd, 1998. 
Lamsam, C., Fu, F.H., Robbins, P.D., Evans, C.H. "Gene Therapy in Sports Medicine." 
Sports Medicine 25, no. 2 (1997): 73~77. 
Lavin, M. "Are the current bans justified?" Journal of the Phaosophy of Sport XIV (1987): 
34A3. 
Ledley, F.D. "Distinguishing genetics and eugenics on the basis of fairness." Journa~ of 
MedicaL Ethics 20 (1994): 157~164. 
Loland, S. "The Record Dilemma." In 20th Wor~d Congress of Philosophy, 1998a. Available 
Online: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Spor/SporLola.htm 
Loland, S. Fair Play: Historical anachronism or topical ideal? Ethics and Sport. S. ]. 
Parry and M.]. McNamee. 79~103. London and New York, E&FN Spon. 1998b. 
Loland, S. "The logic of progress and the art of moderation in competitive sports." In 
Va~ues in Sport: Elitism, Nationalism, Gender Equality, and the Scientific Manufacture of 
Winners, edited by T. Tannsjo and C. Tamburrini, 39~56. London: E & FN Spon, 
2000. 
Longman,]. "Pushing the Limits: Getting the Athletic Edge May Mean Altering Genes." 
The New York Times, 2001. Available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/11/sports/11GENE.html 
Macer, DR.]. Shaping Genes: Ethics, Law and Science of Using New Genetic 
Technology in Medicine and Agricu~ture: Eubois Ethics Institute, 1990. Available 
from: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/11/sports/11GENE.html 
Maclntyre, A. After Virtue: A Study in MoraL Theory (Second Edition). London: Duckworth, 
1985. 
Mackie, ].L Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin, 1977. 
Magdalinski, T. "Performance Technologies: Drugs and h\~t~kin at the S\"llr1L'V 2(,\10 
Olympics." Media InternationaL Australia 97, N~'ember (2000): 59~9. 
Mazlish, B. The Fourth Discontinuity. London: Yale University Press, 1993. 
McBride, F. "A Critique of Mr. Suits' Definition of Game Playing." In Philosophic 
Inquiry in Sport, edited by W.J. Morgan and K.V. Meier, 49~54. Illinois: Human 
Kinetics, 1979/88. 
McIntosh, P.C. Sport in Society. London: C.A. Watts and Co, Ltd, 1963. 
McNamee, M.J. "Sporting Practices, Institutions, and Virtues: A Critique and a 
Restatement." Journa~ of the Phiwsophy of Sport XXII (1995): 61~82. 
Miah, A. "Climbing Upwards of Climbing Backwards? The Technological 
Metamorphoses of Climbing and Mountaineering." The Science of Climbing and 
Mountaineering Edited by N. Messenger, W. Patterson and D. Brook. London, 
Human Kinetics, 2000a, CD~ROM. 
Miah, A. "The Engineered Athlete: Human Rights in the Genetic Revolution." Culture, 
Sport, Society 3, no. 3 (2000b): 25AO. 
Miah, A. "'New Balls Please': Tennis, Technology, and the Changing Game." In Tennis, 
Science, and Techno~ogy, edited by S.A. Haake and A.O. Coe, 285~292. London: 
Blackwell Science, 2000e. 
Miah, A. "Genetic Technologies and Sport: The New Ethical Issue." Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport XXVIII (2001a): 32~52. 
Miah, A. "Genetics, Privacy, and Athletes' Rights." Sports Law Bulletin 4(5) (2001b): 10~ 
12, Also available from: 
http://www.sportslawbulletin.com/Current/Analysis/Analysis.htm 
Miah, A. "Patenting Human DNA." Ethica~ Issues in the New Genetics. Edited by B. 
Almond and M. Parker. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2002, in press. 
Mill, J.S. On Liberty, 1859. Available from: 
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/text/mill/liberty/liberty.rtf 
Morgan, W.J. Lefitst Theories of Sport: A Critique and Reconstruction. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1994. 
Morgan, W.J. Sport and the Humanities: A co~kction of origina~ essays. Knoxville, TenrH.'~~l'l': 
The Bureau of Educational Research and Service, 1980. 
Morgan, W.J. "The Logical Incompatibility Thesis and Rules: A R~consideration of 
Formalism as an Account of Games." Journa~ of the Phdosophy of Sport Xl\' (1981): 1-
20. 
197 
Morgan, N. "Sports facing next problem after drug,takers, gene cheats." Bl.oomb r P 2001. egress 
Munthe, C. "~elected C~~mpions: Making Winners in an Age of Genetic Technology." 
In Va~ues m Sport: Ehtrsm, NationaUsm, Gender EquaUty, and the Scientific Manufacture of 
Winners, edited by T. Tannsjo and C. Tamburrini, 217,231. London and New York: 
E & F.N. Spon, 2000. 
Nagl, S. "Genetic Essentialism and the Discursive Subject." In 20th World Congress of 
Phitosophy, 1998. Available from: 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe/BioeNagl.htm 
Orwell, G. 1984. New York: The New American Library, 1949/83. 
Ozawa, T. "What is Applied Ethics" The Activities of the Centre for Applied Ethics of 
University of British Columbia." University of British Co[umbia, 1996. Available from: 
http://www.kochi.u.ac.jp/- ozawa/whaHext.html 
Palmer, C.A. "Drugs vs. Privacy: The New Game in Sports." Marquette Sports Law]ourna[ 
2, no. 2 (1992): 175,209. 
Pandya, S.K. "Ethical aspects of clinical trials in gene therapy." Issue in Medica[ Ethics 8, 
no. 4 (2000) Available from: http://www.medicalethicsindia.org/084or 122.html 
Parry, S.]. "The Devil's Advocate." Sport & Leisure Nov-Dec (1987): 34,35. 
Perry, C. "Blood Doping and Athletic Competition." In Phitosophic Inquiry in Sport, 
edited by W.]. Morgan and K.V. Meier. Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1988. 
Philpott, M. "Not Guilty, by reason of Genetic Determinism." 1995. Available from: 
http://www.med.upenn.edu/-bioethic/genetics/articles/4.philpott.not.guilty.html 
Pigden, C.R. "Naturalism." In A Companion to Ethics, edited by P. Singer, 421431. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. 
Platt, T. "Medicine, Metaphysics and Morals." In 20th World Congress of Phil.osophy, 1998. 
Available Online: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe!BioePlat.htm 
Post, S.G. "Selective abortion and gene therapy: reflections on human limits." Human 
Gene Therapy 2, no. 3 (1991): 229,233. 
Powell, D. "Spectre of gene doping raises its head as athletes see possibilitie:;." The Times 
2001. 
Pound, R. W. "Sport' Where Talent and Genetic Manipulation Collide." Genetic 
Enhancement of Sporting Performance, Banbury Conference Centre, Cold SI~nn'2 
Harbour, New York, World Anti,Doping Agency, 2002. 
Rachels, J. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." In AppUed Ethics edited by P C;t' /0-35 , . ~ nger, _ -; . 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Rachels, J. "Ethical Theory and Bioethics." In A Companion to Bioethics, edited by H. 
Kuhse and P. Singer, 15~23. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998. 
Radio Nationa~ Transcripts. "The Sports Factor: Technology and Design in Sport." 1999, 
February 5. Available from: 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/ talks/8.30/ sportsf/ sstories/ sf990205 .hnn 
Reid, H.L "Sport, Education, and the Meaning of Victory." Paper presented at the 20th 
Wor~d Congress of Phaosophy, Boston, USA 1998. Available from: 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Spor/SporReid.htm 
Reiss, M.J., and R. Straughan. Improving Nature?: The Science and Ethics of Genetic 
Engineering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Rendtorff, J.D. Basic Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw Paper presented at the 20th 
Wor~d Congress of Phaosophy, Boston, USA 1998. Available from: 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Bioe/BioeRend.htm. 
Resnik, D. "Debunking the slippery slope argument against Human Germ~line Gene 
Therapy." Journa~ of Medicine and Phaosophy 19, no. 1 (1994): 2340. 
Resnik, D.B. "Regulating the Market for Human Eggs." Bioethics 15, no. 1 (2001): 1-25. 
Rickaby, K. "New Gear." CUmber, 1999, p.65. 
Rintala, J. "Sport and Technology: Human Questions in a World of Machines." Journal 
of Sport and Socia~ Issues, Feb (1995): 63~75. 
Root, E., A. Domonkos, M. Granek, and M. Hustler. "Has Science Improved Sport?" 
(DNG). Available Online: 
http://www~white.media.mit.edu/- intille/st/has_science_improved_sport.html 
Rose, A. "Mandatory Drug Testing of College Athletes: Are Athletes Being Denied their 
Constitutional Rights?" Pepperdine Law Review 16 (1988): 45~ 75. 
Rosenberg, D. "The concept of cheating in sport." InternationaUournal of Physical 
Education 32, no.2 (1995): 4~14. 
Rothstein, M.A., and B.M. Knoppers. "Legal Aspects of Genetics, Work and Insurance 
in North America and Europe." European Journal of Health Law 3 (1996): 14 )-161. 
Sandberg, P. "Genetic Information and Ufe Insurance: A Proposal for Ethical Ellwr'l'~m 
Policy." Social Science Medicine 40, no. 11 (1995): 1549~1559. 
ll)l) 
Schneider, A.J., and R.B. Butcher. "A philosophical overview of the arauments on 
banni.ng ~~ping in sport." In Va~ues in Sport: EUtism, NationaUsm, G:nder Equalit)', and 
the Scrennfrc Manufacture of Winners, edited by T. T annsjo and C. T amburrini, 185-
199. London: E & FN Spon, 2000. 
Schneider, A.J., and R.B. Butcher. "Why Olympic athletes should avoid the use and 
seek the elimination of performance enhancing substances and practices from the 
Olympic Games." Journa~ of the Phaosophy of Sport XXI (1994): 64-81. 
Searle, J. "Minds, Brains, and Programs." Behavioura[ and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 
417A58. 
Shapiro, M.H. "The Technology of Perfection: Performance Enhancement and the 
Control of Attributes." Southern CaUfornia Law Review 65 (1991): 11-113. 
Shepherd, R.E. Jr. "Why can't Johnny read or play?" Seton ]ourna[ of Sport Law 1, no. 2 
(1991): 163-199. 
Simon, R.L Fair PLay: Sport, va~ues, and society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991. 
Simon, R.L "Good competition and drug-enhanced performance." ]ouma[ of the 
Phaosophy of Sport XI (1984): 6-13. 
Simon, R.L "Response to Brown and Fraleigh." ]ourna[ of the PhHosophy of Sport XI 
(1985): 30-32. 
Singer, P. Genetics and ethics: spare us the hysteria 1999, June 30, The Age. Available 
from http://www.theage.com.au/daily/990630/news/specials/news3.html. 
Singer, P. Practica~ Ethics, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Steenbergen, J., and J. Tamboer. "Ethics and the double character of sport: an attempt 
to systematize discussion of the ethics of sport." In Ethics and Sport, edited by M. 
McNamees and S. Parry, 35-53. London and New York: E & FN Spon, 1998. 
Suits, B. "The Elements of Sport." In The Phi~sophy of Sport: A co~kction of orginiat essays, 
edited by R.G. Osterhoudt. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1973. 
Tamburrini, C.M. The 'Hand of God'? Essays in the Phi~sophy of Sports. Goteborg: Acta 
Universitatis Gotoburgensis, 2000. 
Tamburrini, C.M. "Sports, Facism, and the Market." Journal of the Phi~sophy of Sport 
XXV (1998) 3547. 
200 
Tamburrini, C.M. "What's wrong with doping?" In Values in Sport: Elitism, Nationalism, 
Gender Equality, and the Scientific Manufacture of Winners, edited by T. T annsjo and C. 
Tamburrini, 200,216. London: E & FN Spon, 2000. 
Tamburrini, C.M. "After Doping What? The Morality of the Genetic Enaineerina of 
Athletes." In Sport Technology: History, Philosophy & Policy, edited by A.oMiah &. S.B. 
Eassom, 253,268. Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2002. 
Tannsjo, T. "Is our admiration for sports heroes fascistoid?" Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport 25 (1998): 23,34. 
Tejada,Flores, L. "Games Climbers Play." In The games climbers play, edited by K. Wilson. 
London: Diadem Books Limited, 1978. 
Tenner, E. Why Things Bite Back: Predicting the problems of progress. London: Fourth Estate, 
1996. 
Thompson, P.B. "Privacy and the Urinalysis Testing of Athletes." In Philosophic Inquiry in 
Sport, edited by W.J. Morgan and K.V. Meier, 313,318. Illinois: Human Kinetics, 
1982/88. 
Tiles, M., and H. Oberdiek. Living in a Technological Culture: Human tools and human 
values. London: Routledge, 1995. 
Tooley, M. "Abortion and Infanticide." In AppUed Ethics, edited by P. Singer, 57-85. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Turing, A. "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." Mind: A Quarterly Journal of 
Psychology and Philosophy LIX, no. 236, October (1950). 
Tuxill, C., and S. Wigmore. ""Merely Meat?" Respect for Persons in Sports and Games." 
In Ethics and Sport, edited by M.J. McNamee and S.J. Parry, 104,115. London and 
New York: E&FN Spon, 1998. 
United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation. "Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights." 1997. Available Online: 
http://www. unesco.org/ibc/ genome/ projet/index.html 
Verokken, M. "Hormones and Sport: Ethical Aspects and the Prevalence of Hormone 
Abuse in Sport." Journal of Endocrinology 170, (2001), 49,54. 
WADA. Press Release: W ADA Conference Sheds Light on the Potential of Gene Doping. New 
York, World Anti-Doping Agency, March 20, 2002. 
Wade, M. L. "Animal Liberationalism, Ecocentrism and the Morality of Sl'lHt 
Hunting." Journal of the Philosophy of Sport XVII I (1990): IS-27. 
201 
Wade, M.L "Sports and Speciesism." Journal of the PhHosophy of Sport XXIII (1996): 11-
29. 
Wadler, G.l. "Doping in Sport: From Strychnine to Genetic Enhancement, It's a 
Moving Target." Paper presented at The Duke Conference on Doping in Sport, R. David 
Thomas Executive Conference Center, 7-8 May, 1998. Available from: 
http://www.law.duke.edu/sportscenter/wadler.pdf 
Wallace, S. "Drugs in Sport: Cheats could inject genes to beat system." 3 December 
2001. 
Walsh, D. "New Crisis Facing Sport." The Times, November 19, 2000. 
Warnock, M. "Do Human Cells Have Rights?" Bioethics 1, no. 1 (1987): 1-14. 
Wright, L "The Common Ground Between the Philosopher and the Sociologist." 
Sociology of Sport OnUne 1 (2) (1999) Available from: 
http://physed.otago.ac.nz/sosol/v li2/v li2a2.htm 
Williams, B. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana Press, 1985. 
Wilmut, 1. "Dolly: The Age of Biological Control." In The Genetic Revo[ution and Human 
Rights, edited by J. Burley, 19-28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Wilson, S. "Olympic drug testers seek upper hand in gene therapy" Sport Server, January 
25,2001. 
Winner, L The Whale and the Reactor: A search for Umits in an age of high-techno[ogy. 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1986. 
Wittgenstein, L Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. 
Wolpe, P.R. "The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View." 
University of Pennsylvania, 1997. Available from: 
http://www.med.upenn.edu/-bioethic/library/papers/paul/Triumph.html 
202 
Notes 
1 For an in,depth overview of th h' t ' 1 f f I e 1S onca context 0 arti icia conception, see 
Challoner (1999). 
2 Numerous articles have detailed this story and it is important to realise how the 
occurrence affected the interest for anti,doping in Canada (the nation Ben Johnson was 
representing). Notably, the "Dubin Inquiry" (Dubin, 1990) that followed the Johnson 
incident, is a key document that reveals this impact. 
3 Kretchmar (1993, p.S) defines the distinction as ethics of means (deontological) and 
ethics of ends (consequential). 
4 Having said this, applied ethics is remarkable for its recognition that ethical issues are 
better informed by other disciplines. Where traditional theoretical ethics might shy 
away from acknowledging the value of sociology or biology to inform ethical discussions, 
applied ethics seeks to embrace such disciplines, arguing that there are fewer distinctions 
between disciplines than some would have it. Indeed, as some support for this in 
relation to the present thesis, Wright's (1999) provides an argument to conclude how 
philosophers and sociologists are not so different in their approach to studying the 
world. 
5 This point is particularly relevant to make within this methodology, as the thesis will 
deal extensively with the weaknesses within biomedical ethics that are revealed in the 
context of new genetics. While an attempt will be made to consider the broad, 
bioethical issues, it will be shown how traditionally accepted ethical principles within 
research cannot be applied in the context of this new technology. These conclusions 
lead to an approach that accepts moral principles must be adopted quite tentatively and, 
at most, only as a guide for beginning ethical inquiry. Upon accepting the relevance of 
ethical inquiry, it is now necessary to determine a methodological approach that befits 
the current dilemma. 
6 As such, the argument is in contrast with 'top,down' approaches to ethics in sport 
philosophy. For example, the application of rights theory to the treatment or animals, is 
argued as insufficient as it is the very justification of rights theory as a guiding ethical 
template that is in question. 
7 Although in a perfect simulation, it might seem an irrelevant difference. 
8 Perhaps the only conclusion that can be made is that there are varying len'is ()\ 
difficulty that a climb can have and that the leycl of difficulty achic\\'d dep~nds in part 
upon what technology is used. Indeed, this perspective is not so different from the 
highly sophisticated way in which climbs are categorised by the difficulty of the route 
taken by the climber. In this sense, it can be said that the value of a climb increases with 
the level of difficulty that is achieved. 
9 The social significance of 'simple' technologies is considered in (Bijker, 1995). 
1~ Inde~d, Fairch~ld (1989) argues that some sports are valued particularly for their being 
nsk taking pursults such as, gliding (Carr, 1995). 
11 Presently, anti~doping codes conclude the latter - the policy of strict liability 
necessitates that no reason or excuse is heard for why an athlete has been found with a 
banned substance in their body. The very existence of the substance is sufficient to 
exclude the athlete from competition. This approach - pragmatic as it might be - does 
seem contrary to the interest in preserving ethical conduct, since it makes no account for 
the character of an athlete (see Houlihan, 1999, for further elaboration). 
12 Such consequentialist reasoning might require pursuing for it presumes an ethical 
view of genetic engineering on the basis of costs and benefits that might not be 
appropriate. For an overview of varying perspectives on approaches to bioethical 
dilemmas see Kuhse and Singer (1998). 
13 This presumes that any engineered person will have characteristics that are more 
advantageous than a non~ngineered person. One might contest this with reference to 
Ledley's (1994) ideas about the environmental determinants of genetic advantage. 
Ledley identifies that seeming dysfunctional genes can simply be a matter of 
environmental circumstances. For example, the sickle~ell gene also carries a protection 
against malaria and the common cystic fibrosis mutation encodes a protein, which may 
function at low temperatures - an advantage in some countries. 
14 The concept of playability is not dissimilar to the concept of a 'sweet tension' 
described by Fraleigh (1984b) and later expanded upon by Loland (1998b). 
15 For an initial problematising of the internal and external goods within Maclntyre's 
thesis and in relation to sport, see McNamee (1995). 
16 This kind of application has been documented significantly in relation to the way in 
which insurance companies might exploit genetic information. It seems quite 
consensual that genetic information could provide knowledge about predispositiuns for 
genetically related conditions. By extension, such information might also indicate . 
whether one is better to avoid specific kinds of physical activity. For example, genetic 
information might reveal that one has a predisposition for a muscular or ~one disease of 
some sort that would make it quite dangerous to perform specific kinds of clltivity. 
17 It is important to note that Schneider and Butcher are dealing specit"i,'ally with ,l')l'ing 
and that OM is not considered explicitly within their argument. 
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18 For more details about the moral consideration of non~living entities see Ell' t 
(1993). 10 t 
19 The authors referenced alongside the different harms provide a picture of where these 
arguments have been considered in some detail, rather than necessarily reflecting the 
c~ntral.arg~ment of the .author. In many cases, the authors consider a variety of 
vlewpomts In the analysIs of arguments concerning doping, though it is useful as some 
form of guide to understand how interests have been focused. 
20 However, one might cite such sports as boxing, wrestling, or judo, where it is relevant 
to distinguish between genetic or biological characteristics to attain a more fair 
competition and promote different kinds of skills that are possible to display by virtue of 
having a different sized body. 
21 For references concerning the ethos of games and sport, see D'Agostino (1981), 
Morgan (1981), and Rosenberg (1995). 
22 For various references see articles in Collingridge (1980). 
23 A challenge more readily adopted by Butcher and Schneider (1998). 
24 Importantly, it is necessary to distinguish between the different kinds of rules that 
exist in sports, which perform different kinds of function, though an in-depth analysis of 
the function of rules will not be attempted here. 
25 One of the most recent controversies in respect of this issue has been the desire of a 
deaf lesbian couple, who sought to have a child who would also be deaf (Fickling, 2002). 
26 For a response to this 'slippery~slope argument, see Resnik (1994). 
27 It is interesting to note that Macer also acknowledges that, perhaps, the more 
determining factor for why such requirements were not maintained was the financial 
costs of the testing. 
28 However, it is important to remember that the use of tools is not defining of human 
identity, since there are examples of animals that can utilise natural objects and change 
their function to become a tool. For example, biological scientist Jane Goodall observed 
how a particular kind of chimpanzee would use leaves that were crushed together as ~l 
sponge to soak water out of tree stump hollows or use sticks to crack nuts. 
29 The rise of medical ethics and the later named, bioethics, is some indication of the 
significant issues raised about how society should construct humanness. 
10 This claim requires a clarification or t}vology of sports since: it \\'l~~dd seem rl'<lsunable 
to claim that quantifiable results are more and less important I,)r different kinds ,)1 
sport. For the present discussion, it is sufficient to consider that the analysis is limited 
to include those sports where the immediate applications of GM are usefuL For such 
kinds of sports, quantifiable results are of some importance. 
31 It is relevant to note that it would seem that the infraction was an oversight. It was 
not clear that marijuana was on any prohibited substance list due to the unusual 
organisation of the snowboarding events. Rather than be under the auspices of a 
snowboarding federation, the International Skiing Federation adopted the role of 
organising the competition. However, unlike the snowboarding federation, the ISF 
included marijuana on their prohibited substances list thus rendering some confusion 
about its acceptability. 
32 For an overview of such arguments, particularly in relation to Peter Singer's work, see 
Wade (1996). 
33 Support for this kind of argument can be found in literature that discusses 
responsibilities towards environment (Elliott, 1993). 
34 Where possible, references include World Wide Web links to full~text readings to 
promote the accessibility of information. Where the link is no longer valid, a starting 
point for finding the online version can be to edit the website address and begin with 
the production organisation homepage. For example, Cogan (1998) includes the 
following address: <http://www.newscientist.com/ns/980523/nsport.html> However, 
if the specific page is no longer valid, then begin searching at the following site 
<http://www.newscientist.com> From here, use the search facility within New Scientists' 
pages. References are also given to print copies, where available. 
